The Constitutional Court Publishes Sentence No. 63/2026
⚠️ HISTORICAL TIMELINE & SUBSEQUENT RULINGS UPDATE:
Sentence No. 63/2026 was the Italian Constitutional Court’s initial ruling on Law 74/2025 (Tajani Reform). Following this decision, two major landmark events reshaped the legal landscape:
1. In July 2026, the Constitutional Court issued Order No. 147/2026, referring Law 74/2025 to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) regarding EU citizenship rights.
2. On July 26 and July 29, 2026, the Supreme Court United Sections issued landmark rulings No. 24045/2026 and No. 24184/2026 (followed by Ministry Circular Prot. 65050 of August 10, 2026)
For my companion legal commentary on Sentence 63/2026, read Avv. Flavia Di Pilla’s in-depth analysis.
Executive Summary: On April 30, 2026, the Italian Constitutional Court published Sentence No. 63/2026 regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992, introduced by Law 74/2025. In my legal assessment as Senior Counsel, while the Court rejected the referral from the Turin Court by classifying the new generational limits as an original statutory barrier rather than a retroactive revocation of acquired status, it affirmed vital procedural protections for applications filed prior to March 27, 2025. Below, I analyze the Court’s constitutional reasoning, the subsequent CJEU referral under Order 147/2026, actionable litigation strategies, and provide the complete translated ruling text in a searchable collapsible archive.
What Did the Constitutional Court Decide in Sentence No. 63/2026?
Sentence No. 63/2026 represents the first comprehensive judgment delivered by the Italian Constitutional Court on the controversial citizenship reform enacted under Decree-Law No. 36/2025 and converted into Law No. 74/2025. The ruling arose from an incidental question of constitutional legitimacy referred by the Specialized Immigration Section of the Ordinary Court of Turin in a judicial proceeding brought by Venezuelan descendants of an Italian citizen born in 1837.
The core dispute centered on Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992, which established that individuals born abroad who possess another foreign citizenship are deemed never to have acquired Italian citizenship by descent, unless they meet strict statutory exceptions (such as an administrative application or judicial claim filed no later than March 27, 2025, an appointment confirmed by that date, an ascendant with exclusive Italian citizenship, or parental residency in Italy for two continuous years).
In its decision, the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible the challenges grounded on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR due to insufficient motivation by the remitting judge, while declaring unfounded the challenges based on Articles 2, 3, and 117 (first paragraph) of the Italian Constitution in relation to Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU.
Why Did the Court Reject the Retroactivity Challenges of the Turin Tribunal?
The remitting judge in Turin argued that Article 3-bis operated as an unconstitutional retroactive deprivation of a status already acquired by birth under the longstanding principles of Law No. 555/1912 and Law No. 91/1992. However, the Constitutional Court rejected this premise by drawing a clear doctrinal distinction between the abstract transmission of bloodline descent and the definitive legal ascertainment of citizenship status.
The Court held that the legislative reform did not “revoke” a perfected legal status, but rather established an original statutory precondition for future recognitions. Under this reasoning, Parliament acted within its wide legislative discretion to regulate the criteria for citizenship recognition by requiring a genuine and continuous link with the Italian Republic, provided that legitimate expectations crystallized in pending judicial or administrative proceedings initiated before March 27, 2025 were shielded by the safeguard clauses (letters a, a-bis, and b of Article 3-bis).
How Does Sentence 63/2026 Relate to Order 147/2026 and Supreme Court Ruling 24045/2026?
To properly evaluate Sentence No. 63/2026 today, it must be read within the broader trajectory of 2026 landmark jurisprudence:
- The CJEU Referral (Order No. 147/2026): Following Sentence 63/2026, the Constitutional Court revisited the European dimensions of Law 74/2025 in July 2026, issuing Order No. 147/2026 to submit preliminary questions directly to the Court of Justice of the European Union under Article 267 TFEU. This referral places the compatibility of generational limitations with EU fundamental rights and Union citizenship directly before Luxembourg.
- Definitive Protection of Pre-March 27, 2025 Filings: On July 26 and July 29, 2026, the Supreme Court United Sections delivered historic rulings No. 24045/2026 and No. 24184/2026. The United Sections confirmed that Law 74/2025 cannot be applied retroactively to proceedings commenced prior to March 27, 2025 and definitively struck down the restrictive “Minor Issue” interpretation under Article 7 of Law No. 555/1912.
- Ministry Alignment: On August 10, 2026, the Ministry of the Interior issued Circular Prot. 65050/2026 (formally revoking Circular 43347/2024)
What Are Your Legal Options After Sentence No. 63/2026? Strategic Assessment
If you are pursuing or defending an Italian citizenship by descent claim, Sentence No. 63/2026 combined with subsequent 2026 rulings dictates a clear procedural strategy:
1. Claims Filed or Booked by March 27, 2025: Your case is fully protected under the grandfathering provisions of Article 3-bis (letters a, a-bis, and b) and the United Sections rulings. Neither the generational limitations nor the residency requirements apply to your proceeding.
2. Involuntary Consular Delays (Prenot@mi Impediment Doctrine): For applicants who attempted in good faith to secure consular appointments before March 27, 2025 but were thwarted by systemic consular booking blockages, my legal strategy directly invokes Point 9.1 of Judgment No. 63/2026 (which expressly left unprejudiced the protection of applicants who initiated the procedure but failed to receive a consular appointment by March 27, 2025 due to administrative bottlenecks) together with Supreme Court Order No. 13818/2026.
3. 1948 Maternal Line Claims: Maternal line judicial petitions before Italian courts continue to proceed under established constitutional non-discrimination doctrines, with procedural stays requested where appropriate pending the CJEU’s definitive ruling under Order 147/2026.
Frequently Asked Questions About Sentence No. 63/2026
WHAT DID CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SENTENCE NO. 63/2026 DECIDE?
Sentence No. 63/2026 declared unfounded the constitutional challenges raised by the Turin Court against Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992 (introduced by Law 74/2025). The Court held that Parliament possessed the discretion to establish new citizenship criteria requiring a genuine connection to Italy, while confirming the validity of statutory exemptions for claims initiated before March 27, 2025.
DOES SENTENCE 63/2026 APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO PENDING COURT CASES?
No. Both Sentence 63/2026 and subsequent Supreme Court United Sections Ruling No. 24045/2026 explicitly confirm that judicial proceedings commenced before March 27, 2025 (as well as administrative applications submitted or formally booked by that date) are governed by the pre-existing legal framework.
HOW DID ORDER NO. 147/2026 CHANGE THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AFTER SENTENCE 63/2026?
While Sentence 63/2026 resolved domestic constitutional questions raised by Turin, the Constitutional Court later issued Order No. 147/2026 in July 2026, referring preliminary questions to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) to determine whether Law 74/2025 violates EU citizenship rights and the principle of proportionality under Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU.
CAN APPLICANTS STILL QUALIFY UNDER JURE SANGUINIS AFTER LAW 74/2025?
Yes. Applicants qualify if their case was filed/booked before March 27, 2025, if an ascendant of 1st or 2nd degree held exclusively Italian citizenship at death, if a parent had 2 years of continuous residency in Italy, or through judicial appeals invoking the EU referral in Order 147/2026 and excusable impediment arguments.
Related Resources & Further Reading
For complete legal analysis and strategic updates regarding Italian citizenship jurisprudence, consult these key resources:
- Ruling 63/2026: The Constitutional Court on Law 74/2025: Comprehensive legal commentary by Avv. Flavia Di Pilla.
- Constitutional Court Order No. 147/2026: Referral to the CJEU: The landmark European referral on Law 74/2025.
- Supreme Court United Sections Ruling No. 24045/2026: Definitive ruling ending the Minor Issue and shielding pre-reform filings.
- Supreme Court United Sections Decision No. 24184/2026: Consolidation of the Minor Issue doctrine under Art. 7 Law 555/1912.
- Italy Citizenship Law Change 2025: Law 74/2025: Pillar guide to the statutory changes and grandfathering provisions.
- After Ruling 63/2026: What the Supreme Court Can Still Do: Procedural roadmaps for judicial appeals.
- Versione Italiana: La Corte Costituzionale pubblica la Sentenza N. 63/2026: Leggi l’articolo in italiano.
Need Strategic Assessment for Your Italian Citizenship Claim?
Whether your case involves a pre-cutoff filing, a Prenot@Mi booking impediment protected under Point 9.1 of Judgment No. 63/2026, a post-reform petition invoking CJEU Referral Order No. 147/2026 (Point 9.2 & Case C-816/26), or reopening a Minor Issue file under Circular Prot. 65050/2026, I personally audit your lineage and represent you before the 26 Specialized District Courts. Preliminary Strategic Consultation Fee: €250 all-in total (taxes included) (100% credited toward your representation retainer under D.M. 55/2014): Schedule a 1-on-1 Consultation with Avv. Michele Vitale →
Full Official Ruling Text (English Translation & Italian Original)
The complete official ruling text is provided below. The full English translation is available in the expandable section below for search indexing and full-text reference, while the authorized Italian original can be downloaded in PDF format directly from my server. Citing practitioners should reference Corte Costituzionale, Sentenza n. 63/2026, ECLI:IT:COST:2026:63.
Click to expand: Full English Translation of Sentence No. 63/2026
Below is the complete unabridged English translation of Judgment No. 63/2026, fully indexed and searchable on this page.
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Judgment 63/2026 (ECLI:IT:COST:2026:63) Judgment: JUDGMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY IN AN INCIDENTAL PROCEEDING President: AMOROSO – Drafter: PITRUZZELLA Public Hearing of 11/03/2026; Decision of 11/03/2026 Deposit of 30/04/2026; Publication in Official Gazette (G. U.) Impugned norms: Art. 3 bis of the law 05/02/1992, n. 91, introduced by art. 1, paragraph 1, of the law-decree 28/03/2025, n. 36, converted, with modifications, in the law 23/05/2025, n. 74. Maxims: Decided acts: ord. 167/2025
JUDGMENT N. 63
YEAR 2026
ITALIAN REPUBLIC IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
composed of: President: Giovanni AMOROSO; Judges : Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following
JUDGMENT
in the judgment of constitutional legitimacy of art. 3-bis of the law 5 February 1992, n. 91 (New norms on citizenship), introduced by art. 1, comma 1, of the law-decree 28 March 2025, n. 36 (Urgent provisions in the matter of citizenship), converted, with modifications, in the law 23 May 2025, n. 74, promoted by the Ordinary Court of Turin, specialized section in the matter of immigration, international protection and free circulation of EU citizens, in monocratic composition, in the proceeding pending between M.E. E.A. and others and the Ministry of the Interior, with order of 25 June 2025, registered at n. 167 of the register of orders 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic n. 38, first special series, of the year 2025.
Having seen the acts of constitution of M.E. E.A., R.J. E.A., M.V. A.B., A.C. A.B., M.V. E.A., M.A. M.A. and M.A. M.A. for themselves and for their minor son J.I. M.V., as well as the acts of intervention of L.P. C.G., of L.A. F., of the Association of jurists Iure Sanguinis (AGIS), of the Confederation of Italians in the world, of L.A. T. and others, of the Italian Association “Sardi Uniti” di Socorros Mutuos, of R. D.C.R.R. and others and, deposited out of term, of A. L.A. and J. L.A., as well as the act of intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers;
heard in the public hearing of 11 March 2026 the reporting Judge Giovanni Pitruzzella;
heard the lawyers Marco Mellone for A. L.A. and J. L.A., Giovanni Bonato, Monica Lis Restanio and Diego Corapi for M.E. E.A. and for the other constituted parties, Corrado Caruso for M.E. E.A., as well as the State lawyer Lorenzo D’Ascia for the President of the Council of Ministers;
deliberated in the council chamber of 11 March 2026.
Considered in fact
1.– The Ordinary Court of Turin, specialized section in the matter of immigration, international protection and free circulation of EU citizens, in monocratic composition, has raised questions of constitutional legitimacy of art. 3-bis – limited to the words «even before the date of entry into force of the present article» and to the conditions foreseen in letters a), a-bis) and b) – of the law 5 February 1992, n. 91 (New norms on citizenship), introduced by art. 1, paragraph 1, of the law-decree 28 March 2025, n. 36 (Urgent provisions in the matter of citizenship), converted, with modifications, in the law 23 May 2025, n. 74.
Art. 3-bis provides the following: «[i]n derogation to articles 1, 2, 3, 14 and 20 of the present law, to article 5 of the law 21 April 1983, n. 123, to articles 1, 2, 7, 10, 12 and 19 of the law 13 June 1912, n. 555, as well as to articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the civil code approved with royal decree 25 June 1865, n. 2358, is considered to never have acquired Italian citizenship whoever was born abroad even before the date of entry into force of the present article and is in possession of another citizenship, unless one of the following conditions occurs: a) the state of citizen of the interested party is recognized, in compliance with the normative applicable to 27 March 2025, following an application, accompanied by the necessary documentation, presented to the competent consular office or mayor no later than 23:59, Rome time, of the same date; a-bis) the state of citizen of the interested party is recognized, in compliance with the normative applicable to 27 March 2025, following an application, accompanied by the necessary documentation, presented to the competent consular office or mayor on the day indicated by an appointment communicated to the interested party by the competent office by 23:59, Rome time, of the same date of 27 March 2025; b) the state of citizen of the interested party is ascertained judicially, in compliance with the normative applicable to 27 March 2025, following a judicial application presented no later than 23:59, Rome time, of the same date; c) an ascendant of the first or second degree possesses, or possessed at the moment of death, exclusively Italian citizenship; d) a parent or adopter has been resident in Italy for at least two continuous years subsequent to the acquisition of Italian citizenship and prior to the date of birth or adoption of the child».
1.1.– The judge a quo reports having been seized by eight Venezuelan citizens, with a recourse proposed pursuant to art. 281-decies of the code of civil procedure against the Ministry of the Interior, deposited on 28 March 2025. The applicants asked for the ascertainment of their status of Italian citizens iure sanguinis, insofar as descendants of the Italian citizen P.M. D., born in Turin in 1837, subsequently emigrated to Venezuela and deceased therein, without ever having naturalized as a Venezuelan citizen and having acquired Italian citizenship by effect of the unification of 1861.
The remitting [judge] observes that, based on the preceding discipline with respect to the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, the application would have been founded, «notwithstanding that in the genealogical line there figures an ascendant of female sex, married to a foreign citizen and with whom she had a son before the promulgation of the current Constitution of 1948». He reports that, in another judgment promoted by other descendants of P.M. D., the Ordinary Court of Rome would have ascertained the status of Italian citizen (order 13 September 2023, n. 23849).
The judge a quo considers applicable to the case at hand the new discipline, dictated by art. 3-bis of the law n. 91 of 1992, insofar as the applicants are Venezuelan citizens and do not fall within the «derogatory» cases referred to in letters from a) to d) of the same art. 3-bis, paragraph 1, not having presented an application for recognition via administrative route and having proposed a judicial application on 28 March 2025, therefore one day after the expiration of the term fixed by law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted. Furthermore, their ascendants did not possess only Italian citizenship nor have they resided in Italy for two years.
2.– The remitting [judge] believes that the cited art. 3-bis determines an implicit and retroactive revocation of Italian citizenship, which the applicants had acquired by birth, and that it is constitutionally illegitimate due to violation of arts. 2, 3 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, this latter in relation to art. 9 of the Treaty on European Union, to art. 20 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, to art. 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948, and to art. 3, paragraph 2, of Protocol n. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights, signed in Strasbourg on 16 September 1963, made executive with decree of the President of the Republic 14 April 1982, n. 217.
2.1.– In reference to arts. 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the remitting [judge] laments the violation of the principles of equality, reasonableness and reliance in legal certainty.
Under the first aspect, the judge a quo notes «the absolute arbitrariness of the treatment between those who had presented a judicial application before 28.3.2025 and those who presented it after, without the diversity in the applicable normative being in any way linked to any further relevant objective element».
Under the second aspect, the remitting [judge] invokes the «protection of vested rights», believing that reliance on legal certainty is at the base of the “social pact” on which the republican order is founded. Reference is made to judgment n. 69 of 2014 of this Court, according to which the institute of forfeiture would not tolerate, «by its nature, retroactive applications, since a hypothesis of extinction of the right cannot logically be configured […] for lack of exercise by the holder in the absence of a prior determination of the term within which the right […] must be exercised (judgment n. 191 of 2005)». According to the judge a quo, such principles should find application in the case at hand, having to consider – in particular – the «particularly elevated “degree of consolidation” of the jurisprudence in the matter of citizenship iure sanguinis, which consists of an innumerable number of pronouncements that (in cases superimposable to that of the species) had peacefully recognized the right to citizenship». Furthermore, a further argument in the sense of the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the mechanism introduced by the censured norm («implicit revocation of citizenship with retroactive efficacy and without any provision of intertemporal law») would be derivable from comparative experience. The remitting [judge] refers that, in Germany, a federal reform entered into force on 1 January 2000 introduced, as a further condition for the acquisition of German citizenship, the principle of the place of birth, in addition to the principle of filiation. However, the German legislator would have made «applicable the new (and more restrictive) normative in the matter of citizenship only to those born after 1.1.2000, without therefore providing any retroactive application (and in peius)». Such comparative experience would confirm the unsustainability of the normative choice of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, which with «immediate efficacy and retroactive effect» disapplies the normative in the matter of acquisition of Italian citizenship by birth in force since 1912.
2.2.– According to the remitting [judge], the censured norm would also contrast with art. 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, that is, with the international obligations assumed by Italy. With reference to the violation of the self-executing norms of the European Union, the judge a quo notes that the jurisprudence of this Court would have settled in the sense of the so-called alternativity of remedies (reference is made to judgment n. 7 of 2025).
In particular, the violation of art. 9 TEU and of art. 20 TFEU is lamented. The first provision establishes that «[t]he Union respects, in all its activities, the principle of the equality of its citizens, who benefit from equal attention from its institutions, bodies and agencies. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship». The second provision establishes, in paragraph 1, that «[c]itizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship».
Such question would be admissible «by reason of the reflection that Italian citizenship produces regarding the ownership of European citizenship»: the censured norm, therefore, would impact norms of the treaties (those relative to citizenship) which have direct efficacy in our legal system.
The remitting[judge] recalls the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in particular Grand Chamber, judgment 5 September 2023, case C-689/21, Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet, according to which, «in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which national legislation has the effect of causing the person concerned to lose ipso iure the nationality of the Member State concerned and, consequently, the status of citizen of the Union on the date on which that person attains the age of 22, that person must have a reasonable period of time to lodge an application aimed at obtaining from the competent authorities an examination of the proportionality of the consequences of that loss as well as, where appropriate, the retention or the ex tunc recovery of that nationality» (point 50).
Therefore, the censured norm would violate arts. 9 TEU and 20 TFEU for not having «provided any mechanism of intertemporal law that would allow […] the conservation of citizenship within reasonable terms (for example, providing a “time window” within which to be able to present an administrative or judicial application for recognition of citizenship)».
2.3.– Art. 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution would be violated also in relation to art. 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which «[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality». The remitting [judge] contests «the arbitrariness of the criteria of “implicit revocation” introduced by art. 1 par. 1 lett. a) and b) law-decree n. 36/2025, in the part in which they make the “revocation” […] retroact to 23:59 of the day preceding the entry into force of the same law-decree».
2.4.– Finally, art. 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution would be violated in relation to art. 3, paragraph 2, of Prot. n. 4 ECHR, according to which «[n]o one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national». The censured norm would deprive its addressees of the «right to enter the Italian territory for the sole fact of not having requested (via administrative or judicial route) the recognition of their own right by 23:59 of the day preceding the entry into force of the law-decree n. 36/2025».
In conclusion, the judge a quo believes art. 3-bis of the law n. 91 of 1992 to be constitutionally illegitimate, in the parts indicated above, since «it would have been possible to provide an intertemporal normative such as to allow the interested persons (that is, Italians born abroad, in possession of another citizenship and lacking a “genuine link” with Italy) to be duly informed of the intervened normative modifications, in order to be able to present – within a reasonable term – the application (administrative or judicial) for recognition of citizenship iure sanguinis».
The declaration of partial constitutional illegitimacy of art. 3-bis would make it applicable only to persons born subsequently to the entry into force of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted. According to the remitting [judge], such declaration could also be accompanied by an intervention of a manipulative type by this Court, «with provision of a mechanism of intertemporal law that guarantees the possibility (to all persons already born on the date of entry into force of the law-decree n. 36/2025) to present an application for recognition of citizenship within reasonable terms».
3.– The parties of the judgment a quo constituted themselves in the present judgment with act deposited on 6 October 2025.
They, in the first place, underline the adequacy of the motivation on relevance and on non-manifest unfoundedness and, therefore, the admissibility of the promoted questions. As for the reference, contained in the order, to the manipulative intervention of this Court, according to the parties it would only have the meaning of «a mere ascertainment of the powers and of the decisional techniques sometimes employed» by this Court, which would be «free to identify the pronouncement most suitable to the reductio ad legitimitatem of the censured provision»: the petitum of the order, however, would remain «ordinarily ablatory».
3.1.– On the merits, the parties observe that individuals could rely on a «stable and coherent legislation» (which for 160 years has foreseen the acquisition of citizenship iure sanguinis) and on a jurisprudence constantly inspired by the principle of favor civitatis. They note that, for all children of an Italian parent, the «substantive ownership» of the status of citizen arises for the sole fact of birth, while the «formal ownership» of such status can be subsequently ascertained in court or via administrative route, if it does not already result from the civil status registries. The ascertainment permits the exercise of the rights correlated to the status.
According to the parties, being a status imprescriptible and permanent, «the individual has never had the legal duty to claim, in the course of their own life, the conservation of their own Italian citizenship»: therefore, the lack of activation of the procedure of ascertainment would not denote «a “negligence” or a “disinterest”». For the extinction of the status civitatis no automatism would be admitted: the loss of the status could descend only from a conscious and voluntary act of the interested subject. Our constitutional legal system would not even admit «cases of collective loss», that is «a mass denationalization against determined individuals», which operates ex lege upon the occurrence of certain conditions.
The parties observe that the requisites for the acquisition of citizenship by descent would be only those dictated by the law in force at the moment of birth. They recall art. 20 of the law n. 91 of 1992, according to which, «[u]nless it is expressly provided, the state of citizenship acquired prior to the present law is not modified except for facts subsequent to the date of entry into force of the same».
According to the parties, there would exist «an authentic fundamental right to the stability and safeguard of the citizenship already possessed» and for the cases of extinction-deprivation of the status there should be «respected stringent and determined limits, respectful of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality».
3.2.– Coming to the individual questions, the parties consider founded the one promoted in reference to art. 3 of the Constitution, insofar as the censured norm would order «a true and proper retroactive revocation (a loss – deprivation) and ad nutum of citizenship». The formula employed by the legislator of “non-acquisition ex tunc” of citizenship, therefore, would mask a hypothesis of automatic and retroactive revocation of the status in question, with consequent violation of the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. The censured norm would provide «a paradigmatic example of proper retroactivity», which «impoverishes the legal sphere of the addressees», violating the principle of protection of legitimate reliance. It should be qualified as extinctive that fact (birth abroad) which – although historically concomitant to a constitutive element – assumes legal relevance only with a law successive in time, with respect to the day on which the status arose. The censured norm would determine a loss of collective citizenship, retroactive, automatic, coercive and «with surprise effect».
The doubts of constitutional legitimacy raised by the remitting [judge] would be confirmed in light of the criteria identified by this Court for the purposes of the review on retroactive laws: the «degree of consolidation of the subjective situation originally recognized and then overwhelmed by the retroactive intervention», the foreseeability of the retroactive modification, the supervened public interests, the «possibility to modify the arrangement of relationships already defined by previous laws, when it results in concrete that these latter have produced results not responding to criteria of equity». The censured intervention would be disproportionate, erasing the status civitatis to the detriment of bipolide individuals born abroad, and unforeseeable: therefore, the norm under examination would be arbitrary and harmful to legitimate reliance and to the certainty of law. It would contemplate an «illegitimate automatism», a pejorative treatment that disregards the conduct held by the addressees and which would have a discriminatory character of bipolides born abroad.
The parties note that the legislations of other Member States of the European Union would never have introduced «pejorative and limitative retroactive modifications of acquired rights, in homage to the principle of non-retroactivity in peius of modifications to citizenship laws». In the matter of citizenship the principle tempus regit actum would apply, the discipline of the causes of acquisition and loss of status would be irretroactive. The censured norm would represent «an unicum within the European legal panorama».
3.3.– Founded would also be the questions promoted in reference to art. 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution. The parties recall the cited judgment Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet, invoked by the remitting [judge]. The censured norm would be incompatible with European Union law «insofar as it does not make it possible, for those who are struck by the consequences of the new discipline, to maintain citizenship […] exercising a reasonable option within a congruous term, or – at the limit – to reacquire it upon simple request if the loss has irreversibly perfected».
The censured norm would also violate the cited art. 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The revocation of citizenship would be arbitrary since it would not be based on «effective justificatory criteria», but would be «correlated only to a point on the timeline»; it would strike «an indistinct plurality of persons» and would be «substantially discriminatory, insofar as linked to the mere accident of birth outside the territory of the State». The arbitrariness would not have been «even tempered by an adequate proceeding in which the private party could defend their subjective legal position».
Finally, there would also subsist the violation of art. 3, paragraph 2, of Prot. n. 4 ECHR. The parties cite the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, fourth section, of 21 June 2016, Ramadan v. Malta, regarding a case of revocation of citizenship, and observe that the intervened presentation of an administrative or jurisdictional application could not «be considered a circumstance from which to derive the greater or lesser “meritoriousness” of the rights and interests of the involved persons».
4.– The President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the General Advocacy of the State, intervened in the judgment with act deposited on 7 October 2025.
The Advocacy, in the first place, excepts the inadmissibility of the questions due to defect of motivation on relevance. In particular, the affirmation of the remitting [judge] on the subsistence of the prerequisites for the acceptance of the applicants’ demand would be apodictic and based on «lacking and contradictory» documentation, with reference to the non-naturalization of the Italian grandfather and to his death certificate.
4.1.– The state defense then retraces the normative and jurisprudential framework antecedent to law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, characterized by an expansive trend of citizenship, and underlines the «exponential increase of requests for recognition of Italian citizenship iure sanguinis on the part of foreign citizens». It reports that Italians resident abroad and born abroad have increased by 51 percent, from 2013 to 2024, passing from just under three million to just under four and a half million. In particular, about 90 percent of Italians resident in Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela were born abroad. The Advocacy observes that for descendants of Italians, who possess iure soli the citizenship of the Country of birth, the possession of Italian (and European) citizenship entails significant advantages, consenting, among other things, to emigrate to Spain. The enormous mass of requests for ascertainment of Italian citizenship iure sanguinis presented to consular offices, especially in South America, would have created long waiting lists, so that many would have turned to the ordinary judge, with a notable increment of litigation in the matter of citizenship: pending proceedings would have passed from 23,654 in 2022 to 61,628 in 2024, with the clarification that the recourse can be proposed jointly by multiple persons.
The exponential growth of the ascertainments of Italian citizenship iure sanguinis, both via administrative route and via jurisdictional route, would have effects also on the composition of the electoral body, increasingly influencing the Italian political decisional process (for example, making more difficult the reaching of the quorum in case of abrogative referendum).
The Advocacy observes that citizenship is granted also to persons who do not have any Italian ascendant, because the spouses of citizens resident abroad can ask, after three years of marriage, for a facilitated naturalization, transmitting citizenship also to their possible minor children who do not have any link not even of blood with Italy.
The state defense then operates a comparative comparison, noting that the major European Countries provide limitations to the transmission of citizenship by descent to persons born and resident abroad and in possession of another citizenship.
The approval of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, would have, therefore, rendered itself necessary «in consideration of the elevated risk of paralysis of organs and functions of the State as well as for reasons of opportune alignment with the normative, in the matter, in force in the other Countries of the European Union». Faced with the undeferrable need to intervene, the legislator would have chosen to «recover the traditional disfavor towards regimes of plural citizenships», avoiding also that the absence of effective ties with the Republic in the head of a growing number of citizens determines «risk factors for national security» and of the other Member States of the European Union. The censured discipline, however, would also protect legitimate reliance, saving the recognitions already disposed and the applications already presented.
According to the Advocacy, art. 3-bis would not entail any loss of rights already acquired, but would intervene exclusively on the mechanisms of transmission of Italian citizenship, introducing a preclusion to acquisition.
4.2.– Coming to the question promoted in reference to arts. 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the state defense observes that the legislator has broad discretion in the matter of acquisition and loss of citizenship, as confirmed by the only provision dedicated by the Constitution to the theme (art. 22).
It then considers the criteria identified by this Court for the purposes of the review on retroactive laws.
As for the consolidation of the injured legal situation, the Advocacy observes that the procedure of ascertainment of citizenship would be «formally declarative but in fact constitutive», at the outcome of a complex preliminary investigation, with evidentiary burdens charged to the applicant. One could not, therefore, speak of a consolidated legal situation but, rather, of «a mere legal expectation». The proceeding of ascertainment would be similar to that of naturalization. Prior to its positive outcome, no right would be exercisable and of no duty could fulfillment be asked.
As for the foreseeability of the modification, according to the state defense the censured norm would not have retroactive reach, not impacting «fully consolidated» legal situations and the concrete exercise of rights. Even admitting its retroactivity, it would not violate a legitimate reliance, being difficult to configure such injury «in relation to the 60 million potential right-holders in the world who have had decades […] of time to be able to manifest their own interest in the recognition of Italian citizenship but who have deliberately chosen to disinterest themselves from it». On the contrary, given the comparative panorama, there subsisted «a founded expectation that also the Italian State would intervene with correctives, moreover notoriously under study by the legislator for many years».
As for the pursued public interests, the Advocacy recalls the premises of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, and observes that, being estimated at around 60 million the descendants of emigrated Italian citizens, if the normative intervention had regarded exclusively future births, the objectives indicated in those premises could not have been adequately realized. Even more grave consequences would have verified in the case in which, to the entire potential audience, a term had been conceded within which to present the instance: the competent administrations would have been invested by an unimaginable number of applications, formulated exactly by effect of the existence of said ultimate term. The state defense notes that the censured norm provided the opportune temperaments, in protection of situations of statelessness, of applications already presented and of minors (art. 1, paragraph 1-ter, of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, introduced at the venue of conversion), «to whom cannot be autonomously imputed the responsibility for not having activated themselves previously». The censured discipline would be, therefore, proportionate.
Finally, as to the necessity of the corrective intervention for the violation of the criterion of equity inherent in the preceding situation, the Advocacy observes that the censured discipline would be aimed at avoiding that «the very concept of “people”, holder of sovereignty, becomes an indeterminable entity, loosed from every bond with the national territory upon which the State exercises sovereignty», with consequent disparity of treatment between the millions of persons born and raised abroad, and citizens of other States to whom they owe bonds of loyalty, and the Italian citizens who live and work in the national territory. This would conflict «with elementary principles of reasonableness and equality, configuring an identical treatment of markedly differentiated situations». The Advocacy cites the judgment of the Cassation, civil united sections, 24 August 2022, n. 25317, according to which «the nexus of citizenship can never be founded on a fictio». Over the course of time, the social, cultural and economic ties with the Country of emigration attenuate and, correlatively, the ties with the Country of rooting become increasingly strong, up to becoming almost exclusive for subsequent generations.
4.3.– The Advocacy considers unfounded also the questions promoted in reference to art. 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution.
The competencies of the States in the matter of citizenship should be exercised in respect of the principle of proportionality and of loyal collaboration between them. The cited judgment Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet would have reiterated the legitimacy of a national legislation «aimed at protecting the relationship of solidarity and loyalty between a Member State and its citizens and the reciprocity of rights and duties which constitute the foundation of citizenship». The decisions of the Court of Justice on the obligations that States must respect when they revoke citizenship would have as their object different cases, because they concern instances in which the interested parties had been identified as citizens of the Member State, had enjoyed the rights and fulfilled the obligations connected with the state of citizen and then had been addressees of individual decisions of loss or revocation of citizenship. Instead, the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, would limit the transmission of citizenship to whoever, «for their whole life, has behaved like a foreigner».
Therefore, according to the state defense, it would be necessary to analyze the European jurisprudence on the criteria for acquisition of citizenship, not on loss. The judgment of the Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, of 29 April 2025, case C-181/23, European Commission, would indicate not only that the censured discipline is in line with European law, but also that it would have «brought the necessary correctives to a normative system which, otherwise, could have resulted in contrast with the very law of the EU». The preceding normative framework, in fact, permitted the enjoyment of the rights foreseen by the European legal system to subjects who do not boast any genuine connection with the European Union, «introducing potentially millions of persons into the Euro-unitary area, without any form of control, with repercussions, likewise, on public security, not only national», and on the disbursement of social benefits. For example, two thirds of Italians resident in Spain were born outside Italy.
In any case, the censured discipline would be proportionate also in light of the European jurisprudence on the loss of citizenship: being excluded an individual examination of individual positions (which would entail the paralysis of the activity of administrative and judicial authorities), the presumed loss of citizenship would strike whoever resides abroad, is the holder of another citizenship and, «having chosen for their whole life not to ask for the recognition of citizenship, would not suffer in fact any change to their own subjective situation». At most, it would be a matter of a loss of the prospect of obtaining a future recognition: a possibility which is not precluded in the forms of naturalization, which the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, would have facilitated for Italian descendants.
As to the question promoted in reference to international law, the Advocacy observes that «[t]here is not found […] any international norm, treaty or customary, which protects the absolute right of persons to possess a dual or multiple nationality». The state defense then recalls the jurisprudence of the ECHR Court, according to which there does not exist, neither in the ECHR nor in its Protocols, an autonomous right to citizenship, and art. 8 ECHR can be violated only if the measure is arbitrary and has an impact on the private life of the individual. The censured discipline would respect the «requisites of reasonableness and proportionality findable in international law» and also the principle of non-discrimination, insofar as «it applies in a homogeneous manner to an extended audience of subjects, not distinguished on the basis of differences of race, religion, sex or other but simply on the basis of a different degree of connection with Italy, identified by the legislator in the unique citizenship of the parent or grandparent».
5.– On 6 October 2025 were deposited acts of intervention of: Association of jurists Iure Sanguinis (AGIS); Confederation of Italians in the world; L.A. T. and others; L.A. F.
The first affirms to gather professionals who operate in the sector of the ascertainment and achievement of Italian citizenship: from this would result a qualified interest in the intervention. AGIS takes note of the jurisprudence of this Court, which requires a nexus between the position of the third party and the object of the judgment a quo, but believes that such criterion should be «remodulated». If elements useful to the constitutional judgment can be provided by the amici curiae, even more so could they come from a subject like AGIS.
The Confederation of Italians in the world reports to be an association that operates for the defense of the rights of Italians resident in other Countries. Furthermore, it affirms to have impugned the circular of the Ministry of the Interior – Department for civil liberties and immigration, 28 May 2025, n. 26185 (Law 23 May 2025, n. 74, of conversion, with modifications, of the law-decree 28 March 2025, n. 36, bearing «Urgent provisions in the matter of citizenship». First operational instructions), relative to the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted. From this would result a qualified interest in the intervention.
L.A. T. and the other five intervening subjects report having proposed (after 27 March 2025) judicial actions for the ascertainment of Italian citizenship. They, therefore, would be holders of the same «substantive relationship» object of the judgment a quo. From this would derive the legitimation to intervene.
L.A. F. affirms that the censured norm deprives him ex tunc of the status of Italian citizen: therefore, he would have a qualified interest in the intervention in the present judgment. The jurisprudence of this Court on the admissibility of interventions would tolerate some exceptions. The drastic nature of the legislative choice, which deprives some subjects of the fundamental status of citizenship, would require to «expand the representation in judgment». The necessity to access «unprecedented» procedural instruments for the protection of the status would also result from art. 391-quater cod. proc. civ., which foresees the possibility to impugn for revocation «decisions passed in res judicata whose content has been declared by the European Court of Human Rights contrary to» the ECHR (paragraph 1), if «the violation ascertained by the European Court has prejudiced a right of status of the person» (paragraph 1, number 1).
On 7 October 2025 were deposited acts of intervention of: Italian Association “Sardi Uniti” di Socorros Mutuos; R. D.C.R.R. and others; L.P. C.G.
The first reports to gather the descendants of Sardinian emigrants in Argentina and affirms to have a qualified interest in the intervention. The nexus with the object of the judgment a quo would result from the provision of the amici curiae: if elements useful to the constitutional judgment can be provided by the amici curiae, even more so could they come from a particularly qualified third party, such as the association in question.
R. D.C.R.R. and others report being parties to judgments (promoted after 27 March 2025) analogous to that from which the questions under examination originate. They, therefore, would be holders of «a specific and qualified interest» in their acceptance.
L.P. C.G. reports being a party to a judgment analogous to that from which the questions under examination originate: such judgment, however, was initiated after 27 March 2025. L.P. C.G. would be legitimated to the intervention because the outcome of the present judgment could irremediably prejudice his legal position.
5.1.– On 7 October 2025 the association Fondazione italiani.it ETS and Intercomites Brasil + 1 deposited two opinions as amici curiae, admitted by presidential decree of 16 January 2026.
The first argues the constitutional illegitimacy of the censured norms, in reference to art. 3 of the Constitution and to arts. 9 TEU and 20 TFEU. Intercomites Brasil + 1 observes that art. 3-bis would have ordered a revocation of citizenship and that its retroactive effects would violate the principle of proportionality, arguing on the point.
5.2.– On 18 February 2026 the parties deposited an ample integrative brief, in which they reply to the exception of inadmissibility and to the arguments of the state defense, dwelling, in particular, on the administrative praxis in the proceedings of ascertainment of citizenship, on the comparative framework and on the injury of vested rights. In relation to the violation of arts. 9 TEU and 20 TFEU, the parties hypothesize a preliminary reference to the CJEU, should the Court have doubts on the meaning of those interposed norms.
On the same date, also the General Advocacy of the State deposited an integrative brief, reiterating the inadmissibility and the unfoundedness of the raised questions.
On the same date also the intervener AGIS deposited an integrative brief.
5.3.– With act deposited on 8 March 2026, intervened in the judgment A. L.A. and J. L.A.
The interveners report being applicants in a judgment for the recognition of Italian citizenship, pending before the Ordinary Court of Campobasso, which suspended it in order to raise questions of constitutional legitimacy – with order registered at n. 40 of the register of orders 2026 – on the same norms censured by the Court of Turin. The intervention would be admissible insofar as the decision that this Court will adopt on the questions under examination would condition the outcome both of the judgment of constitutional legitimacy promoted by the Court of Campobasso and of the common judgment pending before it.
Considered in law
6.– The Ordinary Court of Turin, specialized section in the matter of immigration, international protection and free circulation of EU citizens, in monocratic composition, doubts the constitutional legitimacy of art. 3-bis – limited to the words «even before the date of entry into force of the present article» and to the conditions foreseen in letters a), a-bis) and b) – of the law n. 91 of 1992, introduced by art. 1, paragraph 1, of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted.
Art. 3-bis provides the following: «[i]n derogation to articles 1, 2, 3, 14 and 20 of the present law, to article 5 of the law 21 April 1983, n. 123, to articles 1, 2, 7, 10, 12 and 19 of the law 13 June 1912, n. 555, as well as to articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the civil code approved with royal decree 25 June 1865, n. 2358, is considered to never have acquired Italian citizenship whoever was born abroad even before the date of entry into force of the present article and is in possession of another citizenship, unless one of the following conditions occurs: a) the state of citizen of the interested party is recognized, in compliance with the normative applicable to 27 March 2025, following an application, accompanied by the necessary documentation, presented to the competent consular office or mayor no later than 23:59, Rome time, of the same date; a-bis) the state of citizen of the interested party is recognized, in compliance with the normative applicable to 27 March 2025, following an application, accompanied by the necessary documentation, presented to the competent consular office or mayor on the day indicated by an appointment communicated to the interested party by the competent office by 23:59, Rome time, of the same date of 27 March 2025; b) the state of citizen of the interested party is ascertained judicially, in compliance with the normative applicable to 27 March 2025, following a judicial application presented no later than 23:59, Rome time, of the same date; c) an ascendant of the first or second degree possesses, or possessed at the moment of death, exclusively Italian citizenship; d) a parent or adopter has been resident in Italy for at least two continuous years subsequent to the acquisition of Italian citizenship and prior to the date of birth or adoption of the child».
According to the remitting [judge], the censured norm would violate: a) arts. 2 and 3 of the Constitution, in reference to the principles of equality, reasonableness and reliance in legal certainty, insofar as, on one side, it would be arbitrary to distinguish between those who requested the ascertainment of citizenship before 28 March 2025 and those who requested it after; on the other side, vested rights would be injured, because art. 3-bis would determine an «implicit revocation of citizenship with retroactive efficacy and without any provision of intertemporal law»; b) art. 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to art. 9 of the TEU and to art. 20 of the TFEU, which attribute citizenship of the Union to whoever possesses the citizenship of a Member State; c) art. 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to art. 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which «[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality, nor denied the right to change his nationality»; d) art. 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to art. 3, paragraph 2, of Prot. n. 4 ECHR, according to which «[n]o one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national».
7.– In a preliminary manner, it is necessary to reiterate the inadmissibility of the intervention of A. L.A. and J. L.A., already declared with order made at the hearing, attached to the present judgment.
Also the other interventions filed in the present judgment are inadmissible.
With judgment n. 142 of 2025 and with order n. 85 of 2025, this Court, in four judgments having as object the norms that foresaw the transmission of citizenship by filiation, without limits, declared inadmissible the interventions of two associations of descendants of Italian emigrants and of two associations of jurists who operate in the sector of citizenship, insofar as they boasted «an interest only indirect, connected in a general way to the statutory aims of protection of their own members» (judgment n. 142 of 2025), different from that required by art. 4, paragraph 3, of the Supplementary Norms for judgments before the Constitutional Court, according to which in the judgment of constitutional legitimacy in an incidental proceeding «[c]an intervene the holders of a qualified interest, inherent in a direct and immediate manner to the relationship deduced in judgment», having to be intended as «relationship deduced in judgment» that which is the object of the judgment a quo (ex multis, judgment n. 199 of 2025; order n. 60 of 2025). This holds «all the more so in consideration of the current art. 6 of the Supplementary Norms, which allows non-profit social formations and institutional subjects bearers of collective or diffuse interests pertaining to the question of constitutional legitimacy to present to this Court a written opinion in the capacity of amici curiae» (judgment n. 142 of 2025).
In light of these precedents, relative to a symmetrical affair with respect to the one now under examination, the inadmissibility of the intervention of AGIS, of the Confederation of Italians in the world and of the Italian Association “Sardi Uniti” di Socorros Mutuos must be declared. In fact, the judgment before the Court of Turin has as its object the request of eight Venezuelan citizens, aimed at the ascertainment of their status of Italian citizens by filiation, and none of the intervening subjects is the holder of an interest connected «in a direct and immediate manner» with such judgment.
As for the acts of intervention of individual subjects, parties to processes analogous to that from which the one under examination draws origin or anyway addressees of the censured norm, it is necessary to reiterate that «it is not sufficient, for the purpose of rendering the intervention admissible, the circumstance that the subject is the holder of interests analogous to those deduced in the principal judgment, or that they are a party in an analogous judgment, but different from the judgment a quo, upon which the decision of this Court may influence, insofar as the access of such a third party to the incidental judgment of constitutional legitimacy would occur without the prior verification on the relevance and on the non-manifest unfoundedness of the questions on the part of the judge a quo» (order n. 85 of 2025). Therefore, the inadmissibility of the interventions of L.A. T. and others, L.A. F., R. D.C.R.R. and others and L.P. C.G. must be declared.
7.1.– Still on a point of procedure, the exception of inadmissibility raised by the State Advocacy, for insufficient motivation on relevance, is to be examined. In particular, the affirmation of the remitting [judge] on the subsistence of the prerequisites for the acceptance of the applicants’ demand would be apodictic and based on «lacking and contradictory» documentation, with reference to the non-naturalization of the Italian grandfather and to his death certificate (occurred in 1901).
The exception is not founded.
The remitting [judge] argues amply on the subsistence of the requisites for the acceptance of the demand (however impeded by the censured norm), citing the documents – produced in the judgment a quo – relative to the Italian citizenship by birth of the emigrated grandfather, to his non-naturalization in Venezuela (which would have caused the loss of Italian citizenship: see the subsequent point 8.1.), to the birth and to the marriages of the descendants, among whom the applicants in the judgment a quo. The remitting [judge] specifies that Italian citizenship was transmitted notwithstanding the presence, in the genealogical line, of a woman who had a child before 1948: this is in conformity with the jurisprudence of the Cassation (civil united sections, judgment 25 February 2009, n. 4466; see the subsequent point 8.1.). Finally, the remitting [judge] recalls that other descendants of the emigrated Italian grandfather, of the daughter and of the grandson obtained the ascertainment of Italian citizenship, with the order of the Court of Rome n. 23849 of 2023. The argumentation on relevance, therefore, results more than sufficient.
8.– Before examining the individual questions of constitutional legitimacy, a premise is opportune, articulated in three parts: the first, aimed at providing a historical framing of the discipline of the transmission of Italian citizenship and at highlighting the peculiarities of the Italian situation (point 8.1.); the second, aimed at examining the impact of the entry into force of the Constitution and the progressive divergence, with respect to it, of the legislative discipline on citizenship (point 8.2.); the third, directed at illustrating the meaning of the censured norms and their ratio (point 8.3.).
8.1.– Citizenship is a «constitutionally protected legal state and which imports a series of rights in the private and public fields and moreover, in particular, political rights» (judgment n. 87 of 1975). In Italy, the basic criterion for its acquisition is the relationship of filiation, based on arts. 1, 2 and 3 of the law n. 91 of 1992. Before the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, the transmission to descendants occurred without temporal limits. Judgment n. 142 of 2025 of this Court declared in part inadmissible and in part unfounded the questions raised on the absence of limits in the transmission of citizenship by filiation.
The status civitatis founded on the bond of filiation has a character «permanent and is imprescriptible [and] justiciable at any time based on the simple proof of the acquisitive case integrated by the birth from an Italian citizen» (Cass., civil united sect., judgments n. 25317 of 2022, and 24 August 2022, n. 25318).
The criterion followed by the law n. 91 of 1992 sinks its roots in the civil code of 1865, which welcomed the rule of ius sanguinis unlimited in the direct agnatic line, in a historical context in which, as is known, suffrage was very limited. As results from the Compendium of Italian electoral statistics, drafted in 1946 by the Central Institute of Statistics and by the Ministry for the Constituent Assembly, in 1865 the active political electorate belonged to 2.08 percent of the population. Based on arts. 1, 2 and 3 of the law 22 January 1882, n. 593 (Political electoral law), it rose to 7.39 percent of the population, being reserved to literate males having at least 21 years of age, in possession of determined requisites of instruction or census (these latter not realizable by Italians abroad, insofar as regarding the payment of direct taxes).
Art. 11, first paragraph, civil code 1865 expressed an orientation of disfavor towards dual citizenship («Citizenship is lost […] 2° By he who has obtained citizenship in a foreign country»), but such provision was interpreted restrictively, because the lemma «obtained» was referred to the sole hypotheses of voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship (Cassation of Naples, judgment 6 October 1907). Therefore, the chain of transmission of Italian citizenship did not interrupt in case of acquisition iure soli of foreign citizenship on the part of the descendants of the Italian emigrant.
The criterion of transmission of citizenship by filiation was confirmed by the law 13 June 1912, n. 555 (On Italian citizenship), which also dealt with the problem of the loss of Italian citizenship connected to the original (and therefore involuntary) acquisition iure soli of the citizenship of the country of emigration, on the presupposition that the phenomenon of dual citizenship was to be avoided. The choice of the legislator of 1912 was that of an opting out model, proposed by Vittorio Polacco, for which Italian citizenship was lost only by express declaration (art. 7: «Save special provisions to be stipulated with international treaties, the Italian citizen born and resident in a foreign State, from which he is deemed its own citizen by birth, conserves Italian citizenship, but, having become of majority age or emancipated, can renounce it»); the opposite solution of opting in, advocated by Vittorio Scialoja, for which the Italian citizen who had received iure soli foreign citizenship would have lost – with majority age – the Italian one acquired iure sanguinis, save an express declaration of wanting to conserve it, was instead defeated.
In the fifty years that go from 1876 to 1925, over 16 and a half million Italian citizens emigrated to various global destinations, of which the majority (about 8.9 million persons) directed towards the American continent, in Countries where ius soli was in force (see the brief deposited by the National Institute of Statistics – ISTAT on 14 April 2025 in the 1st Commission to the Senate, Constitutional Affairs, in relation to the draft law of conversion of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025). Thus an enormous mass of foreign citizens was formed who maintained also Italian citizenship, almost always not ascertained.
In the course of the years, the dimension of the phenomenon of dual citizenship doubled, also by virtue of legal factors. On one side, this Court, with judgments n. 87 of 1975 and n. 30 of 1983, declared constitutionally illegitimate the norms that foresaw the loss of citizenship on the part of the Italian woman who acquired the citizenship of the foreign husband, by effect of marriage (art. 10, third paragraph, of the law n. 555 of 1912), and which did not attribute citizenship by birth to the child of a citizen mother (art. 1, number 1°, of the law n. 555 of 1912); on the other side, the Court of Cassation held that the norms declared illegitimate were inapplicable also to factual cases prior to the entry into force of the republican Constitution (see the cited judgment n. 4466 of 2009).
The Italian situation has assumed, therefore, with time, completely peculiar characteristics. The massive migratory phenomenon, united with the absence of limits to the transmission of citizenship by filiation, has created a multitude of foreign citizens endowed with a “virtual” Italian citizenship, insofar as not ascertained, activatable without limits of time by the holders (the technical report to the draft law of conversion of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025 estimates at over 60 million the Italo-descendants). The Italian discipline represented an isolated case at the comparative level, because the other Countries have over time introduced limitations to the transmission of citizenship by filiation: in France, see arts. 23-6 and 30-3 of the Code civil (text of 1993); in Germany, § 4, paragraph 4, of the law on citizenship (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz – StAG); in the United Kingdom, Section 3(2) of the British Nationality Act of 1981; in Spain, art. 24 of the Código Civil.
Such situation has remained unchanged not only following the extension of the active male electorate, which occurred with the law 30 June 1912, n. 665 (On the reform of the political electoral law), but also after the events which, between 1945 and 1948, have radically mutated the scenario: the introduction of female suffrage (lieutenancy legislative decree 1 February 1945, n. 23, bearing «Extension to women of the right to vote») and the entry into force of the republican Constitution. As will be seen immediately, the maintenance of the original norms, arisen in a very different context, has determined a tendential disharmony of the legislative discipline on citizenship with respect to the constitutional arrangement.
8.2.– The transformation of the form of State determined by the Constitution has entailed an essential modification of the status of citizen. In fact, full universal suffrage and the republican Constitution have connected the status civitatis and the status activae civitatis, which, instead, in the “monoclass State”, based on restricted suffrage for reasons of census and instruction, were disjointed.
The Constitution has realized a “Copernican revolution” in the relationship between citizens and the State apparatus, because it has entrusted to the former, united in the people, sovereignty, not only quoad titulum, but also quoad exercitium.
The provision according to which sovereignty belongs to the people, who exercise it in the forms and within the limits provided by the Constitution (art. 1, second paragraph, Const.), concretizes itself in the provisions that attribute to citizens the rights of democratic participation, in particular the active and passive electorate (arts. 48 and 51 Const.), the concourse to the determination of national policy through political parties (art. 49 Const.) and the right to vote in referendums (arts. 75 and 138 Const.).
Therefore, the political decisions binding the state community are taken through the concourse of the same citizens who are subjected to those decisions. In this way, a congruence is established between being subject in a durable manner to a determined political dominion, insofar as components of the people of the State, and being holders of democratic participation rights. The democratic principle, thus understood, allows reconciling the permanence of political dominion – which entails the distinction between governors and governed, between command and obedience – and the principle of self-determination of the citizens who form the sovereign people.
It follows that citizens are linked in a substantial manner to the life of the democratic State, which they constitute and support, giving rise to a community of political destinies. They, through democratic cooperation to the decisions that invest the community, are co-responsible for what happens to it and undergo, at least in a certain measure, its consequences, both the advantageous ones, and those which imply burdens and sacrifices.
8.2.1.– Democratic participation that gives life to a community of political destinies roots itself in an effective tie between the citizens and the national community. The necessity of this tie emerges with clarity from some constitutional principles.
In particular, art. 1 Const. establishes a nexus between the territory (the concept of «Italy» comprehends the geographical place), the people and sovereignty, in the sense that sovereignty is exercised on the territory and cannot belong to a multitude of citizens untied from that territory.
Art. 4, second paragraph, statuses that «[e]very citizen has the duty to carry out, according to his own possibilities and his own choice, an activity or a function that concurs to the material or spiritual progress of society». Active commitment in the national community, therefore, is a consubstantial element to the constitutional vision of citizenship, which entails the existence of an effective ensemble of relationships, social bindings, sharing of experiences and responsibilities, which constitute the base of the community of political destinies.
The constitutional nexus between citizenship and active commitment in the national community constitutes the logical development of what is established by art. 3, second paragraph, Const., which, on one side, entrusts to the Republic the task of removing obstacles of an economic and social order which in fact limit the liberty and equality of citizens, on the other, connects such task of the Republic to the objective of rendering effective participation in the political, economic and social organization of the Country, as well as by art. 2, which requires «the fulfillment of the inderogable duties of political, economic and social solidarity». It is then to be recalled that, based on the fundamental norm of which to art. 1, first paragraph, Const., the Republic is «founded on labor».
Finally, art. 54, first paragraph, Const. establishes that «citizens have the duty to be faithful to the Republic and to observe its Constitution and laws». Indeed, even if foreigners present in the territory of the State have the obligation to respect its Constitution and laws, the “duty of fidelity” is precipuous of citizens and expresses the intensity of the bond that unites them to the national community.
Ultimately, the web of constitutional principles converges in the configuration of the people as a community bound by effective ties among its members, constituted by solidarity, reciprocity of rights and duties, commitment for the progress of society, sharing of common destinies. In the same perspective, this Court, underlining the pertinence of the tributary duty to the pactum unionis rather than to that of subiectionis, has observed that, in the constitutional perspective, «what stands at the center is no longer so much the State and the tributary power […] but other conceptual categories that pertain to the person situated inside the community, to the relationships that derive from the social ties in which he is immersed, to the bonds of solidarity that follow from it and which it is up to the legislator to define, inspiring himself by progressivity and in respect of contributory capacity» (judgment n. 137 of 2025, point 6).
8.2.2.– The broader guarantee of pluralism offered by the Constitution (arts. 2, 6, 8, 18, 19, 33, 39, 41, 49 Const.) causes the people to be articulated in a multiplicity of formations, political, economic, social, religious, cultural. But the “people as multiplicity” is flanked by the “people as unity”. The richness of pluralism, in its multiple dimensions, does not exclude, in fact, that the people can express itself as unity – in particular, in its guise of electoral body – and that the Constitution configures it, in its first article, as a unitary subjective figure. To the famous We the People with which the US Constitution opens corresponds the lapidary affirmation according to which «[s]overeignty belongs to the people». Analogously to the expression used by the US Constitution, it founds the democratic order on a “singular plural”, on a “collective ego”, which necessarily presupposes a bond with a territory – sovereignty, in fact, is exercised in a determined territorial space – and the sharing of some material principles that create the sense of common belonging, of collective identity.
In this regard, this Court has underlined that «the constitutional norms evoke a correlation between citizenship and territory of the State, insofar as a place that reflects a common cultural humus and the sharing of constitutional principles» (judgment n. 142 of 2025, point 11.2.). Therefore, citizens constitute the people insofar as, besides the bond structured through some form of participation in collective life, solidarity, reciprocal rights and duties, they tendentially share the constitutional principles, which are the expression of the civic values upon which the Republic is founded. In this way, the citizen experiences himself as a member not already of a casual assemblage of individuals, but of a specific demos in which elevated pluralism and political conflictuality are compatible with the maintenance of national unity and of social cohesion.
Moreover, the aforementioned constitutional configuration of the people allows justifying the operating of the majority rule, necessary to ensure the functioning of representative democracy (art. 64 Const.). In fact, the power of the majority to adopt political decisions that regard the entire community without the minority feeling dominated by an “other”, in contradiction with the democratic principle, presupposes that both the majority and the minorities self-perceive themselves as making part of the same community and therefore bound by ties that transcend the single decision or the political address of a specific Government.
8.2.3.– The Constitution expressly dedicates to the regime of citizenship a single provision, and that is art. 22, pursuant to which no one can be deprived, for political reasons, of citizenship. The lack of other punctual constitutional rules makes it so that the legislator – as this Court has pointed out – enjoys an ample discretion in the discipline of the institute (judgments n. 25 and n. 142 of 2025). However, this Court has also specified that the norms on citizenship are not subtracted from the judgment of constitutional legitimacy and that the Constitution anyway outlines «traits of citizenship, immersed in the complexity of the constitutional text» (judgment n. 142 of 2025, point 11.2.).
In the absence of punctual constitutional rules to apply to the regime of citizenship, one must take into account the complex of the examined principles, from the web of which emerges a very general model of citizenship (with few essential traits), to which the ordinary legislation should refer, even in a space characterized by ample margins of discretion.
Three aspects of this model, identified in the preceding points, must be underlined: a) citizens are holders of the rights of democratic co-participation to the formation of the political decisions that regard them, making of the people a community of political destinies, and are, in principle, subjected both to the advantages, and to the sacrifices and burdens that derive from the complex of such decisions; b) citizenship implies an effective bond with the people and with the State, which entails the commitment for the progress of society and the fulfillment of the duties of solidarity; c) the effective bond of the citizen with the people is also constituted by the sharing of a common cultural “humus” and of constitutional principles, expressions of the civic values on which the Republic is founded (see the cited point 11.2. of judgment n. 142 of 2025).
8.2.4.– Now, a legislation such as the one prior to the decree under examination, which allowed even to persons not having any effective tie with the republican community to obtain without any limitation Italian citizenship and, therefore, to concur (in case of ascertainment) to the determination of the decisions that apply to such community, on close inspection distanced itself notably from the model of citizenship outlined above. It permitted, in fact, to concur to the political decisions concerning the community even to those who had not contributed to its progress, did not participate in the common destinies and could easily subtract themselves from the sacrifices and obligations deriving from such decisions.
Furthermore, the fact that persons substantially extraneous to the national community, through the acquisition of citizenship, could be determinant for the formation of the political majority (or for the outcome of a referendum) weakened the legitimation of the majoritarian principle. In fact, the other citizens, who had not concurred to the formation of such majority, but had among themselves an effective tie, would have perceived the political decisions adopted by it as imposed “from the outside”.
The problematic aspects just exposed were accentuated with the reforms that introduced the vote of Italians abroad: constitutional laws 17 January 2000, n. 1 (Modification to article 48 of the Constitution concerning the establishment of the Foreign constituency for the exercise of the right to vote of Italian citizens resident abroad), and 23 January 2001, n. 1 (Modifications to articles 56 and 57 of the Constitution concerning the number of deputies and senators in representation of Italians abroad), implemented with the law 27 December 2001, n. 459 (Norms for the exercise of the right to vote of Italian citizens resident abroad).
8.2.5.– The discipline of citizenship must, furthermore, respect the principles that concern Union citizenship (judgment n. 142 of 2025, point 11.3. of the Considered in law). The fact that a matter – like citizenship – falls within the competence of the Member States does not prevent that, in situations falling within the ambit of application of Union law, the national norms must respect this latter (CJEU, fourth chamber, judgment 25 April 2024, joined cases from C-684/22 to C-686/22, Stadt Duisburg, point 34). This obligation finds its coverage, under the profile of national constitutional law, in arts. 11 and 117, first paragraph.
The ownership of the citizenship of a Member State constitutes the premise for the attribution of European citizenship, from which derives the enjoyment of some rights, among which the full freedom of circulation and the right to vote and of eligibility at the elections of the European Parliament and at municipal elections in the Member State of residence, under the same conditions as the nationals of that State (art. 20 TFEU), as well as all the other rights that the Luxembourg judges have founded on the aforementioned freedom of circulation.
From what has been exposed descend two consequences: a) the discipline of the conditions of acquisition of national citizenship must take into account the effect of attribution of European citizenship and, therefore, cannot prejudice the juridico-constitutional meaning of this latter; b) the revocation of national citizenship has an immediate impact on the ownership of European citizenship and therefore on the enjoyment of the rights deriving from it, with the consequence that it will have to respect some Euro-unitary principles, such as that of proportionality.
On all this we will return at the moment of examining the specific grievance relative to the violation of art. 117, first paragraph, Const. For the moment, however, two aspects of the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice should be highlighted: a) the Member States, in attributing citizenship, must take into account the fact that «the foundation of the bond of citizenship of a Member State resides in the particular relationship of solidarity and loyalty existing between that State and its citizens as well as in the reciprocity of rights and duties», because that relationship «constitutes also the foundation of the rights and duties that the treaties reserve to the citizens of the Union»; b) European citizenship is founded «on the common values contained in art. 2 TEU and on the mutual trust that the Member States accord to each other as to the fact that none of them exercises such competence in a way that is manifestly incompatible with the very nature of the citizenship of the Union» (Court of Justice, judgment Commission, points 96-97 and 95).
Therefore, there must exist a relationship of coherence between the constitutional arrangement of national citizenship and the regime of European citizenship. The reconstruction of citizenship in the democratic legal system carried out in the preceding paragraphs harmonizes and integrates perfectly with the needs of European citizenship (judgment n. 142 of 2025, point 11.3.). In fact, in coherence with what affirmed by the Luxembourg judges, an effective relationship of solidarity and of loyalty between the State and the citizens and the reciprocity of rights and duties is required. Furthermore, the aforementioned reconstruction ensures the connection between national citizenship and European citizenship based on the sharing of some civic values, which stand as the foundation both of the Republic and of the European Union. The constitutional principles, which concur to the creation of an effective tie of the citizen with the national community, are in large part superimposable and anyway always coherent with the values enumerated by art. 2 TEU, which stand at the base of the “European society”. Exactly this homogeneity of values permits the same individual to feel simultaneously Italian and European and to have a dual affiliation, to the Italian people and to the “European society”.
8.3.– It is now the moment to illustrate the content of the censured norms.
Art. 3-bis of the law n. 91 of 1992, introduced by art. 1, paragraph 1, of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, derogates ex tunc to the norms (illustrated in point 8.1.) that foresee the unlimited transmission of citizenship by filiation. In substance, it establishes that «is considered to never have acquired Italian citizenship whoever was born abroad even before the date of entry into force of the present article and is in possession of another citizenship», unless one of the following conditions occurs (alternatively): a) the state of citizen is recognized (via administrative or judicial route) following an application presented by 23:59 of 27 March 2025, or subsequently, on the day indicated by an appointment communicated to the interested party by the competent office by 23:59 of 27 March 2025; b) a parent or a grandparent possesses, or possessed at the moment of death, exclusively Italian citizenship (such requisite is specified by the circular of the Ministry of the Interior n. 26185 of 2025); c) a parent or adopter has been resident in Italy for at least two continuous years subsequently to the acquisition of Italian citizenship and prior to the date of birth or of adoption of the child.
The meaning of such discipline is reconstructed in opposite terms by the State Advocacy and by the judge a quo (with whom the constituted parties agree). According to the first, it would not have retroactive effects, applying to future recognitions of citizenship. In the opinion of the second, art. 3-bis of the law n. 91 of 1992 would order an implicit and retroactive revocation of citizenship for all its addressees.
Neither of these perspectives is shareable.
The discipline under examination represents an exemplary case of proper retroactivity, insofar as the legal effects of pre-existing norms are excluded ex tunc, that is art. 3-bis attributes to preceding facts «legal consequences different from their own ones in the temporal framework of reference» (judgment n. 173 of 2019).
On the other hand, the new provision is clear in configuring an original preclusion to the acquisition of Italian citizenship for foreigners born abroad, and not a revocation. Also from the “topographical” point of view, the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, has inserted the new discipline (art. 3-bis of the law n. 91 of 1992) immediately after that relative to the acquisition by filiation (arts. 1, 2 and 3), not in the context of the provisions dedicated to revocation (art. 10-bis) and to the loss of citizenship (art. 12).
The non-utilization of the institute of revocation is coherent with the content of the norms under examination, which produce effects with respect to which revocation is conceptually extraneous. In fact, both in general administrative law (art. 21-quinquies of the law 7 August 1990, n. 241, bearing «New norms in the matter of administrative proceeding and right of access to administrative documents») and in the law on citizenship (art. 10-bis of the law n. 91 of 1992), revocation is an institute that operates ex nunc, in connection with supervening circumstances, while art. 3-bis produces effects ex tunc, in order to cope with a very long-standing situation (even if aggravated over the decades). Furthermore, revocation (as also the loss of citizenship regulated by art. 12 of the law n. 91 of 1992 and the ex officio annulment of the measure granting citizenship) goes to strike a status already officially acquired by a single individual, while the norms under examination affect the unofficially recognized status of a multitude of persons. It is likely due to this the particular locution used by the legislator («is considered to never have acquired Italian citizenship»): the use of the presumptive formula results adequate to the fact that for none of the addressees of the norms was the status of Italian citizen legally certain.
It is important to point out, moreover, that the decree under examination modifies other provisions, with the aim of facilitating entry into Italy and the obtainment of Italian citizenship on the part of foreigners of Italian origin. Art. 1, paragraph 1-bis, modifies art. 4 of the law n. 91 of 1992, which regulates the acquisition of Italian citizenship by “benefit of law”. Furthermore, art. 1-bis of the same law-decree dictates «[p]rovisions to favor the recovery of the Italian roots of oriundi and the consequent acquisition of Italian citizenship», facilitating entry into Italy for subordinate labor for the oriundo foreigner, without generational limits, and their naturalization (the necessary period of residence comes reduced from three to two years): on such novelties we will return in point 9.2.3.
9.– We can now examine the individual questions of constitutional legitimacy raised by the Court of Turin.
As seen (point 6), the first question, which denounces the violation of arts. 2 and 3 Const., comprises two distinct sub-questions. In the first place, art. 3-bis would arbitrarily distinguish between those who requested the ascertainment of citizenship before 28 March 2025 and those who requested it after. In the second place, art. 3-bis would injure vested rights, determining an «implicit revocation of citizenship with retroactive efficacy and without any provision of intertemporal law».
9.1.– The first question is not founded.
In general, the adoption of transitory norms which, on the occasion of a change of discipline, keep firm the application of pre-existing norms to proceedings already initiated certainly does not result singular. This Court has excluded the unreasonableness of norms of the kind, underlining the ample discretion of the legislator in the limitation of retroactivity through transitory norms (judgments n. 376 of 2008 and n. 246 of 1992).
In the case under examination, the censured discipline has deemed to save foreigners of Italian origin who had already presented an application for ascertainment of Italian citizenship (or had received an appointment), placing, therefore, a certain reliance on the application of the pre-existing norms. The application for ascertainment is a circumstance that can reasonably be evaluated suitable to differentiate those who proposed it, insofar as it increases the weight of their reliance. There remains unprejudiced, moreover (insofar as extraneous to the judgment a quo and therefore not raised by the remitting [judge]), the question relative to the differentiation between those who received the appointment and those who started the procedure of recognition of citizenship, but did not receive the appointment by 23:59 of 27 March 2025.
9.2.– Also the question relative to the lesion of vested rights is not founded.
The principle of legitimate reliance is derived from art. 3 Const. (ex multis, judgments n. 216 of 2023 and n. 169 of 2022) and is «subject to the normal balancing proper to all constitutional principles and rights» (judgments n. 134 of 2025 and n. 182 of 2022 and, in the same sense, n. 108 of 2019). To evaluate whether art. 3-bis has balanced in a not unreasonable way the legitimate reliance of foreigners of Italian origin with the pursued constitutional interests, it is necessary to consider the “weight” of the interest pursued by the censured norms (point 9.2.1.) and the consistency of the injured reliance (point 9.2.2.), taking into account the “compensatory” measures contained in the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted (point 9.2.3.).
9.2.1.– For the purposes of the first passage of the review on the reasonableness of the balancing effected by the legislator, it is convenient to take moving steps from the preamble of the decree under examination, which exposes analytically the reasons that led to its adoption.
The leitmotiv is the principle of effectiveness, that is the necessity that citizenship be reserved to whoever is bound by «effective ties» with the Republic (this phrase recurs four times in the preamble). The preamble begins by recalling the pre-existing regime, in which the ascertainment of citizenship could be requested without a temporal limit, regardless of the «effective ties» with the Republic, and underlines that the enormous number of «potential Italian citizens» lacking ties with Italy constitutes a «serious and current risk factor for national security» and of the other Member States of the EU.
The preamble then affirms the necessity to introduce «limitations in the automatic transmission of Italian citizenship» to persons born abroad, «conditioning it on clear indices of the subsistence of effective ties with the Republic». Based on a joint consideration of the principles set forth in arts. 1 and 3 Const., the necessity not to distinguish based on the moment of birth is affirmed, that is the distinction based on that element is excluded as unreasonable.
The preamble then declares, «in application of the principle of proportionality», the opportunity to maintain Italian citizenship for those who have already obtained its recognition and to apply the pre-existing norms to proceedings of ascertainment already initiated.
In substance, the aim pursued by the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, is that of establishing the necessity of «effective ties with the Republic», in order to restore the nexus between people, sovereignty and territory (this is derived from the reference to art. 1 Const. and is confirmed by the premise and by point V of the illustrative report to the draft law of conversion). As to the retroactive application of the new norms, it is justified by the consideration that the distinction based on the moment of birth (before or after the decree under examination) would be unreasonable, insofar as that moment is a «casual factor and not indicative of effective ties with the Republic».
Having thus clarified the interest aimed at by the legislator, it is necessary to specify that it – as seen in point 8.2. – places itself in line with the constitutional web that draws the traits of citizenship.
The “weight” of the criterion of the genuine link, besides emerging also in the jurisprudence of legitimacy (Civil Cassation, first section, judgment 8 February 2024, n. 3564, point 4; see then the cited judgment of the civil united sections, n. 25317 of 2022, point XI), finds confirmation expanding the gaze beyond our borders.
That criterion is recognized, in the first place, by art. 7, paragraph 1, letter e), of the European Convention on Nationality of 6 November 1997 (elaborated within the Council of Europe), according to which the deprivation of citizenship by law is possible in case of «lack of a genuine link between the State Party and a national habitually residing abroad».
The criterion of the genuine link is valorized also in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in decisions that concern both the conferral of citizenship (see the cited judgment Commission), and the loss of it (for example, Grand Chamber, judgment 12 March 2019, case C-221/17, Tjebbes, point 35); on the theme we will return in point 10.
Finally, the importance of the principle of effectiveness of citizenship emerges also in the jurisprudence of other constitutional tribunals. With decision n. 1130/1131/1132/1133 QPC of 11 April 2025, the Conseil constitutionnel rejected four questions prioritaires de constitutionnalité having as object art. 30-3 of the French civil code, which regulates the loss of citizenship by desuetude. The Conseil noted that the legislator pursued an objective of general interest, putting an end to the transmission iure sanguinis of French citizenship at the moment in which this is devoid of any effectiveness. For its part, according to the Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal (judgment 15 December 2025, n. 1133, which cites its own judgment n. 599 of 2005), the discipline of citizenship «must give essential importance to the relationships that reveal situations of effective tie between the individual and the Portuguese State and the national community» (point 12). In the judgment of the same Tribunal, of the same date, n. 1134 of 2025, it is reiterated that «[i]t will be therefore arbitrary the deprivation of citizenship unlinked from motives that do not indicate the rupture of the effective tie between individual and State» (point 14.1). Finally, one can also recall the German federal constitutional Tribunal, which has affirmed that «the State cannot link citizenship to factual circumstances not relevant, which with it are not connected in a sufficient manner»[judgment of 21 October 1987, Teso, in BVerfGE 77, 137 (153)] (translations by this Court).
Moreover, since the remitting [judge] contests not the new norms in themselves, but only their retroactive application, it is necessary to verify also the weight of the exigency, for the legislator, to render operative ex tunc the principle of effectiveness.
As seen in point 8.1., the legislator of 1912 adopted a discipline unsuited to achieve the objective of balancing the need to maintain a tie with the emigrants (and their descendants) with that of conserving an effective tie between them and Italy. The total absence of limits to the transmission of citizenship by filiation, united to the grandiosity of the migratory phenomenon, created a multitude of foreign “potential Italian citizens” (so the preamble of the law-decree of 2025), whose entity was (and is) unknown to the Italian State itself. Following the events of the years 1945-1948 (point 8.2.), a critical situation was determined from the juridico-constitutional point of view, for the virtual entitlement to political rights of millions of persons completely disconnected from Italy, and then also from the socio-economic point of view, at the moment in which the “poles of attraction” inverted and Italy became a Country of immigration. Since the law n. 91 of 1992 did not mutate the normative arrangement, the subsequent concrete manifestation of such criticalities was the enormous influx of applications at Italian consulates and of recourses at Italian tribunals, aimed at the ascertainment of citizenship. If in December 2013 Italian citizens resident abroad were 4,482,115, of which 2,974,488 born abroad, in December 2024 they rose to 6,412,752, of which 4,496,297 born abroad (see the Table reported in the report to the draft law of conversion, point IV).
The limitation of the effects of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, to future births would have left the situation just described practically unchanged. In other words, if the interest in maintaining an effective tie between Italian citizens and the Italian social fabric has the relevant weight illustrated above, analogous weight must be recognized to the need to retroactively apply the new conditions for the acquisition of citizenship. The finality pursued by the decree under examination would have been largely frustrated if the censured provisions had not also turned to the past, with the aim of remedying the effects of the pre-existing norms.
9.2.2.– The second passage of the test of reasonableness on the retroactive law requires evaluating the consistency of the reliance of those who suffered the normative mutation caused by the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted.
Art. 3-bis, excluding ex tunc the acquisition of Italian citizenship for a vast audience of persons, certainly impacted their reliance on being able, one day, to request the ascertainment of the status in question, in order to exercise the relative rights (such as the right to reside stably in Italy and to vote).
The weight of such reliance, however, results weakened by the following circumstances.
The essential element to remark is that art. 3-bis does not impact consolidated positions, that is on the status and rights of those who have already been recognized as Italian citizens, and not even on the position of those who presented the application or received the appointment. In coherence with what affirmed in the preamble, the reliance of these latter, even if lacking real ties with Italian society, was deemed by the legislator prevalent over the interest underlying the principle of effectiveness.
Citizenship is a composite subjective position, whose center of gravity is a status, to which rights and duties connect. If it is true that the status is acquired at the moment of birth from an Italian citizen, it is also true that, for persons born abroad of Italian origin, it is a matter of a status that necessarily requires an ascertainment (administrative or jurisdictional), in the lack of which they do not enjoy the regime of the Italian citizen. For none of the addressees of the new discipline does legal certainty exist regarding their status as Italian citizens. On the contrary, for all the addressees of art. 3-bis there exists the certainty that, the status not being recognized, they could not concretely enjoy the rights nor were they concretely subject to the duties incumbent upon Italian citizens.
It is true that foreigners of Italian origin did not have a specific duty to activate themselves before 28 March 2025, but one cannot consider equivalent, in the perspective of reliance, someone who activated themselves compared to someone who remained inert in the face of a status that requires a prior ascertainment for the effective enjoyment of the connected rights.
The second factor to consider pertains to the fact that art. 3-bis has a “corrective” character, that is it is aimed at defusing a situation caused by an unbalanced discipline in perpetuating ad infinitum a tie that, with the passing of generations, becomes fictitious. This Court has affirmed that «[t]he exigency to restore criteria of equity and reasonableness and to remove inequalities and incongruencies, inherent in a favorable treatment, is to be considered preponderant with respect to the protection of reliance» (judgments n. 182 of 2022 and n. 136 of 2022; see also judgments n. 70 of 2024, n. 145 of 2022, n. 108 of 2019, n. 56 of 1989).
Finally, it is to be noted that the retroactivity of the normative mutation could not be considered «absolutely unforeseeable» (judgment n. 70 of 2024), on the basis of two different considerations. The non-unforeseeability derives, in the first place, from what has just been said on the regime of particular favor provided by the derogated norms (for example, judgment n. 182 of 2022), especially in comparison with other Countries similar to Italy, which have introduced limits to the transmission of citizenship iure sanguinis (see point 8.1.). In the second place, from Italy had already arrived some signals in the sense of the limitation of the transmission by filiation and of the recourses aimed at ascertaining citizenship: on 9 October 2024 the first draft laws directed at introducing limits to citizenship by filiation had been presented (A.S. 1263 and A.C. 2080), and in December 2024 an onerous unified contribution had been introduced, for recourses in the matter of citizenship, calculated per head instead of per cause, as happened up to that moment (art. 1, paragraph 814, of the law 30 December 2024, n. 207, bearing «Forecast budget of the State for the financial year 2025 and multi-year budget for the triennium 2025-2027»).
Nor can it be considered that the introduction of limits was foreseeable, but not their retroactivity. For what has already been said, in the Italian case a remedy turned only to the future would have left intact the problem that was intended to be resolved.
9.2.3.– Finally, in evaluating the reasonableness of the balancing operated by the retroactive law, it is necessary to take into account the “compensatory” measures contained in the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted.
As mentioned (point 8.3.), the decree modifies other provisions, with the aim of facilitating entry into Italy and the obtainment of Italian citizenship on the part of foreigners of Italian origin.
In particular, two novelties concern art. 4 of the law n. 91 of 1992. Now paragraph 1 foresees the acquisition of citizenship by benefit of law also in favor of the foreigner who has a parent or grandparent who is currently an Italian citizen by birth. Furthermore, the new paragraph 1-bis regulates in the following terms the acquisition of Italian citizenship on the part of the foreign or stateless minor who has a citizen parent by birth: «[t]he foreign or stateless minor, of whom the father or mother are citizens by birth, becomes a citizen if the parents or the tutor declare the will of the acquisition of citizenship and one of the following requisites occurs: a) subsequently to the declaration, the minor resides legally for at least two continuous years in Italy; b) the declaration is presented within three years from the birth of the minor or from the subsequent date on which filiation, even adoptive, by an Italian citizen is established» (the term referred to in letter b was brought from one to three years by art. 1, paragraph 513, letter a, of the law 30 December 2025, n. 199, bearing «Forecast budget of the State for the financial year 2026 and multi-year budget for the triennium 2026-2028»). Art. 1, paragraph 1-ter, of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, extends this last possibility to parents (who have requested the ascertainment of citizenship before the decree) of minors born before the decree: «[f]or minors at the date of entry into force of the conversion law of the present decree, children of citizens by birth referred to in article 3-bis, paragraph 1, letters a), a-bis) and b), of the law 5 February 1992, n. 91, the declaration provided for by article 4, paragraph 1-bis, letter b), of the same law can be presented by 23:59, Rome time, of 31 May 2029» (this last term was moved from 31 May 2026 to 31 May 2029 by art. 1, paragraph 19-ter, of the law-decree 31 December 2025, n. 200, bearing «Urgent provisions in the matter of normative terms», converted, with modifications, in the law 27 February 2026, n. 26).
Still, art. 1-bis of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, dictates «[p]rovisions to favor the recovery of the Italian roots of oriundi and the consequent acquisition of Italian citizenship», facilitating entry into Italy for subordinate labor for the oriundo foreigner, without generational limits, and their naturalization. Based on art. 27, paragraph 1-octies (introduced ex novo), of the legislative decree 25 July 1998, n. 286 (Consolidated text of the provisions concerning the discipline of immigration and norms on the condition of the foreigner), «[a]re permitted, outside the quotas referred to in article 3, paragraph 4, with the procedures referred to in article 22, the entry and stay for subordinate labor for the foreigner resident abroad, descendant of an Italian citizen and in possession of the citizenship of a State of destination of relevant flows of Italian emigration, identified with decree of the Minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, in concert with the Ministers of the interior and of labor and social policies». Such norm was implemented with the interministerial decree 17 November 2025 (Identification of the States of destination of relevant flows of Italian emigration to whose citizens, if descendants of an Italian citizen, is permitted entry and stay in Italy for subordinate labor outside the quotas referred to in article 3, paragraph 4, of the legislative-decree 25 July 1998, n. 286). Finally, art. 1-bis, paragraph 2, of the decree under examination reduced from three to two years the period of residence necessary for the naturalization of the oriundo foreigner (see the new text of art. 9, paragraph 1, letter a, of the law n. 91 of 1992).
9.2.4.– Overall, from the considerations exposed in points 9.2.1., 9.2.2. and 9.2.3. it descends that the censured norms have balanced in a not unreasonable way the reliance of the addressees and the constitutional principle of effectiveness of citizenship.
Art. 3-bis introduced ex tunc new conditions for the acquisition of citizenship by filiation on the part of foreigners born abroad, requiring a sufficient nexus with Italy but contemporaneously protecting the reliance of those who had already obtained the recognition of the status or had presented the application (or at least received the appointment). The legislator intervened to cope with a divergence of the legislation from the constitutional context, which had progressively aggravated due to the legal and social reasons already exposed (points 8.1. and 8.2.). In the matter of citizenship, the legislator enjoys ample discretion, which this Court has recognized by declaring in part inadmissible the questions raised on the absence of limits in the transmission of citizenship by filiation (judgment n. 142 of 2025). Even in the awareness of the value that Italian descent covers for the communities of oriundi and of the importance that those same communities have, under the cultural and economic profile, for Italy – which in the decree under examination translated into the provisions of favor recalled in point 9.2.3. –, this Court believes, therefore, not founded the question raised for injury of vested rights.
10.– The judge a quo then laments the violation of art. 117, first paragraph, Const., in relation to art. 9 of the TEU and to art. 20 of the TFEU, which attribute citizenship of the Union to whoever has the citizenship of a Member State.
Neither is such question founded.
In point 8.2.5. the meaning of the nexus between citizenship of the Member State and European citizenship was already illustrated and it was underlined that, according to the Court of Justice, the citizenship conferred by the States must be based on a real relationship between State and citizen (see the cited judgment Commission). The decision on the Maltese case of 2025 represents a coherent development of previous judgments, which considered justified – even if reviewable under the profile of proportionality – national norms that disposed the loss of citizenship, insofar as directed at «protecting the particular relationship of solidarity and of loyalty between it [the Member State] and its citizens as well as the reciprocity of rights and of duties, which constitute the foundation of the bond of citizenship» (Grand Chamber, judgment 2 March 2010, case C-135/08, Rottmann, point 51; in the same sense the cited judgments Stadt Duisburg, point 37, and Tjebbes, point 31; Grand Chamber, judgment 18 January 2022, case C-118/20, Wiener Landesregierung, point 52), and to guarantee the permanence of an effective bond with the Member State: «it is legitimate for a Member State to consider that citizenship is the expression of an effective bond between itself and its own citizens and to link, consequently, to the absence or to the cessation of such an effective bond the loss of its citizenship» (so, again, the cited judgment Tjebbes, point 35). However, «taking into account the importance that the primary law of the Union attributes to the status of citizen of the Union which, as recalled in point 29 of the present judgment, constitutes the fundamental status of the citizens of the Member States, it is up to the competent national authorities and the national judges to verify whether the loss of the citizenship of the interested Member State, whenever it entails the loss of the status of citizen of the Union and of the rights deriving therefrom, respects the principle of proportionality regarding its consequences on the situation of the interested party and, if the case, on that of their family members, under the profile of the law of the Union» (see the cited judgment of the Court of Justice Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet, point 38).
The remitting [judge] recalls such jurisprudence and censures art. 3-bis for not having «provided any mechanism of intertemporal law that would allow […] the conservation of citizenship within reasonable terms (for example, providing a “time window” within which to be able to present an administrative or judicial application for recognition of citizenship)».
The question is not founded due to the irrelevance of the recalled jurisprudence with respect to the censured norms. The pronouncements of the Court of Justice cited above concern, all, cases in which a Member State has deprived a subject of an ascertained status (of national and, therefore, European citizen), thus impacting rights concretely exercisable by the same subject. According to the Court of Justice, norms depriving of citizenship fall within the ambit of application of Union law when they entail the loss of a recognized status and of the correlated rights (judgments Rottmann, point 49; Stadt Duisburg, point 36; Tjebbes, point 32; Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet, point 30; Wiener Landesregierung, points 39-41 and 48; see also Grand Chamber, judgment 8 March 2011, case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano, point 42: «art. 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine and effective enjoyment of the rights attributed by their status as citizens of the Union»). The Court of Justice underlines that the consequences produced by norms depriving of citizenship «cannot be hypothetical or eventual»: judgment Tjebbes, point 40 (in the same sense judgments Stadt Duisburg, point 50; Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet, point 54; Wiener Landesregierung, point 59).
Precisely because national norms concretely impact the rights correlated to European citizenship, an individual examination of the consequences produced on the life of the interested parties is necessary, according to the Court of Justice, in implementation of the principle of proportionality. Such examination would not even be hypothesizable if the status of European citizen is not ascertained and, therefore, no right is concretely exercisable by the interested subjects. The ratio of the European jurisprudence is to guard the citizenship of the Union intended as fundamental status of the citizens of the Member States: such ratio is missing in the case in question, because for none of the addressees of the censured art. 3-bis was the status of European citizen legally certain.
Ultimately, the pronouncements of the Court of Justice recalled by the remitting [judge] are not pertinent because the censured norms, as specified in point 8.3., do not order a loss of Italian citizenship.
Being clear that the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice delimits the obligation of individual examination (of the consequences produced by norms depriving of citizenship) to cases in which the subject loses an ascertained status and the correlated concretely exercisable rights, the request, advanced by the parties, to operate a preliminary reference on the compatibility between the censured art. 3-bis and arts. 9 TEU and 20 TFEU is to be rejected. In fact, when doubts exist on the content of Union law, which comes into relief in a judgment of constitutional legitimacy, this Court proposes a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice. In the case at hand, however, the pronouncements of this latter relative to arts. 9 TEU and 20 TFEU make evident, for the reasons exposed above, that the prerequisites recur which, according to the jurisprudence of the same Court, exonerate from the duty to operate the preliminary reference (Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, judgments 24 March 2026, Remling, case C-767/23, and 6 October 2021, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, case C-561/19; judgment 6 October 1982, Cilfit and others, case C-283/81).
11.– According to the remitting [judge], art. 3-bis would violate art. 117, first paragraph, Const. also in relation to art. 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which «[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality, nor denied the right to change nationality».
The question is inadmissible.
Such Declaration is not a binding international act, insofar as it is incorporated in resolution 217A of the UN General Assembly. Therefore, art. 15, paragraph 2, of the Declaration, as a non-binding provision, is unsuited to integrate the parameter of art. 117, first paragraph, Const., which refers to the «bonds deriving […] from international obligations». From this descends the inadmissibility of the question for insufficient motivation on the non-manifest unfoundedness, insofar as the remitting [judge] does not explain why from the Declaration an international obligation would descend, suited to “activate” art. 117, first paragraph, Const. (judgments n. 185, n. 95 and n. 142 of 2025, n. 194 of 2018).
There remains unprejudiced the question whether art. 15, paragraph 2, of the Declaration expresses a customary norm, given that the remitting [judge] specifically recalls art. 117, first paragraph, Const. (not art. 10, first paragraph, Const.) and «treaty international law» and, in the point relative to art. 15 of the Declaration, never invokes an international custom with corresponding content.
12.– Finally, the judge a quo laments the violation of art. 117, first paragraph, Const. in relation to art. 3, paragraph 2, of Prot. n. 4 ECHR, according to which «[n]o one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national».
Also such question is inadmissible.
The ECHR does not guarantee a right to citizenship, disciplining only, in art. 3 of protocol n. 4, the «[p]rohibition of expulsion of nationals» in these terms: «1. No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of which he is a national. 2. No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national». Therefore, art. 3 guarantees the right to remain or enter the territory of the State of which one is citizens, not that of having or conserving citizenship. The explanatory report that accompanies protocol n. 4 indicates that the Committee of experts (responsible for the elaboration of the text of the Protocol) proposed to insert a provision according to which a State would be prohibited from depriving a national of its nationality for the purpose of expelling him. However, «the majority of the experts thought it was inadvisable in Article 3 to touch on the delicate question of the legitimacy of measures depriving individuals of nationality» (point 23). Therefore, art. 3 of protocol n. 4 deliberately avoids disciplining measures depriving of citizenship, prohibiting only those that injure the right of abode of someone who is a citizen.
From the jurisprudence of the ECHR Court it results that: a) a right to acquire or conserve a certain citizenship is not guaranteed by the ECHR (for example, judgment 21 May 2013, Fehrer and Dolnik v. Slovakia, point 41); b) an «arbitrary denial» of citizenship could injure the right to private life under art. 8 ECHR, but the arbitrariness of the deprivation must be ascertained based on the internal law of the State (again, judgment Fehrer and Dolnik, point 41; see also judgments 22 December 2020, Usmanov v. Russia, points 53-54, and 17 September 2024, Abo v. Estonia, points 63-64); c) the right to enter the territory of a State, guaranteed by the cited art. 3, paragraph 2, of protocol n. 4, belongs only to the citizens of that State (Grand Chamber, judgment 14 September 2022, H.F. and others v. France, points 205 and 245).
From an obiter of the cited judgment H.F. it results that the deprivation of citizenship inflicted for the purpose of preventing the entry of the citizen into the territory could be «problematic» in relation to art. 3, paragraph 2, of protocol n. 4 (point 249). The European Court makes reference, anyway, to an act concerning persons who, before the injurious act, had the right of entry insofar as recognized as citizens, not to an act (like the decree under examination) concerning persons who did not have an effective right of entry into the Italian territory insofar as their citizenship had not been ascertained.
The remitting [judge] faces none of the profiles exposed above, not arguing, therefore, the pertinence of art. 3, paragraph 2, with respect to the censured norms. From this derives the inadmissibility of the question due to insufficient motivation on non-manifest unfoundedness.
FOR THESE REASONS THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
- declares inadmissible the interventions in judgment of L.A. T. and others, L.A. F., R. D.C.R.R. and others and L.P. C.G.;
- declares inadmissible the interventions in judgment of the Association of jurists Iure Sanguinis (AGIS), of the Confederation of Italians in the world and of the Italian Association “Sardi Uniti” di Socorros Mutuos;
- declares inadmissible the question of constitutional legitimacy of art. 3-bis of the law 5 February 1992, n. 91 (New norms on citizenship), introduced by art. 1, paragraph 1, of the law-decree 28 March 2025, n. 36 (Urgent provisions in the matter of citizenship), converted, with modifications, in the law 23 May 2025, n. 74, raised – limited to the words «even before the date of entry into force of the present article» and to the conditions foreseen in letters a), a-bis) and b) –, in reference to art. 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to art. 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the Ordinary Court of Turin, specialized section in the matter of immigration, international protection and free circulation of EU citizens, in monocratic composition, with the order indicated in the epigraph;
- declares inadmissible the question of constitutional legitimacy of art. 3-bis of the law n. 91 of 1992, introduced by art. 1, paragraph 1, of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, raised – limited to the words «even before the date of entry into force of the present article» and to the conditions foreseen in letters a), a-bis) and b) –, in reference to art. 117, first paragraph, Const., in relation to art. 3, paragraph 2, of Protocol n. 4 to the European Convention on human rights, signed in Strasbourg on 16 September 1963, made executive with decree of the President of the Republic 14 April 1982, n. 217, by the Ordinary Court of Turin, specialized section in the matter of immigration, international protection and free circulation of EU citizens, in monocratic composition, with the order indicated in the epigraph;
- declares not founded the question of constitutional legitimacy of art. 3-bis of the law n. 91 of 1992, introduced by art. 1, paragraph 1, of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, raised – limited to the words «even before the date of entry into force of the present article» and to the conditions foreseen in letters a), a-bis) and b) –, in reference to arts. 2 and 3 Const., by the Ordinary Court of Turin, specialized section in the matter of immigration, international protection and free circulation of EU citizens, in monocratic composition, with the order indicated in the epigraph;
- declares not founded the question of constitutional legitimacy of art. 3-bis of the law n. 91 of 1992, introduced by art. 1, paragraph 1, of the law-decree n. 36 of 2025, as converted, raised – limited to the words «even before the date of entry into force of the present article» and to the conditions foreseen in letters a), a-bis) and b) –, in reference to art. 117, first paragraph, Const., in relation to art. 9 of the Treaty on European Union and to art. 20 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, by the Ordinary Court of Turin, specialized section in the matter of immigration, international protection and free circulation of EU citizens, in monocratic composition, with the order indicated in the epigraph.
Thus decided in Rome, in the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, 11 March 2026.
Signed: Giovanni AMOROSO, President Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Drafter Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry Deposited in the Registry on 30 April 2026 The Director of the Registry Signed: Roberto MILANA
ANNEX: ORDER READ AT THE HEARING OF 11 MARCH 2026
ORDER
Noted that the Ordinary Court of Turin, specialized section in the matter of immigration, international protection and free circulation of EU citizens, with order registered at n. 167 of the register of orders 2025 and published in the O.G. of 17 September 2025, n. 38, has raised questions of constitutional legitimacy of art. 3-bis – limited to the words «even before the date of entry into force of the present article» and to the conditions foreseen in letters a), a-bis) and b) – of the law 5 February 1992, n. 91 (New norms on citizenship), introduced by art. 1, paragraph 1, of the law-decree 28 March 2025, n. 36 (Urgent provisions in the matter of citizenship), converted, with modifications, in the law 23 May 2025, n. 74, for violation of arts. 2, 3 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution;
that, with act deposited on 8 March 2026, intervened in the constitutional judgment A. L.A. and J. L.A.;
that the interveners report being applicants in a judgment for the recognition of Italian citizenship, pending before the Ordinary Court of Campobasso;
that the Court of Campobasso has suspended such judgment and has raised questions of constitutional legitimacy – with order registered at n. 40 of the register of orders 2026, in the course of publication in the Official Gazette – on the same norms censured by the Court of Turin;
that the interveners argue the admissibility of the intervention observing that the decision that this Court will adopt on the questions promoted by the Court of Turin would condition the outcome both of the judgment of constitutional legitimacy promoted by the Court of Campobasso and of the common judgment pending before it;
that A. L.A. and J. L.A. ask to intervene to propose an instance for joint treatment of the present judgment and of that registered at n. 40 reg. ord. of 2026, with the aim of avoiding a prejudice to their right of defense;
that they argue the timeliness of the intervention noting that it would have been impossible to deposit the relative act by 7 October 2025, insofar as the interest to intervene would have arisen only subsequently to the remittal order of the Court of Campobasso of 9 February 2026;
that they underline, in this regard, that, due to the fulfillments foreseen for proxies issued abroad, the defender was able to receive the proxy only on 3 March 2026.
Considered that, based on art. 4, paragraph 3, of the Supplementary Norms for judgments before the Constitutional Court, the interventions of third parties in the judgment of constitutional legitimacy in an incidental proceeding «take place with the modalities and within the term referred to in the preceding paragraph», that is «within the peremptory term of twenty days from the publication of the order in the Official Gazette»;
that, in the case at hand, the term expired on 7 October 2025 and the act of intervention of A. L.A. and J. L.A. was deposited on 8 March 2026, without the date of the recalled order of the Court of Campobasso having relevance;
that this Court has confirmed the peremptory character of the term for the deposit of the act of intervention (ex multis, judgment n. 198 of 2022 and order n. 24 of 2021);
that, anyway, the necessary fulfillments for the proxy do not represent as a rule an insuperable impediment for the respect of the term, nor have real and effective suitable circumstances been alleged to justify an eventual readmission into terms;
that, ultimately, the intervention of A. L.A. and J. L.A. must be declared inadmissible.
FOR THESE REASONS THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
declares inadmissible the intervention explained by A. L.A. and J. L.A. in the judgment of constitutional legitimacy promoted by the Ordinary Court of Turin, specialized section in the matter of immigration, international protection and free circulation of EU citizens.
Signed: Giovanni Amoroso, President
The anonymized version is conformed, in text, to the original
The judgments and orders of the Constitutional Court are published in the first special series of the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic (pursuant to art. 3 of the law 11 December 1984, n. 839 and 21 of the decree of the President of the Republic 28 December 1985, n. 1092) and in the Official Collection of the judgments and orders of the Constitutional Court (pursuant to art. 29 of the Supplementary Norms for judgments before the Constitutional Court, approved by the Constitutional Court on 16 March 1956).
The text published in the Official Gazette makes entirely faith and prevails in case of divergence.
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The authorized complete text of Corte Costituzionale, Sentenza n. 63/2026 is available as a PDF on my server.
How to cite: Corte Costituzionale, Sentenza n. 63/2026, ECLI:IT:COST:2026:63, depositata il 30 aprile 2026.
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