The Turin Court’s EU Law Challenge to Law no. 74 of 2025

By Avvocato Michele Vitale

In recent weeks, a climate of profound uncertainty has enveloped the global community of Italian descendants. The enactment of Decree-Law no. 36 of March 28, 2025, converted with modifications into Law no. 74 of 2025 and widely known as the “Decreto Tajani,” introduced a sharp break with the past. This legislation threatens to retroactively redefine the very contours of jure sanguinis citizenship and nullify the legitimate expectations of countless families. It’s a situation that has prompted a necessary and rigorous constitutional scrutiny of Law no. 74 of 2025.

In this complex scenario, the ordinance from the Court of Turin dated June 25, 2025 (R.G. 6648/2025) emerges as a legal landmark. It is the first authoritative judicial ruling that not only contests the legitimacy of the decree but does so through a sophisticated, multi-layered argument. Its significance lies not solely in defending national constitutional principles, but in its most innovative and strategic element: framing the issue within the context of European Union law.

Special thanks to Reddit user CakeByThe0cean for posting the PDF file of the anonymized (“redacted”) ruling, which we make available for download as an attachment in this article.

By raising the question of constitutional legitimacy, the Turin ordinance has shifted the focus of the debate, transforming a national legislative dispute into a matter of basic European rights. This article aims to analyze in-depth the legal structure of this ordinance, explaining why the European perspective represents the most solid bulwark against the decree’s retroactive application and detailing its strategic impact for Italian descendants.

1. The “Living Law” of Jus Sanguinis: A Right Acquired at Birth

To fully appreciate the value of the Turin ordinance, it is essential to start from a core principle of our legal system, consolidated by decades of jurisprudence from the Court of Cassation: the so-called “living law” (diritto vivente) regarding citizenship by descent.

Prior to the 2025 legislative intervention, the Unified Sections of the Supreme Court had clearly established the following points:

• Citizenship as a Personal Status: Jure sanguinis citizenship is not a mere administrative concession, but an “essential quality of the person” possessing characteristics of “absoluteness, originality, inalienability, and imprescriptibility” (Cass. S.U. n. 4466/2009).
• Acquisition by Original Title: An individual born to at least one Italian parent acquires citizenship ipso iure at the moment of birth. Consequently, the subsequent administrative (consular) or judicial procedure does not “create” the status of a citizen but merely “declares” it, formally certifying its existence.
• Irrelevance of Formal Recognition for Title: As the Turin ordinance acutely highlights, citing the Court of Cassation, “those born abroad to an Italian ancestor were Italian citizens ab origine. The fact that they had, or had not, taken legal action for the ‘formal’ recognition of their status was a simple matter of fact, irrelevant for the purposes of the recognition of the right.”

This was the settled legal framework upon which descendants have reasonably based their life plans. The Tajani Decree attempted to subvert this certainty by introducing a legal fiction: “it is considered never to have acquired Italian citizenship if one was born abroad…” This formula does not just regulate the future; it purports to erase the past, transforming an existing legal status into a mere expectation, conditioned on terms (like the March 27, 2025 deadline) that were impossible to meet because they had already expired.

2. The Turin Ordinance: A Structured and Penetrating Legal Analysis

The case brought before the Court of Turin, with an application filed on March 28, 2025, provided the judge with the opportunity for a critical analysis of the new decree. The ordinance correctly qualifies the legislative intervention not as a simple procedural rule, but as an “implicit revocation” of citizenship with “retroactive effect.” This qualification is decisive because it shifts the focus from the mere application of law over time to the potential infringement of a perfect subjective right already consolidated in the legal heritage of the applicants. It is on this basis that the judge builds the censure of unconstitutionality.

3. The Strategic Turning Point: European Citizenship as an Inviolable Parameter

The most valuable and original element of the ordinance lies in having projected the issue of Italian citizenship into its European dimension. The judge’s reasoning is both linear and compelling:

1. Citizenship of an EU Member State automatically confers the status of Citizen of the Union (Art. 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFUE).
2. Therefore, Italian citizenship is not only a bond with the Italian Republic but also the gateway to a set of basic rights guaranteed at the European level (freedom of movement, right to vote, etc.).
3. Consequently, any national act affecting the citizenship of a Member State must be compatible with EU law. National competence in matters of citizenship is not absolute but must be exercised in compliance with the core principles of the EU.

This strategic approach is crucial because it subjects Italian legislation to external scrutiny by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

The Principle of Proportionality in CJEU Jurisprudence

The Court of Turin explicitly bases its analysis on the recent and established case law of the CJEU, particularly the judgment of September 5, 2023, in Case C-689/21 (X v. Denmark). In that ruling, the Court established that the loss of Member State citizenship, which entails the loss of EU citizenship status, must always respect the principle of proportionality.

A national measure is proportionate only if it is suitable for achieving a legitimate objective and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it. The CJEU clarified that an automatic loss of citizenship, like that envisaged by the Tajani Decree, is disproportionate and thus incompatible with EU law if the following procedural safeguards are not guaranteed:

• Possibility of an Individual Examination: Authorities must be able to assess the consequences of the loss of citizenship for the individual concerned in light of EU law.
• Adequate Notice (Due Notice): The individual must be informed in a timely manner of the potential loss of their status.
• A Reasonable Time to Act: The individual must be granted a reasonable period to submit an application to retain or recover their citizenship.

The Tajani Decree is in clear violation of all three of these requirements. It imposes a mass, automatic loss without any individual assessment; it provides no advance warning, creating a “surprise effect”; and it sets a retroactive deadline, making any action impossible. The Turin judge’s conclusion is therefore legally sound: the decree, as drafted, conflicts with the core principles of European Union law.

4. The Defense of National Constitutional Principles

In addition to the decisive European argument, the ordinance strengthens its position by invoking solid principles of the Italian Constitution.

• Violation of the Principle of Reasonableness and Legitimate Expectation (Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution): The law is defined as “absolutely arbitrary” because it creates an unreasonable disparity in treatment based solely on an unforeseeable temporal distinction. This undermines the legitimate expectation of citizens in the stability of the legal order.
• Violation of International Obligations (Art. 117 of the Constitution): The ordinance also refers to Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (against “arbitrary” deprivation of nationality) and Article 3 of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR (right to enter the territory of the State of which one is a citizen).

5. From Theory to Practice: The Arguments in the Constitutional Court Debate

The Turin ordinance paved the way, but the legal battle has already evolved. During the historic public hearing on June 24, 2025, at the Italian Constitutional Court, the defense for the descendants made a further strategic move. As I analyzed in my previous article on the June 24th hearing, the lawyers masterfully argued that Law no. 74 of 2025 has effectively “completed” the question. They argued that the issue is no longer whether the old law was too generous, but whether the new law is constitutionally legitimate in its retroactive application. This approach shifts the focus from defending the old law to directly attacking the new one.

6. Strategic Implications: What the Turin Ordinance Does NOT Solve

While the ordinance represents a important step forward, it is crucial for descendants and their legal counsel to maintain a prudent, strategic approach. One must understand not only what it says but also what it *does not* say.

As rightly noted by user CakeByThe0cean, a moderator of the authoritative subreddit /r/juresanguinis, the Turin ordinance specifically focuses on the issue of retroactivity and deadlines (i.e., the conditions in letters a, a-bis, and b of Art. 3-bis). The analysis deliberately leaves untouched other substantial and equally thorny issues introduced by the decree, including:

• The “Exclusivity” Requirement for Citizenship: The ordinance does not address the new exceptions (letters c, d, and e) which, in some cases, seem to require the ancestor to have held *exclusively* Italian citizenship.
• The “Minor Case” Risk: The decree’s impact on the delicate issue of minor children of naturalized parents is not addressed.
• “Pre-1912” Cases: The complex issues related to lines of descent that predate the 1912 law remain open.

This clarification is vital: winning the battle over retroactivity is the first and most important step, but it is not the only one. The path to recognition may still present obstacles that require careful and personalized legal analysis.

Conclusion: A New Paradigm for the Defense of Jus Sanguinis

The Turin Court’s ordinance has marked a point of no return. It has elevated the debate, demonstrating that the defense of the rights of Italian descendants is based not only on historical and national principles but also on the pillars of European law. It has provided judges, lawyers, and applicants with a highly effective legal tool: the principle of proportionality and the protection of the status of Citizen of the Union.

As the Constitutional Court prepares to deliberate, the picture is clear. The battle is no longer solely Italian; it is European. The final decision will not only define the boundaries of Italian citizenship but will also measure the coherence of our legal system with the values of legal certainty, protection of trust, and basic rights that form the heart of the European project.

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If your citizenship application is impacted by the Decree-Law n. 36/2025, it is essential to act with an informed and aware legal strategy. This is a crucial moment that requires expert analysis not only of domestic law but also of its deep interconnections with European law. Contact us for a strategic consultation to assess your position and define the most effective path forward.

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You can download the original Italian version, redacted, here.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

What is Law no. 74 of 2025 (Tajani Decree)?

Law no. 74 of 2025, which converted Decree-Law 36/2025 (the “Tajani Decree”), introduces significant restrictions on Italian citizenship by descent (jure sanguinis). The law is now undergoing constitutional scrutiny. It limits automatic recognition to descendants within two generations of an Italy-born ancestor and imposes a retroactive cut-off date of March 27, 2025, for filing applications under the old rules.

Is Law no. 74 of 2025 retroactive?

Yes, the law is explicitly retroactive. It states that individuals born before its enactment are “considered to have never acquired Italian citizenship” if they do not meet the new criteria. The Court of Turin has challenged this retroactivity, raising a question of constitutional legitimacy, particularly in light of European Union law.

How does European Union law affect the Tajani Decree?

Since Italian citizenship confers EU citizenship, any national law that deprives an individual of this status must comply with EU principles, such as the principle of proportionality. The Court of Justice of the EU has ruled that automatic loss of citizenship without individual assessment and a reasonable time to act is disproportionate. The Turin ordinance argues that the Tajani Decree violates these principles, making it incompatible with EU law.

Can Law no. 74 of 2025 be challenged in court?

Yes. The ordinance from the Court of Turin is the first formal judicial step in challenging the law’s constitutionality. It has referred the matter to the Italian Constitutional Court for a final decision on its compatibility with both the Italian Constitution and European Union law. Individuals affected by the law can file their own court cases to assert their rights.