Hearing at the Constitutional Court – 9 June 2026

TL;DR: Hearing Summary and Key Points

• The Reporting Judge (Prof. Giovanni Pitruzzella): Outlined the referral orders (Mantua No. 4/2026, Campobasso No. 40/2026 and No. 41/2026) challenging Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992, highlighting issues of retroactivity and unequal treatment due to consular backlogs.
• The Protection of Minors (Atty. Alfonso Celotto): Argued that the reform retroactively degrades a minor’s birthright citizenship into a “weakened legitimate interest,” violating Article 22 of the Constitution. Celotto cited the recent Corte di Cassazione Order No. 13818 (May 12, 2026) to show that citizenship is an absolute, primary right.
• Timing, EU Rights, and Sezioni Unite (Atty. Marco Mellone): Criticized the Court’s practice of announcing decisions via press releases before publishing the legal grounds. Mellone presented proof of a concrete EU job offer received by a client, demonstrating that EU citizenship rights are not hypothetical, and requested the Court to suspend proceedings in light of three pending appeals before the Sezioni Unite of the Corte di Cassazione. He also questioned if the judges knew all millions of descendants personally to deny their genuine link.
• The Absolute Nature of Ius Sanguinis (Atty. Monica Lis Restanio): Defended ius sanguinis as an absolute, permanent right rather than a virtual status dependent on bureaucratic clearance. Citing Cassazione Order 13818/2026, she argued that consular backlogs constitute a denial of justice and that administrative inefficiencies cannot strip descendants of their birthright.
• The Inequity of the Safeguard Clause and Art. 77 (Atty. Corrado Caruso): Argued that limiting the safeguard to scheduled appointments shifts the burden of Prenot@mi bottlenecks onto citizens. He proposed an additive ruling to protect anyone who manifested their intent but was blocked by objective impediments, and challenged the use of an emergency Decree-Law for permanent reforms under Article 77.
• The State’s Defense (State Atty. Lorenzo D’Ascia): Defended the reform’s proportionality, highlighting compensatory measures for minors and arguing that the immediate availability of judicial remedies (exempt from consular waiting lists) guarantees effective judicial protection for diligent applicants.

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📺 Watch the Full Hearing Video with English Subtitles

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⚖️ Introduction: The True “Second Act” of the Tajani Reform

Yesterday, on June 9, I personally attended the hearing at the Palazzo della Consulta, sitting in the public gallery on the fifth floor to follow the live broadcast from the main courtroom, which was located on the second floor. The gallery environment was strictly monitored; court ushers and assistants kept a very close eye on the public, enforcing a strict ban on mobile phones, photos, or recordings, and demanding absolute silence. Yet, this formal silence was repeatedly broken. At several moments, parts of the gallery erupted into loud applause and cheers of approval, particularly when Attorney Marco Mellone delivered his sharpest, most biting arguments directly to the Constitutional Court judges. At the end of the third round of applause and roaring, the noise became so thunderous that one of the guards was forced to intervene. He sternly ordered the gallery to cease any further demonstrations of jubilation, warning that although those cheers wouldn’t be loud enough to reach the courtroom on the second floor due to the distance, he would clear the entire room if it happened again.

Following Judgment No. 63/2026 on April 30, 2026, many observers hastily concluded that the constitutional battle over the legitimacy of the citizenship reform (introduced by Decree-Law No. 36/2025 and converted into Law No. 74/2025) was over. However, that decision left completely untouched many open questions.

The public hearing, held before the fifteen judges of the Constitutional Court, presided over by Court President Giovanni Amoroso and with Professor Giovanni Pitruzzella as the reporting judge, went straight to the heart of these unresolved issues. The referral orders from the Court of Mantua (No. 4/2026) and the Court of Campobasso (No. 40/2026 and 41/2026) shifted the center of gravity of the debate from “whether” the legislature may limit ius sanguinis to “how” and “within what limits” it can do so retroactively on already consolidated legal statuses.

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🎙️ Technical Analysis of the Courtroom Debate

Referral Order No. 4/2026 (Mantua): Arthur Vincenzo De Lucca and the Rights of Minors

Attorney Alfonso Celotto, representing the parents of the minor Arthur Vincenzo De Lucca, opened the discussion by focusing on the gravity of applying retroactivity to a minor born Italian. According to the defense, the minor was born an Italian citizen under the previous legislation, and the transcription of his birth certificate is merely declaratory, not constitutive. Celotto argued: > “Indeed, we find ourselves facing a sort of automatic mass revocation of citizenship, which has left a whole series of interests, expectations, reliance, and rights unresolved…”

The reform retroactively degrades this status civitatis—a fundamental and imprescriptible right—into a mere “weakened legitimate interest,” in clear violation of Article 22 of the Constitution, which prohibits the automatic deprivation of citizenship for political reasons or administrative convenience. Celotto explicitly cited the very recent Order No. 13818 of the Court of Cassation (May 12, 2026) to support the constitutional relevance of the minor’s right: > “Following your well-known Sentence No. 63 of April 30, the Court of Cassation intervened […] with order No. 13818 of May 12, 2026, where it recalls precisely that citizenship is a subjective right of primary relevance, even more so for a minor born Italian, who suddenly, without his will and without ever having been able to exercise it precisely because he is a minor, finds himself deprived of this imprescriptible right.”

Referral Order No. 40/2026 (Campobasso): Timings, EU Citizenship, and the ECHR Reservation (Atty. Mellone)

Attorney Marco Mellone, representing Argentine applicants Agustin and Joaquin Lopez Alt, expressed the defense’s dismay at having to argue before a panel that had filed Judgment No. 63/2026 just 50 days prior. Mellone sharply criticized the Court’s practice of announcing the outcome of its rulings through “press releases” (which occurred on March 12, 2026, the day after the hearing) long before the legal grounds were published, forcing lower courts to align with “news” devoid of its analytical boundaries: > “Let me say one thing, President: it is not right for this Court to speak through press releases. Judges speak through sentences, not through press releases issued fifty days before the filing of the grounds.”

Mellone filed a motion based on a new development: a concrete job offer received by one of his clients in another European Union member state, demonstrating that EU citizenship is not a “virtual” or “hypothetical” issue as asserted in Judgment No. 63: > “Very well, just last week one of my two clients received a job offer from a European Union member state […] contingent, of course, on that person being able to enter the EU to accept the job offer. […] and this shows you that it is not a hypothetical issue, as you write in Judgment 63; it is a concrete issue, a real-life issue.”

Mellone requested the Court to suspend the proceedings and wait for the upcoming ruling of the Sezioni Unite of the Corte di Cassazione: > “Three appeals are pending before the Sezioni Unite of the Court of Cassation, already discussed on April 14 […] Let us wait for the Sezioni Unite, let us hear what they have to say. If necessary, let us suspend this proceeding or return it to the docket…”

Furthermore, Mellone questioned the judges’ assumption regarding the lack of connection with Italy in a highly cited statement:

> English: “Because if the Constitutional Court of my country defines citizens who are so from birth by law as foreigners or as individuals lacking any link with the Italian community, I ask myself if the judges of the Italian Constitutional Court know one by one all the millions of Italian citizens living abroad. Do you know them all? Do you know for certain that all those born abroad have no links with the Italian territory and community? I do not believe so, President.” >

> Italian: “Perché se la Corte Costituzionale del mio Paese definisce stranieri o persone prive di ogni vincolo con la comunità italiana cittadini che lo sono dalla nascita per legge, io mi chiedo se i giudici della Corte Costituzionale italiana conoscano uno a uno tutti i milioni di cittadini italiani che vivono all’estero. Sapete per certo che tutti coloro che sono nati all’estero non hanno vincoli con il territorio e con la comunità italiana? Io non credo, Presidente.”

The defense formally requested to enter into the record a reservation to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for violations of Articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 8 (respect for private life) of the ECHR.

Referral Order No. 41/2026 (Campobasso): Ius Sanguinis as a Permanent Bond and Consular Obstructionism (Atty. Restanio)

Attorney Monica Lis Restanio vigorously defended the original nature of ius sanguinis, rejecting the thesis (accepted in Judgment No. 63) that the citizenship of Italians living abroad is a “virtual” or “imperfect” status until it is officially recognized: > “An absolute right, part of the legal heritage of the Italian born abroad, has been reduced to an eventual or even virtual right, because it is subordinated to a subsequent administrative or judicial recognition.”

Reconstructing historical parliamentary debates from 1864, 1912 (Vittorio Scialoja), and up to 1992, she recalled that the family bond is the only genuine link historically recognized by the Italian State. Citing the Court of Cassation’s Order No. 13818/2026, she reiterated that the inability to secure consular appointments constitutes, for all intents and purposes, a denial of justice, and that the law cannot use the State’s administrative inefficiencies as a selective criterion to exclude right holders: > “In a ruling of clear systemic impact, the Supreme Court [Order 13818] reaffirmed that citizenship iure sanguinis is born with the holder and is a right of high constitutional standing, and that delays and impediments in accessing the procedures constitute substantial forms of denial deserving of protection.”

The Arbitrariness of the Transitional Clause and the Additive Petition (Atty. Caruso)

Attorney Corrado Caruso analyzed the safeguard clause, characterizing it as patently unreasonable and exclusionary. The rule solely protects those who obtained an appointment by March 27, 2025, shifting the inefficiencies of the Prenot@mi system entirely onto descendants: > “Limiting the safeguard to those who obtained an appointment means unloading onto the applicants the inefficiencies of the administrative apparatus (the waiting list system in Brazilian consulates, the Prenot@mi portal in Argentina).”

Caruso pointed out that Judgment No. 63 defined this specific disparity of treatment as “undecided” because it had not been raised by the Court of Turin, but today it is explicitly challenged by the Court of Campobasso. He therefore proposed an additive ruling declaring Article 3-bis unconstitutional insofar as it fails to safeguard all formal expressions of intent that were blocked by objective impediments of the public administration: > “We believe it is within the powers of this Court to declare the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 3-bis, letters a), a-bis), and b) of Law 91 of 1992, in the part where it does not allow the recognition of the status civitatis following an administrative application or a lawsuit, or other manifestation of will directed at obtaining recognition, which did not materialize due to objective impediments not attributable to the applicant. This would be an additive judgment…”

Caruso also challenged the violation of Article 77 of the Constitution: there was no prerequisite of extraordinary necessity and urgency, as the consular backlog was a chronic, pathological situation known for years, and a Decree-Law was improperly used to implement a permanent, structural reform of citizenship: > “The Government did not intervene to face an extraordinary and unpredictable event […] The Decree-Law was used for a general and organic reform of citizenship […] an exceptional tool precluded for such purposes since sentence No. 220 of 2023.”

The State’s Defense: Proportionality and the Judicial Remedy (State Atty. Lorenzo D’Ascia)

State Attorney Lorenzo D’Ascia defended the legitimacy of the reform, arguing that Article 3-bis does not affect family unity and provides adequate compensatory measures for minors: > “For minors, compensatory measures are provided that facilitate access to citizenship without compromising family unity, while interrupting the automatic and unlimited transmission of status in the absence of a genuine link, in line with sentence 63.”

D’Ascia downplayed the impact of the Cassation’s Order No. 13818/2026, considering it applicable to a regulatory framework that has now been superseded: > “Regarding the recent Cassation order of May 12, 2026, it rules on a previous and different regulatory framework. It is difficult to believe that an interpretation of a law no longer in force can serve as a parameter for evaluating the constitutionality of the new rule…”

He also argued that the transitional clause is fully proportionate, as the avenue of judicial appeal has always been immediately available and exempt from consular waiting lists; therefore, anyone wishing to diligently protect their position could have initiated legal action before the deadline: > “Moreover, that Cassation order recalls that the judicial remedy is immediate and activatable by anyone, which reinforces the assessment of proportionality of the transitional rule: judicial action (saved by letter b) was not subject to consular waiting lists and could be initiated immediately.”

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📖 Official Hearing Transcript (English Translation)

[Role No. 1: Referral Orders No. 4, 40, and 41 of 2026]

[President of the Court] Referral Orders No. 4, 40, and 41 of 2026. Three referral orders, various dates and various judicial authorities. For S.M.C. and D.L. C., in their capacity as parental guardians of the minor D.L. A. V., represented by Attorney Alfonso Celotto. For L.A. A. and other, represented by Attorney Marco Mellone. For C.D.S.C. F., represented by Attorneys Monica Lis Restanio, Giovanni Bonato, Giovanni Caridi, Riccardo De Simone, Licia Celi, and Corrado Caruso. State Attorneys: Ilia Massarelli and Lorenzo D’Ascia. For the Confederazione degli Italiani nel Mondo (Confederation of Italians in the World), intervening party ad adiuvandum, represented by Attorneys Nunzio Pinelli and Giuseppe Pinelli. For S.D.S., L.G. and other, intervening party ad adiuvandum, represented by Attorneys Monica Lis Restanio, Fabio Cadeddu, Alessandro Vernice, and Maristella Urbini. For V.F., intervening party ad adiuvandum constituted out of term, represented by Attorney Matteo Magnano.

Good morning, attorneys, please proceed. For the report, the reporting judge Professor Giovanni Pitruzzella, please.

[Reporting Judge Giovanni Pitruzzella] Thank you, President. The Court of Mantua, civil division, has raised questions regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis, strictly limited to the words “even prior to the date of entry into force of this article” and to the conditions provided in letters a), a-bis), and b) of Law No. 91 of 1992, introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025.

The Article 3-bis in question provides that: anyone born abroad, even prior to the date of entry into force of this article, who possesses another citizenship is considered never to have acquired Italian citizenship, unless the following conditions are met: a) the citizen status of the interested party is recognized following an application submitted to the competent consular office or mayor before March 28, 2025; a-bis) the citizen status of the interested party is recognized following an application submitted to the competent consular office or mayor on the specific appointment day communicated to the interested party by the competent office before March 28, 2025; b) the citizen status of the interested party is judicially established following a lawsuit filed before March 28, 2025; c) a first- or second-degree ancestor possesses or possessed, at the time of death, exclusively Italian citizenship; d) a parent or adopter has resided in Italy for at least two consecutive years after acquiring Italian citizenship and before the date of birth or adoption of the child.

According to the referral judge, Article 3-bis would violate, in the first place, Article 22 of the Constitution, under which no one may be deprived of legal capacity, citizenship, or name for political reasons. The referring judge argues that this provision should be interpreted broadly. It would prevent each citizen’s right to maintain their status civitatis from being sacrificed for reasons connected to the public interest of the community. Article 3-bis is argued to be illegitimate because it deprives the recipients of their citizenship for asserted public interests deemed preeminent, namely the regulation of migration flows and the workload of Italian citizenship applications.

Article 3-bis would also violate Article 3 of the Constitution under a dual profile: first, the decision to act retroactively on the recognition of the status civitatis resulted in the illegitimate weakening of those who, born before the entry into force of the regulation in question, had already acquired Italian citizenship at birth. Second, the challenged rule contrasts with the principle of equality. The difference in treatment between those who filed a judicial lawsuit or an administrative application with the consulates or competent mayors before March 28, 2025, and those who filed after, is argued to be completely arbitrary, as the actual opportunity to present appropriate documentation proving the transmission of Italian citizenship iure sanguinis is not certain in terms of timing, depending heavily on bureaucratic and procedural factors.

The referring judge then complains of the violation of Article 2 of the Constitution, as the challenged rule would arbitrarily and unreasonably affect an inviolable human right. Furthermore, it would violate Article 24 of the Constitution by unreasonably restricting access to judicial protection of the subjective right to citizenship. Article 3-bis should have identified a reasonable grace period, subsequent to its entry into force, to allow interested parties to take action before the competent administrative or judicial authorities to obtain recognition of their citizenship acquired iure sanguinis.

Article 3-bis is also argued to violate Articles 1, second paragraph, 56, and 58 of the Constitution. Italian citizenship, retroactively excluded by the challenged provision, represents the indispensable prerequisite for active and passive political rights.

Finally, the judge a quo finds constitutional illegitimacy profiles in the use of an emergency Decree-Law. First and foremost, Article 72, fourth paragraph, of the Constitution is violated: the legislative reserve to the Chambers, established by the rules, necessarily implies a formal reserve of law, thus preventing acts having the force of law in the indicated matters. Having said this, the referring judge observes that citizenship falls within constitutional and electoral matters, and is therefore covered by a formal reserve of law to the Chambers. Indeed, the choice of individuals who compose the people of a State affects a constitutive element of the State and the shape of political representation. Furthermore, Article 77 of the Constitution is violated, as it is difficult to recognize the prerequisites of extraordinary necessity and urgency in this case.

Lastly, the judge a quo complains of the contrast with Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to the respect for the principle of non-discrimination established in Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The minor, party to the primary judgment, represented by his parents, has entered an appearance. The minor’s defense first recalls the regulatory and jurisprudential framework regarding citizenship and observes that the challenged rule would result in an impermissible automatic, implicit, and collective revocation of Italian citizenship. The defense then presents arguments in support of the issues related to Articles 2, 3, 22, 24, 72, 77, and 117 of the Constitution.

The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the present judgment. The State Attorney’s Office objects to the admissibility of the questions due to a lack of relevance under two profiles. The defense of the State then argues the groundlessness of the raised questions.

The associations Patrimonio Italiano, Nati Italiani, and the Confederazione degli Italiani nel Mondo intervened in the judgment. The interventions of the first two were declared inadmissible by order number 69 of 2026. The Euro-American Research Center on Constitutional Policies of the University of Salento, the Argentinos nelle Marche association, the Union of Italian Descendants in the World, Intercomitê Brasil, and the Associazione Trentini nel Mondo filed opinions as amici curiae. These opinions were admitted by decree of the President of the Court on March 31, 2026.

The Court of Campobasso, specialized division on immigration, international protection, and free movement of EU citizens, with two referral orders registered under numbers 40 and 41 of the 2026 orders register, having identical content, has raised constitutional legitimacy questions on Article 3-bis of Law 91/92, in the same part challenged by the Court of Mantua.

For the Court of Campobasso, Article 3-bis, where applied to individuals born before Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, would entail a substantial revocation of an already acquired right. The referring judge argues first the violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution due to the injury of acquired rights, in terms similar to those already described. Furthermore, Article 3-bis would violate the principle of equality for the reasons previously illustrated. Compared to the Mantua referral, the Campobasso Court adds that the concrete possibility of submitting the recognition application depends not only on bureaucratic factors but also on economic ones, with reference to the financial resources required to access the courts.

Furthermore, Article 3-bis, by causing a mass revocation of citizenship, is argued to be disproportionate, since the purposes of managing the administrative and judicial workload could have been pursued with temporary measures. According to the referring judge, the challenged rule also contrasts with Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union, and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 3-bis would lead to the automatic and generalized loss of European citizenship, thus falling within the scope of European law, where Member States must respect the principle of proportionality. The referring judge cites the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Furthermore, the challenged provision is argued to violate Article 22 of the Constitution for reasons similar to those already described. According to the referring judge, Article 3-bis also contrasts with Articles 72, fourth paragraph, and 77 of the Constitution.

The plaintiffs in the primary lawsuit entered an appearance in the proceedings registered under number 40 of 2026. First, the parties reserve the right to apply to the ECtHR for violation of Article 6 of the ECHR and in relation to the declaration of inadmissibility of their intervention in the judgment decided by Sentence No. 63 of 2026 of this Court. The parties then argue on the violations of Articles 22, 72, fourth paragraph, and 77 of the Constitution.

The plaintiff in the primary lawsuit entered an appearance in the proceedings registered under number 41 of 2026, arguing the merits of the question raised concerning the injury of acquired rights and that relating to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Alternatively, the party requests that this Court make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice on the meaning of the cited European parameters. Furthermore, according to the party, Article 3-bis violates Article 22 of the Constitution, which would exclude automatisms in the loss of citizenship, even if linked to the public interests of the community. Finally, the party argues the merits of the questions relating to Articles 72, fourth paragraph, and 77 of the Constitution. The use of a Decree-Law to introduce an unfavorable retroactive regime with a surprise effect would harm legal certainty.

The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings initiated by the Court of Campobasso, arguing the groundlessness of the raised questions. In the proceedings registered under number 41 of 2026, L.G., S.D.S., and another entered an appearance. In both proceedings initiated by the Court of Campobasso, the Confederazione degli Italiani nel Mondo intervened. These interventions were declared inadmissible by order adopted on June 8, 2026. In the proceedings registered under number 41 of 2026, the opinion of the Associazione Argentinos nelle Marche APS was filed. It was admitted by decree of the President of the Court on April 29, 2026.

The attorney for the plaintiffs filed a supplementary brief in the proceedings initiated by the Court of Mantua. The party replies to the objection of inadmissibility proposed by the State Attorney’s Office and presents further arguments taking into account Sentence No. 63 of 2026 of this Court. Supplementary briefs of the plaintiffs were also filed in the proceedings initiated by the Court of Campobasso. The parties reply to the arguments contained in Sentence No. 63 of 2026 of this Court, also recalling the order of the Court of Cassation, First Civil Division, May 12, 2026, number 13818. Furthermore, the parties raise new questions of constitutional legitimacy not included in the referral order registered under number 40 of 2026. Alternatively to the constitutional legitimacy challenges, the parties request the return of the acts to the primary judge so that the questions may be reconsidered in light of the cited Cassation order, and in any case, to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice.

In particular, in the proceedings registered under number 41 of 2026, the party observes that the question left undecided by Sentence No. 63 of 2026, relating to the differentiation between those who received an appointment and those who initiated the recognition procedure but did not receive an appointment before March 28, 2025, is not foreign to the referral order of the Court of Campobasso. Therefore, it requests alternatively to declare the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 3-bis where it does not allow the recognition of citizen status following a manifestation of will directed at obtaining it, which did not materialize due to objective impediments not attributable to the interested party. As a further alternative, it requests to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice in relation to the compatibility of the challenged discipline with Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

This, President, is the state of the acts.

[President of the Court] For the private party in the judgment of referral order number 4, Attorney Celotto.

[Atty. Alfonso Celotto] Thank you, President. I do not need to repeat what a structured and complex issue we are here to discuss. Indeed, this is demonstrated by how many referral orders we have before us, with so many opinions, so many interventions, and so many lawyers. I will only be the first, and for this reason, I will be very brief.

Furthermore, we find ourselves facing a sort of automatic mass revocation of citizenship, which has left a whole series of interests, expectations, reliance, and rights unresolved, which will lead to a whole series of lawsuits and questions. Some issues, on which we have written extensively, concern intertemporal law, while other questions are of a purely formal nature, especially regarding procedural violations of Articles 72 and 77.

Here, I wanted to focus strictly on the Mantua case, which is a case concerning a minor. This is not a question of the many adults who requested an appointment, have already received it, or did not have it. Even that was an inefficient system, with years of waiting lists at consulates and embassies. But here we are talking about an individual who was a minor at the time, born Italian. And this measure, as configured, degrades an absolute, imprescriptible right like citizenship into a sort of weakened legitimate interest in citizenship.

Following your well-known Sentence No. 63 of April 30, the Court of Cassation intervened, as widely cited in the acts, with order No. 13818 of May 12, 2026, where it recalls precisely that citizenship is a subjective right of primary relevance, even more so for a minor born Italian, who suddenly, without his will and without ever having been able to exercise it precisely because he is a minor, finds himself deprived of this imprescriptible right.

Therefore, what do we request? We ask for a reassessment of these aspects. We know that Sentence No. 63 outlines a general framework of these questions, but here one of the most rarely evoked parameters is violated, specifically Article 22 of the Constitution, due to the automatic loss of this citizenship with which this child was born. For this reason, regarding Mantua, we insist on the acceptance of the question. Thank you.

[President of the Court] Thank you, attorney. For the private party, in referral order number 40, Attorney Mellone. Please proceed, attorney.

[Atty. Marco Mellone] Hello, good morning. Good morning, President, good morning to all the illustrious members of this most excellent Court.

President, I would start by saying that I am perhaps one of the first lawyers in the world called upon to change the minds of fifteen judges who, no more than forty days ago, already adopted a decision on the very same tema decidendum of today. I refer to Sentence No. 63 of 2026, rendered at the outcome of a proceeding in which this Court preferred not to join all the proceedings of the various preliminary referrals, although all private parties had requested it, and although this defense had made a specific request to intervene. Today we find ourselves no longer facing a tema decidendum, but a tema decisum. The sentence already exists and essentially covers almost all the points raised by today’s referral orders.

Furthermore, this was done because there was evidently a great urgency to intervene immediately with a ruling. So much so that the day after that hearing, President, on March 12, a press release was immediately issued by this Court announcing the decision of groundlessness of the constitutionality questions. Let me say one thing, President: it is not right for this Court to speak through press releases. Judges speak through sentences, not through press releases issued fifty days before the filing of the grounds. Based on that press release, all national judges based their decisions on that news, without us lawyers being able to know what the argumentative scope was, or what your reasons were. For all these violations of the right of defense, an appeal has already been filed with the European Court of Human Rights for violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Now I find myself in this surreal position of having to argue even in the face of an already decided issue. You will find all the further grounds of the unconstitutionality of this rule in the defensive briefs. I do not need to repeat, as I also stated at the hearing on June 24 last year, that the challenged rule is constitutionally unsustainable. Anyone who wants to see it, sees it. The legislator, in addition to everything else, has also established as new retroactive conditions for being Italian citizens the fact of being born in Italy, or having an exclusively Italian parent or grandfather. Now, tell me who decides their own place of birth. Tell me who decides the nationality of their father or grandfather. These are all conditions that are impossible to satisfy now for then. This is ictu oculi obvious, direct, and immediate, as Descartes would say. For this reason, I refer substantially to the acts of this judgment.

I will not comment further on Sentence 63/2026, also because it pains me to say that in that ruling I found elements that are hardly legal, President. Because if the Constitutional Court of my country defines citizens who are so from birth by law as foreigners or as individuals lacking any link with the Italian community, I ask myself if the judges of the Italian Constitutional Court know one by one all the millions of Italian citizens living abroad. Do you know them all? Do you know for certain that all those born abroad have no links with the Italian territory and community? I do not believe so, President.

This is aside from the other arguments written in that sentence to justify the retroactivity and predictability of that regulatory change. You wrote that if there is a legislative reform proposal pending before Parliament, a citizen must foresee that it might be approved, and therefore the legislator can retroactively impute to the citizen the failure to adapt to that proposal. But do you realize, President, that in this way, tomorrow morning we must all check the Parliament website for all legislative proposals to be sure that there is nothing that could harm us? You wrote in Sentence 63 that if the court fee changes in a matter, then the citizen must foresee that the substantive rule will change as well. So what happens? If tomorrow the court fee changes in procurement matters, must an entrepreneur imagine that the entire procurement code might change retroactively? There are things written in that sentence, President, that really cannot find a logical or legal justification.

And in this regard, perhaps the most important central point of that sentence is precisely the fact that you recharacterized the case of the Italian citizen born abroad. You say: the citizen born abroad to Italian parents is not actually a citizen at birth, but becomes one only when an administrative official recognizes the status. Thus, as if that administrative recognition had a constitutive or perfecting value. Now, President, children of Italian citizens, whether born abroad or in Italy, are always subject to an administrative check. This is obvious. It is not as if a child born in Italy has “Italian citizen” written on their forehead. They are registered at the civil registry within ten days, and from that moment, retroactively, are considered Italian citizens. Therefore, we are all Italian citizens by descent because we were born Italian if our parent was Italian, whether born in Italy or abroad. If born abroad, the parent goes to the consulate so that the act can be sent to the Italian municipality for registration. This is it, nothing changes.

But above all, the law and the jurisprudence of 160 years – the so-called “living law” (diritto vivente), as this Court calls it – have always affirmed this principle. This is not a thesis of Attorney Mellone. These are things that have always been well known in this field. And the Court of Cassation reaffirmed it not more than twenty days ago.

So, President, I see only one possible solution here. Let us attempt to provoke a supplement of reflection. Three appeals are pending before the Sezioni Unite of the Court of Cassation, already discussed on April 14, in which the First Division asked the Sezioni Unite to pronounce a principle of law on the scope of application of the challenged rule. The ruling is expected shortly. Let us wait for the Sezioni Unite, let us hear what they have to say. If necessary, let us suspend this proceeding or return it to the docket, but let us await what the nomofilattico body in this country tells us on this issue. This is the first procedural petition I filed last Friday.

Furthermore, there is a new fact compared to the March hearing. In Sentence No. 63, regarding the irrelevance of EU law, you stated that these people cannot invoke EU protection because they have never exercised any right linked to the European Union. Well, just last week, one of my clients received a concrete job offer from a Member State of the European Union, with an immediate start and a high salary, subject to the possibility of entering EU territory. You will find this in the acts of the second procedural petition filed on Friday, and it demonstrates how this is not a virtual issue, but one of real life. These people did not turn to the judges because they had nothing to do, but because the administration denies them their status, in this case only because they are descendants of an Italian woman. In 2026, we are still talking about differences in transmission between men and women.

I conclude by hoping for this supplement of reflection. I kindly request, President, that it be recorded in the minutes of today’s hearing that this defense reserves the right to challenge any forthcoming decision before the Strasbourg Court for violation of the fundamental right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. Thank you.

[President of the Court] For the judgment in referral order number 41, Attorney Restanio. Please proceed, attorney.

[Atty. Monica Lis Restanio] Thank you, President. I speak with the utmost respect for this most excellent Court, but with the clarity and firmness imposed upon me by my role as defense counsel and as an Italian citizen born abroad. Today, this panel also represents the Italy of the diaspora, deprived on March 28, 2025, of a legal position of which it was the legitimate holder.

With profound, profound dismay we learned that Sentence No. 63, in confirming the recent reform, modified the very nature of the principle of ius sanguinis. An absolute right, part of the legal heritage of the Italian born abroad, has been reduced to an eventual or even virtual right, because it is subordinated to a subsequent administrative or judicial recognition. In making the right depend on such establishment, the bureaucratic and economic obstacles imposed by the executive branch are ignored. An ostruzionismo that for years has conditioned access to the procedures, ending up denying the right itself, despite the fact that this Court recognized its absolute, permanent, imprescriptible, and unavailable nature just eight months ago.

In this unprecedented definition, ius sanguinis retains its name but loses its substance. Citizenship is no longer transmitted by filiation, but depends on a subsequent bureaucratic intervention. The right to citizenship, which has always been the prerequisite for recognition, becomes a subordinate element, without the guarantees of Article 22 of the Constitution having been able to operate to safeguard its legal identity.

Sentence 63 also excludes the family bond from the concept of a genuine link, although the Court of Cassation and European law consider it a legitimate criterion of belonging to the State. It follows that there is no real balance: the criterion assumed as the basis for the limitation of the right is not imposed by the Constitution, but derives from a discretionary political choice that ends up self-legitimizing. It cannot be expected that those who are citizens by filiation should have believed they had to develop a different relationship with the State to preserve a citizenship founded on the sole criterion of connection that Italy has always historically recognized.

The failure to join the referral orders means that the defense finds itself today discussing a right already deprived of its correct legal framework. Sentence No. 63 assumes as justification for the reform letters a), a-bis), and b), saving those who managed to obtain an appointment by March 27, 2025. However, as documented, the possibility of benefiting from them has always depended on political-administrative decisions that for decades have restricted access. To this, politics has added economic barriers that make access to judicial protection dependent on a family’s financial capacity.

In this desolating scenario, we are comforted by order No. 13818 of the Court of Cassation of May 12, 2026. In a ruling of clear systemic impact, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that citizenship iure sanguinis is born with the holder and is a right of high constitutional standing, and that delays and impediments in accessing the procedures constitute substantial forms of denial deserving of protection.

The European dimension of citizenship is a major concern. The family bond represents in Europe a historically recognized form of the genuine link. It would be up to the Court of Justice to rule on European compatibility; the preliminary reference would constitute the natural instrument of cooperation between the courts, preferable to affecting a right from which European citizenship also derives.

We must be loyal to history: in the parliamentary debates of 1864, it was stated that “in any doubtful case, the presumption most favorable to citizenship is admitted.” In 1912, Minister Vittorio Saloja reminded Parliament of those Italian families abroad who “preserve Italian citizenship through a long series of generations in homage to the principle of ius sanguinis.” In 1992, the reporter Mazzola stated that the law on citizenship is fundamental to make Italians abroad part of the homeland.

Law 74 achieves the maximum possible compression of a right protected by Article 22 based on the scarecrow of an invasion of millions of potential Italians, a scenario demonstrated to be unrealistic. Most excellent Court, today history, the Italian legal tradition, and the generations of emigrants who have always trusted that the link transmitted to their children would be guarded and never denied by the homeland, speak to you. Thank you.

[President of the Court] From the same party, Attorney Caruso. Please.

[Atty. Corrado Caruso] Thank you, President, thank you to the most excellent Court.

This defense is aware that today’s questions must confront Sentence No. 63 of 2026. While colleague Restanio pushed the Court to reconsider its conclusions with an “iron” argument, my task is, with a “velvet” argument, to carry to their extreme logical consequences some statements contained in that very sentence.

This precedent affirmed that the discipline of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025 integrates a form of retroactivity proper, consisting in giving a new legal characterization to situations arisen before its entry into force. What was previously considered a status of citizenship pleno iure is now recharacterized as an imperfect status that necessarily requires an administrative or judicial check. This new characterization is not irrelevant to the unconstitutionality profiles linked to Article 3 of the Constitution (legitimate reliance) and Article 77 (emergency decree).

Sentence 63 noted that the Decree-Law addressed legitimate reliance by saving the previous discipline for those who had already received a consular appointment. However, the Court stated that the question of the differentiation between those who received an appointment and those who initiated the procedure but did not receive an appointment by March 27, 2025, remained undecided. This profile is today explicitly addressed by the Court of Campobasso, which notes the illegitimacy of the saving clause in the part where it limits application only to applications for which an appointment had already been scheduled. The actual possibility of submitting applications depends indeed on bureaucratic and economic factors entirely foreign to the applicant’s will.

Limiting the safeguard to those who obtained an appointment means unloading onto the applicants the inefficiencies of the administrative apparatus (the waiting list system in Brazilian consulates, the Prenot@mi portal in Argentina). In this way, the protection of a subjective position is made to depend on circumstances outside the applicant’s sphere of control.

We believe it is within the powers of this Court to declare the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 3-bis, letters a), a-bis), and b) of Law 91 of 1992, in the part where it does not allow the recognition of the status civitatis following an administrative application or a lawsuit, or other manifestation of will directed at obtaining recognition, which did not materialize due to objective impediments not attributable to the applicant. This would be an additive judgment, consistent with the petition and with a less disruptive effect than a total ablation.

There is an element of tragedy in the pleas of these people. Allow me a parallel with Euripides’ Alcestis: just as Hercules snatches Alcestis from Hades, rescuing her from a fate independent of her will, so the constitutional judge is called upon to prevent applicants from remaining prisoners of administrative inefficiencies, turning a condition outside their control into an irreversible loss.

This discourse connects to Article 77 of the Constitution. If the subjective position of the Italian-descendant was subject to a check and constituted an unconsolidated situation, it should have developed according to ordinary procedures. The prerequisite of extraordinary necessity and urgency was therefore lacking. The Government did not intervene to face an extraordinary and unpredictable event, but to affect a plurality of legal situations in formation, anticipating the outcome of pending proceedings. The Decree-Law was used for a general and organic reform of citizenship (as shown by the introduction of stable changes in the granting of citizenship), an exceptional tool precluded for such purposes since sentence No. 220 of 2023. Thank you.

[President of the Court] For the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, State Attorney D’Ascia. Please proceed.

[Atty. Stato Lorenzo D’Ascia] Thank you, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen of the Court.

I will limit myself to recalling our written briefs and replying to the additional issues raised today.

First, regarding the issue of minors in referral order No. 4/2026, we believe the discipline guarantees a multi-level protection regime. For minors, compensatory measures are provided that facilitate access to citizenship without compromising family unity, while interrupting the automatic and unlimited transmission of status in the absence of a genuine link, in line with sentence 63. These measures are provided for by Law No. 91 of 1992 and the amendments of Decree-Law No. 36.

Regarding the recent Cassation order of May 12, 2026, it rules on a previous and different regulatory framework. It is difficult to believe that an interpretation of a law no longer in force can serve as a parameter for evaluating the constitutionality of the new rule, which is reserved to this Court. Moreover, that Cassation order recalls that the judicial remedy is immediate and activatable by anyone, which reinforces the assessment of proportionality of the transitional rule: judicial action (saved by letter b) was not subject to consular waiting lists and could be initiated immediately.

On the distinction between those who obtained an appointment and those who only sent a request without feedback, the referral order of Campobasso does not examine whether in the specific case a formal administrative application had been filed. The legislator’s choice to save cases where there had already been an appointment or a lawsuit adequately protects the reliance of those who formally took action. Judicial action was an accessible tool without impediments and without limits. For these reasons, we insist on the inadmissibility or groundlessness of the questions raised.

Facing an adverse ruling at the Tribunal level following these constitutional developments? Evaluate your legal options and deadlines for an Italian citizenship Court Denial Appeal before the Corte d’Appello.