The Constitutional Court’s decision 142/2025 has been released. And, as expected, the internet has exploded.

I’ve chosen not to use clickbait videos with exultant faces, mimicking a trend I see online, to tell you one thing straight away: no, this ruling is not the definitive victory that many are celebrating.

So, what is it then? It’s good news, without a doubt, and in this two-part series, we will explore every facet of it. But it’s complex news, whose value lies between the lines, not in the shouted headlines. I’ve noticed a tendency online towards an overly enthusiastic interpretation, perhaps to acquire new clients or to reassure existing ones. My mission, however, is radical transparency, not partisan cheerleading.

For this reason, I’ve decided to do something different: dedicate not one, but two separate articles to this decision, which I will publish as a series.

1. The first article (the one you are reading now) will present a deliberately “pessimistic” analysis. It will highlight how the Court, perhaps unintentionally, has provided the State’s Attorney with new and powerful arguments to defend the restrictions of the “Tajani decree.”
2. The second article will offer an “optimistic” perspective. It will analyze the same passages of the ruling to extract the legal weapons and principles the Court has handed us to challenge the new law.

Why this approach? Because the scope of this Italian citizenship decision is precise and limited. It concerned issues raised before the new law was passed and therefore could not demolish it directly. Understanding this is crucial to avoid harboring illusions.

Let me be clear: I remain convinced that this ruling is, on the whole, positive news. But it must not, under any circumstances, lead us to believe that the battle is won. On the contrary, the war has just begun. A long, intricate, and difficult path still lies ahead, and to navigate it, we need a realistic map, not facile enthusiasm.

Let’s begin with the first analysis—the one that tempers the excitement to build a more solid awareness.

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Decision 142/2025: Is the Constitutional Court Paving the Way for the Tajani Law?

A critical analysis of the ruling that, behind its apparent neutrality, may have given the legislature the legitimacy for its crackdown on ius sanguinis.

The community of Italian-foreign descendants anxiously awaited the Italian citizenship decision n. 142/2025, hoping for an unequivocal defense of the historic principle of ius sanguinis without generational limits. The decision, which declared the questions “inadmissible,” has left many in a state of uncertainty. At first glance, it might seem like a non-decision, a simple passing of the buck to Parliament. However, a more in-depth and less optimistic analysis reveals how the Court’s arguments, far from being neutral, can be interpreted as an implicit green light for the controversial Law 74/2025 (conversion of the “Tajani decree”), providing the legislature with a solid legal and political basis for its restrictive reforms. Let’s see why.

1. The Court Steps Back: “We Cannot Substitute for the Legislator”

The heart of the Court’s decision lies in its reason for declaring the questions “inadmissible.” It did so because the lower courts were asking for a “manipulative” intervention—that is, to create new citizenship rules from scratch. The Court explicitly stated that it could not be the one to decide what kind of “effective link” is necessary to maintain the right, whether it be residency, language, foreign citizenship, or a combination of these. As the official text from the Corte Costituzionale states:

“This Court would then have to decide whether to give relevance to birth abroad […]; it would then have to assess whether to consider the residency abroad of the ascendant or the descendant […]; finally, it would have to weigh the meaning of the reference to dual citizenship…” — Decision n. 142/2025, para. 12.2.1

The Negative Angle: This passage is a formidable assist for the State’s defense in future trials. The State’s Attorney can now forcefully argue: “The Court itself admitted that these are complex and discretionary political choices that only Parliament can make. And Parliament has chosen, with Law 74/2025, to give weight to precisely these factors.” The Court, by passing the ball to the legislature, has legitimized not the specific law, but the process by which it was created. It has confirmed that the playing field is political, and the legislature, by acting, has simply exercised a prerogative that the highest Court has just reaffirmed.

2. The Weakening of Ius Sanguinis: The Court Provides the Theoretical Hook

Perhaps the most alarming passage of the decision is found in that same paragraph, 12.2.1. Here, the Court, explaining the complexity of the issue, introduces a legally explosive concept. It discusses how the “attributive function of civil status proper to the status of filiation would be weakened” when strong ties to a foreign legal system exist.

The Negative Angle: The Court is theorizing that the right of blood is not an absolute dogma. Its “function”—to create a substantial link with Italy—diminishes, weakens, when the blood tie remains the only thread connecting a person to the Republic. This provides Law 74/2025 with an almost “pre-approved” theoretical basis. The State’s Attorney can now argue that the law does nothing more than translate into a norm a principle recognized by the Court itself: when the link becomes a mere historical formality, the legislator has the right, and perhaps the duty, to intervene and demand a more concrete connection.

3. Legitimizing the “Effective Link” as a Valid Criterion

The lower courts’ ordinances asked to introduce a requirement of an “effective connection.” The Court, while not imposing it, took this concept very seriously, analyzing it also in light of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The Negative Angle: By validating the “effective link” as a legitimate concern and a valid objective, the Court indirectly vindicates the ratio of the new law. Law 74/2025, with its new requirements (limit to the second degree, prior residency of a parent), is nothing more than the normative translation of the “effective link” concept. It’s as if the Court said: “We can’t write the rule ourselves, but the principle that inspires it is correct.” This makes it much more difficult to challenge the new law on the grounds that it introduces unreasonable requirements, as the Court itself has already legitimized the search for such requirements.

4. EU Law as a Manual for “Safe” Restrictions

Many hoped that European Union law would act as a shield. Instead, the Court might have used it to also to draw a “safe zone” for the legislator. Analyzing the CJEU’s case law, the Court concluded that Italian ius sanguinis, as broad as it is, is not “manifestly incompatible” with EU law, unlike, for example, the “commercialization” of citizenship condemned in the Malta case.

The Negative Angle: The implicit message to the legislator is clear: “As long as you don’t sell passports and your restrictions are motivated by the search for a link to the State, you are within the margin of maneuver that Europe allows.” This offers a sort of European cover to the reform, making a future challenge based on the violation of Union principles more arduous. The Court did not use EU law to protect applicants, but to define the boundaries within which the legislator can move to limit their rights, a topic we previously discussed in relation to the constitutional scrutiny of Law 74/2025.

Final thoughts

Although the Italian citizenship decision 142/2025 has not canceled ius sanguinis, its true impact lies in how its neutral language can be interpreted. A pessimistic reading—the one the State’s Attorney will likely reveal a worrying picture. The Court’s language can be used to argue that it has strengthened Parliament’s discretion, introduced the concept of a “weakened function” of the bloodline, legitimized the search for an “effective link,” and defined the limits for a restrictive reform to be considered compatible with EU law. Viewed through this lens, the decision is far from a victory; it could be remembered as the moment that opened the door, and provided the justification, for the end of ius sanguinis as we have always known it.

Worried? Don’t be. Wait until you read the optimistic viewpoint I will publish tomorrow…

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Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

What is the main outcome of the Italian citizenship decision 142/2025?

The Italian Constitutional Court declared the questions raised by lower courts as ‘inadmissible.’ It did not rule on the merits of limiting ius sanguinis (citizenship by descent) but stated that defining citizenship criteria is a discretionary power of the Parliament, not the courts. This decision has both pessimistic and optimistic interpretations for future applicants.

Does decision 142/2025 cancel the new restrictive Italian citizenship law (Tajani Decree)?

No, the decision does not cancel the new law (Law 74/2025, or ‘Tajani Decree’). The questions before the Court were raised before the new law was passed, so it was not the subject of the ruling. However, the Court’s reasoning provides principles that will be used in future legal challenges against the new law’s constitutionality.

Why is the concept of an ‘effective link’ important after this Italian citizenship decision?

The Court acknowledged the ‘effective link’ (legame effettivo) as a legitimate concern for the legislator. By doing so, it indirectly validated the reasoning behind the new law’s requirements (like generational limits). This makes it harder to argue that the new restrictions are inherently unreasonable, as the Court itself has legitimized the principle of ensuring a concrete connection to Italy.