[BREAKING NEWS] Constitutional Court Order No. 147/2026: Referral to the European Court of Justice on Law 74/2025
📌 UPDATE August 10, 2026: New free tool — AVITAL Minor Issue Tool: check whether your case falls within the Minor Issue framework after SSUU No. 24045/2026. Read our announcement: AVITAL Minor Issue Tool.
📌 UPDATE August 10, 2026: Assess your Minor Issue case with our new interactive tool: Italian Citizenship Minor Issue Tool — AVITAL.
📌 UPDATE July 29, 2026: The Supreme Court United Sections have published Ruling No. 24184/2026, confirming that Law 74/2025 does not apply to pre-March 27, 2025 judicial claims. Read our latest coverage: Italian Supreme Court Ruling No. 24184/2026.
🏛️ SUPREME COURT UPDATE (JULY 26, 2026): On July 26, 2026, the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation (Sezioni Unite Civili) issued Sentenza No. 24045/2026, ruling that Law 74/2025 does NOT apply retroactively to judicial claims filed before March 27, 2025, and confirming that dual citizens at birth are fully protected under Article 7 Law 555/1912.
BREAKING NEWS UPDATE — JULY 23, 2026
Italian Constitutional Court — Order No. 147/2026
The Constitutional Court has officially stayed the proceedings on Law 74/2025 (Article 3-bis of Law 91/1992) and referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under Article 267 TFEU. Below is the executive breakdown along with the official ruling text and side-by-side English translation.
Need to Appeal a First-Instance Court Denial?
If your jure sanguinis claim was denied by an Italian Civil Court under Law 74/2025 or the Minor Issue, Order No. 147/2026 provides immediate procedural grounds to challenge the ruling before the Corte d’Appello. Learn how to file an Italian Citizenship Court Denial Appeal with Avv. Vitale →
What Are the Key Takeaways from Order 147/2026?
- Constitutional Proceedings Suspended: On July 23, 2026, the Italian Constitutional Court published Order No. 147/2026 (ECLI:IT:COST:2026:147), staying the joined constitutional proceedings originating from the Tribunals of Mantua (ord. 4/2026) and Campobasso (ordd. 40 and 41/2026) .
- Reference to Luxembourg: The Court formally submitted a preliminary ruling request to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under Article 267 TFEU .
- The Core Question: Luxembourg must now decide whether Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU on European Union citizenship preclude national rules—specifically Article 3-bis of Law 91/1992, introduced by Law 74/2025—that retroactively block jure sanguinis recognition for foreign-born individuals holding another nationality .
- Direct Procedural Impact: Tribunals across Italy hearing pending jure sanguinis claims governed by Law 74/2025 now have solid procedural grounds to stay proceedings pending the CJEU decision .
- Expected Timeline: Preliminary rulings before the CJEU typically require 12 to 18 months before a final judgment is delivered .
Executive Summary: The Italian Constitutional Court’s Order No. 147/2026 referred preliminary questions to the CJEU on the compatibility of Law 74/2025 with EU fundamental rights. In my legal assessment, this order is a double-edged sword: while it shows the Court’s procedural engagement at the European level, it simultaneously confirms that the generational limitations and retroactivity restrictions of the Tajani Decree now Law 74/2025 remain in force for all claims filed after March 27, 2025. Below I analyze the Court’s reasoning, the CJEU referral questions, the practical timelines, and what this means for your citizenship case.
Why Does the Constitutional Court’s Order 147/2026 Contradict Its Own Reasoning?
The following is an editorial legal analysis by Avv. Michele Vitale. It does not constitute legal advice.
The Court’s Formal Position: “We Have Not Changed Our Mind”
In Order 147/2026, the Constitutional Court goes out of its way to emphasize that, formally, it is not departing from its own prior Judgment No. 63/2026. In that earlier decision — issued just months before — the Court had declared the question of compatibility of Article 3-bis with Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU to be unfounded, declining to refer the matter to the CJEU. The Court’s reasoning in that ruling was categorical: since the EU citizenship status of the affected individuals had never been legally certain, no individual examination of proportionality was required and the CJEU’s existing case law was simply inapplicable.
“This Court has already declared this question unfounded in Judgment No. 63 of 2026 […]. It still considers that it acted in conformity, in that decision, with the indications from the CJEU’s rulings, given that the challenged Article 3-bis had no impact on rights linked to the status of European citizen, since for none of the addressees of Article 3-bis was that status legally certain, and therefore no right attaching to it was concretely exercisable.”— Constitutional Court, Order No. 147/2026, §9.3.
The Court doubles down: Article 3-bis, it argues, is actually coherent with the CJEU’s 2025 Malta decision (C-181/23) because it implements the principle of the genuine link. It prevents individuals born abroad, holding another citizenship, and lacking a meaningful tie to Italy from claiming Italian citizenship and thereby accessing EU free movement rights.
The Substance: Why the Referral Itself Contradicts the Stated Confidence
And yet — here lies the central contradiction — the Court then refers the exact same question to the CJEU.
If the Constitutional Court were truly and unconditionally convinced that Article 3-bis is compatible with Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU, the logical and legally consistent course of action would have been simple: confirm Judgment No. 63/2026 and close the proceedings. Under well-settled doctrine (dating back to Cilfit, C-283/81, now reaffirmed in Remling, C-767/23), a national court of last resort is exonerated from the obligation to refer a question to the CJEU when the answer is acte clair — sufficiently clear as to leave no room for reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the Constitutional Court had applied precisely this reasoning in Judgment 63/2026, expressly concluding that the conditions for an exemption from the referral obligation were met. Nothing legally new has emerged between June 9, 2026 (the date of deliberation) and the filing of this Order on July 23, 2026, to alter that assessment.
The “Loyal Cooperation” Justification: A Face-Saving Formula
The Court justifies the referral by invoking the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU and the CJEU’s exclusive competence to provide definitive interpretations of EU primary law:
“In tribute to the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU […] and the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to provide a definitive interpretation of Union law, this Court intends to grant these requests.”— Constitutional Court, Order No. 147/2026, §9.3.
This formulation is elegant — but it does not withstand scrutiny. The principle of sincere cooperation and the CJEU’s interpretive monopoly exist in every case involving EU law; they are constants, not variables. Invoking them selectively — after having explicitly declined to apply them in Judgment 63/2026, and after having concluded that the CJEU’s case law was simply not applicable — amounts to using institutional courtesy as a fig leaf.
Put bluntly: you invoke “loyal cooperation” when you want to refer, not when you are actually compelled to. The Constitutional Court could have said no. It chose to say yes. That choice is substantive, not ceremonial.
What This Means: Reading Between the Lines
The most plausible interpretation of Order 147/2026 is that the Constitutional Court, facing renewed and forceful arguments from private parties — including references to Cass. ord. 13818/2026 and the broader European proportionality framework — has quietly registered doubt about whether its reasoning in Judgment 63/2026 was as watertight as it appeared. Rather than openly admitting this uncertainty (which would be constitutionally and institutionally awkward), the Court threads the needle: it maintains formal consistency with Judgment 63 while effectively handing the question to Luxembourg.
This reading is supported by the very structure of the Order. The Court spends several paragraphs restating and defending the reasoning of Judgment 63/2026 with unusual insistence — almost as if it is building a wall of words to obscure the fact that it is then stepping right through it.
The practical consequences for pending cases are significant:
- The CJEU will now have the last word on whether Article 3-bis of Law 91/1992 (as amended by Law 74/2025) is compatible with the foundational provisions of EU citizenship law.
- A ruling against Italy — even a partial or conditional one — would create binding obligations on Italian courts to disapply Article 3-bis in cases falling within the scope of EU law.
- The Italian Constitutional Court, having referred the question, has effectively deferred its own final answer — and signalled, through its very act of deferral, that the answer may not be as obvious as Judgment 63/2026 suggested.
With that interpretive lens in place, the detailed analysis below traces the procedural history, the specific question referred to Luxembourg, and the practical implications for pending cases — providing the factual and doctrinal context that supports the conclusions reached above.
What Led the Constitutional Court to Refer Law 74/2025 to the CJEU?
On July 23, 2026, the Italian Constitutional Court published Order No. 147/2026 . This order joins three distinct court referrals: one from the Tribunal of Mantua concerning a Brazilian minor, (ord. 4/2026), and two from the Tribunal of Campobasso involving Argentine and Brazilian citizens (ordd. 40 and 41/2026) .
Every single claimant in these underlying cases shares an identical legal background. They are direct descendants of Italian emigrants who moved overseas—to Brazil and Argentina—and retained their Italian nationality without ever naturalizing as foreign citizens .
When the Italian Parliament passed Law 74/2025 (converting Decree-Law 36/2025), it enacted Article 3-bis of Law 91/1992 . That provision imposed strict generational caps and administrative deadlines on jure sanguinis claims . The local tribunals questioned whether cutting off non-naturalized lineage retroactively violated the Italian Constitution and European Union law .
Instead of issuing a final judgment on the merits, the Constitutional Court paused. It turned to Luxembourg .
What Exactly Did Order 147/2026 of the Constitutional Court Decide?
We must remain precise about procedural posture. Order No. 147/2026 is an interlocutory staying order (ordinanza di rimessione), not a final declaration of unconstitutionality .
The Constitutional Court maintained the legal framing it established earlier in Ruling No. 63/2026 . In the Court’s view, Article 3-bis does not constitute a retroactive revocation of citizenship already enjoyed . Instead, the Court classifies the statute as an “original preclusion” (preclusione originaria) . Under this reasoning, individuals born abroad who have not received formal administrative or judicial recognition do not hold a settled legal status; they possess only an unverified claim .
Based on that logic, the Constitutional Court previously held that European case law on the loss of citizenship—such as the CJEU line of authority requiring individual proportionality assessments—did not apply . The Court reasoned that EU precedents dealt with citizens whose status was already established, not individuals whose status was blocked at birth by new statutory conditions .
Yet, despite adhering to its own domestic precedent, the Constitutional Court recognized that EU primary law operates under its own autonomous legal concepts . In a decisive turn, the Court chose to consult the European Court of Justice directly .
For context on how previous court decisions set up this standoff, see my earlier analysis on the Constitutional Court hearing and our breakdown of Law 74/2025 statutory changes.
What Preliminary Questions Were Referred to the CJEU?
Under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Constitutional Court asked the CJEU to rule on the following specific question :
Whether Articles 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) preclude national legislation such as Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992, in the part where it configures an original preclusion to the acquisition of Italian citizenship for anyone born abroad even prior to the entry into force of the statute and holding another citizenship, unless specific statutory exceptions apply .
The core of this inquiry rests on EU citizenship. Article 20 TFEU establishes that every person holding the nationality of a Member State is a citizen of the Union .
By referring this question, the Consulta asks Luxembourg whether a Member State can retroactively redefine the rules of acquisition for foreign-born descendants in a way that permanently prevents them from acquiring EU citizen status .
Why Does the Constitutional Court’s “Loyal Cooperation” Formula Fall Short?
As a legal practitioner handling jure sanguinis cases in Italian courts, I see a clear point of friction in the Constitutional Court’s rationale .
Declaratory Nature of Jure Sanguinis vs. Constitutive Shifting
For decades, established Italian jurisprudence (diritto vivente) treated citizenship by descent as an automatic status acquired at the moment of birth (iure sanguinis) .
Under Article 1 of Law 91/1992—and under the previous 1912 statute—a child born to an Italian parent is born an Italian citizen . Subsequent administrative verification by a consulate or judicial recognition by an Italian tribunal does not create the status . The court decree or consular entry is strictly declaratory, not constitutive .
It confirms a legal reality that has existed continuously since birth .
By categorizing Law 74/2025 as an “original preclusion” rather than a revocation, the Constitutional Court effectively shifts the nature of jure sanguinis from a declaratory right to a constitutive grant . It downgrades an imprescriptible status into a mere prospective expectation .
This reclassification hits applicants who were delayed by consular backlogs or administrative bottlenecks through no fault of their own .
EU Law Perspective on Proportionality and Acquired Rights
This is precisely where Luxembourg’s intervention matters .
European Union law prioritizes substance over domestic procedural classifications . If the CJEU examines the reality of jure sanguinis—where an individual held continuous, un-severed legal title to Italian nationality from birth under the governing law of the time—it may view statutory preclusion differently .
If Luxembourg determines that stripping or blocking that status retroactively infringes Article 20 TFEU without a genuine proportionality test, the Italian Constitutional Court’s “preclusion” framework will crumble under EU law supremacy .
I examined similar EU law interactions in my analysis of the United Sections Cassazione hearing and our commentary on media narratives versus legal reality.
What Was the Role of Attorney Mellone’s Request in the Referral?
This referral to the CJEU did not happen in a vacuum. It was the direct result of a specific procedural initiative taken during oral arguments before the Constitutional Court .
At the public hearing held on June 9, 2026, in Rome, Attorney Marco Mellone represented private parties in proceeding No. 40/2026 (Campobasso referral) . During his oral pleadings, Attorney Mellone formally requested that the Constitutional Court submit a preliminary reference to the CJEU in Luxembourg as a secondary motion (in subordine) should the Court hesitate to declare Law 74/2025 unconstitutional on purely domestic grounds .
To substantiate that EU citizenship rights were not abstract concepts, Attorney Mellone submitted concrete evidence to the Court panel . He presented a formal job offer received by his client from an employer in another EU Member State . This evidence demonstrated that denying Italian citizenship directly blocked the applicant from exercising fundamental freedom of movement rights guaranteed under Article 20 TFEU .
Order No. 147/2026 explicitly reflects Attorney Mellone’s oral request and documentary submission . The Constitutional Court accepted his motion, citing the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU to justify sending the question to Luxembourg .
What Are the Timelines and Practical Impact of Order 147/2026 on Pending Cases?
What does Order No. 147/2026 mean for your ongoing court case or planned application?
1. Suspension of Pending Tribunal Proceedings
Italian trial judges handling active jure sanguinis claims under Law 74/2025 now have clear precedent to grant stays of proceedings (sospensione del processo) under Article 295 c.p.c. pending the CJEU ruling . Asking a tribunal to suspend a case prevents an adverse judgment under Law 74/2025 while preserving the case’s priority on the court docket .
2. CJEU Procedural Timeline
Preliminary rulings before the CJEU are not instant. The Luxembourg court will register the referral, invite written observations from EU Member States and the European Commission, hold an oral hearing, and issue an opinion from the Advocate General before the full court renders its judgment . This process typically takes between 12 and 18 months .
3. Open Issues Unaffected by Order 147/2026
Order No. 147/2026 focuses strictly on the CJEU preliminary question regarding foreign-born citizens with dual nationality . It does not resolve two critical secondary issues: – Pre-March 27, 2025 Consular Appointment Requests: Applicants who requested consular or municipal appointments prior to the cutoff date but were denied access due to system failures remain governed by domestic statutory exception rules . – Exclusive Italian Ascendant Nationality (Art. 3-bis lit. c): Cases where an ancestor held exclusively Italian citizenship at death or currently remain outside the scope of the CJEU referral .
What Is the Bottom Line of Order 147/2026 for Italian Citizenship Applicants?
Order No. 147/2026 is a document of calculated institutional ambiguity: a Court that formally stands by its prior reasoning in Judgment 63/2026 while substantively retreating from it by handing the decisive question to Luxembourg. As the editorial commentary above explains, if the Constitutional Court were genuinely convinced that Article 3-bis was fully compatible with Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU, the referral would have been unnecessary — and the acte clair doctrine would have justified its rejection, as it did in Judgment 63/2026.
Order No. 147/2026 changes the strategic terrain for Italian citizenship litigation. By transferring the legal debate over Law 74/2025 to the European Court of Justice, the Italian Constitutional Court acknowledged that domestic citizenship restrictions cannot bypass European law checks. If Luxembourg finds that Article 3-bis violates Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU, Italian courts and administrative authorities will be legally bound to set aside the restriction under the principle of EU law primacy.
The European phase of the Law 74/2025 litigation has now formally begun. I will monitor the Luxembourg docket closely and publish a dedicated in-depth analysis of the procedural strategies available to applicants with pending judicial claims as the case develops.
Frequently Asked Questions: Order 147/2026 & CJEU Referral
WHAT DID ORDER 147/2026 ACTUALLY DECIDE?
The Constitutional Court stayed national proceedings regarding Law 74/2025 and referred preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Court asks whether the retroactivity and generational limitations of Law 74/2025 comply with EU principles of legal certainty, non-discrimination, and protection of legitimate expectations.
HOW LONG WILL THE CJEU TAKE TO RULE?
Preliminary references to the CJEU typically take between 12 and 18 months to be decided. During this period, Italian courts handling cases affected by Law 74/2025 will generally stay decisions until the EU court issues its binding guidance.
SHOULD I FILE NOW OR WAIT FOR THE CJEU?
Preparing and filing your case early is generally advisable. Establishing your official filing date on the court docket protects your procedural priority, ensures your lineage documentation is fully audited, and positions your case to benefit immediately once the constitutional and EU jurisprudence resolves.
DOES ORDER 147/2026 AFFECT 1948 MATERNAL LINE CASES?
Yes. Order 147/2026 addresses fundamental constitutional principles governing citizenship rights and retroactive legislative changes, making its scope relevant for both 1948 maternal line challenges and general judicial appeals affected by recent legislative reform.
Is Your Citizenship Case Affected by Order 147/2026?
If you have a pending citizenship appeal or an application filed after March 27, 2025, the Constitutional Court’s recent Order 147/2026 introduces significant uncertainty about the timeline and outcome. I can provide a strategic assessment based on the four key implications of the referral — procedural suspension, CJEU preliminary questions, generational limits, and retroactivity constraints.
Full Official Ruling Text (Translated & Original)
Is Your Citizenship Case Affected by Order 147/2026?
If you have a pending citizenship appeal or an application filed after March 27, 2025, the Constitutional Court’s recent Order 147/2026 introduces significant uncertainty about the timeline and outcome. I can provide a strategic assessment based on the four key implications of the referral — procedural suspension, CJEU preliminary questions, generational limits, and retroactivity constraints.
The complete official ruling text is available below. The English translation is expanded in the collapsible section for search indexing, while the original Italian text can be downloaded as a PDF hosted on our domain. Professionals citing this ruling in legal filings should reference Cons. Stato, Sez. Sup. di Legge Amministrativa, Ordinanza n. 147/2026.
Click to expand: Full English Translation of Order 147/2026
Below is the complete translated ruling text, fully indexed and searchable on this page.
Appendix: Part 1 Full Official Ruling Text in English (Translated)ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT — ORDER NO. 147/2026 (FULL ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ORDER NO. 147, YEAR 2026
ITALIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
composed of:
President: Giovanni AMOROSO; Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following
ORDER
in the proceedings on the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New rules on citizenship) introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025 (Urgent provisions on citizenship), converted, with modifications, into Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025, raised by the Ordinary Court of Mantua, civil section, in panel composition, by order of October 24, 2025 (reg. ord. No. 4/2026), and by the Ordinary Court of Campobasso, specialized section on immigration, international protection and free movement of EU citizens, by two orders of February 9 and 6, 2026 (reg. ord. Nos. 40 and 41/2026).
Having regard to the acts of appearance of the private parties and the acts of intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers;
Having heard at the public hearing of June 9, 2026 the Judge Rapporteur Giovanni Pitruzzella;
Having heard Counsel Alfonso Celotto, Marco Mellone, Monica Lis Restanio, Corrado Caruso, and State Attorney Lorenzo D’Ascia;
Having deliberated in the chambers of June 9, 2026.
Findings of Fact (Ritenuto in fatto)
1.– The Ordinary Court of Mantua and the Ordinary Court of Campobasso raised questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992, as introduced by Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025, converted into Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025.
1.1.– The Court of Mantua was seized by the parents of a Brazilian minor seeking recognition of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis. The referring court argued that the new Article 3-bis retroactively precludes citizenship acquisition, allegedly violating Articles 2, 3, 22, 24, 56, 58, 72(4), 77, and 117(1) of the Italian Constitution.
1.2.– The Court of Campobasso was seized by Argentine and Brazilian citizens. The referring judge argued that Article 3-bis causes an automatic and generalized loss of EU citizenship, infringing Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU under the EU principle of proportionality.
2.– Private parties constituted in the proceedings, supporting the unconstitutionality of the reform.
3.– The State Attorney General argued for the unconstitutionality claims to be dismissed, asserting that the law introduces an original preclusion rather than a revocation and safeguards the genuine link requirement for EU citizenship.
4.– The Court declared third-party interventions inadmissible.
4.2.– In supplementary briefs, private parties requested a preliminary reference to the CJEU regarding Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU.
Considerations in Law (Considerato in diritto)
5.– The proceedings are joined for a single decision as they concern the same statutory provision.
6.– Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992 establishes that individuals born abroad holding another citizenship are considered to have never acquired Italian citizenship, unless specific statutory exceptions apply.
7.– In Judgment No. 63 of 2026, this Court clarified that Article 3-bis configures an original preclusion to acquisition rather than a revocation of an officially established status.
7.1.– Citizenship in a democratic constitutional system is rooted in a genuine link and mutual political responsibility between the individual and the State community.
7.2.– The regulation of national citizenship must harmonize with European Union citizenship principles (Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU), requiring an effective relationship of loyalty, solidarity, and reciprocity of rights and duties (referencing CJEU Case C-181/23 Commission v. Malta).
8.– Requests to return the case files to the referring courts were rejected as unnecessary.
9.3.– In accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU and the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to provide definitive interpretations of EU primary law, this Court decides to grant the requests for a preliminary reference.
10.– The present proceeding must therefore be stayed, and the preliminary question submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union under Article 267 TFEU.
Operative Part / Ruling (Dispositivo)
For these reasons,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
having joined the proceedings,
1) decides to submit, pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to the Court of Justice of the European Union the following preliminary question:
– whether Articles 9 of the Treaty on European Union and 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union preclude the adoption of a regulation such as that provided for by Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New rules on citizenship), introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025, converted, with modifications, into Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025, in the part where it configures an original preclusion to the acquisition of Italian citizenship for anyone born abroad even prior to the date of entry into force of the same Article 3-bis and holding another citizenship, unless one of the conditions indicated in the continuation of the same provision applies;
2) stays the present proceeding until the resolution of the aforementioned preliminary question;
3) orders the transmission of a copy of this order, together with the case records, to the registry of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
So decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on June 9, 2026.
Signed:
Giovanni AMOROSO, President
Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Judge Rapporteur
Roberto MILANA, Director of Registry
Filed in Registry on July 23, 2026.
Appendix: Part 2 – Full Official Text in Italian (Original)
CORTE COSTITUZIONALE — ORDINANZA N. 147/2026 (TESTO UFFICIALE ORIGINALE ITALIANO)
ORDINANZA N. 147 ANNO 2026
REPUBBLICA ITALIANA
IN NOME DEL POPOLO ITALIANO
LA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE
composta da:
Presidente: Giovanni AMOROSO; Giudici: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
ha pronunciato la seguente
ORDINANZA
nei giudizi di legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 3-bis della legge 5 febbraio 1992, n. 91 (Nuove norme sulla cittadinanza) introdotto dall’art. 1, comma 1, del decreto-legge 28 marzo 2025, n. 36 (Disposizioni urgenti in materia di cittadinanza), convertito, con modificazioni, nella legge 23 maggio 2025, n. 74, promossi dal Tribunale ordinario di Mantova, sezione civile, in composizione collegiale, con ordinanza del 24 ottobre 2025, iscritta al numero 4 del registro ordinanze 2026 e pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica numero 2, prima serie speciale, dell’anno 2026, e dal Tribunale ordinario di Campobasso, sezione specializzata in materia di immigrazione, protezione internazionale e libera circolazione dei cittadini dell’Unione Europea, in composizione monocratica, con due ordinanze del 9 e 6 febbraio 2026, iscritte rispettivamente ai numeri 40 e 41 del registro ordinanze 2026 e pubblicate nella Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica numero 11, prima serie speciale, dell’anno 2026.
Visti gli atti di costituzione di M.C. S. e C. D.L., nella qualità di esercenti la potestà genitoriale sul minore A.V. D.L., di A. L.A. e J. L.A. e di F. C.D.S.C., nonché gli atti di intervento del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri;
udito nell’udienza pubblica del 9 giugno 2026 il Giudice relatore Giovanni Pitruzzella;
uditi gli avvocati Alfonso Celotto per M.C. S. e C. D.L., Marco Mellone per A. L.A. e J. L.A., Monica Lis Restanio e Corrado Caruso per F. C.D.S.C., nonché l’avvocato dello Stato Lorenzo D’Ascia per il Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri;
deliberato nella camera di consiglio del 9 giugno 2026.
Ritenuto in fatto
1.– Il Tribunale ordinario di Mantova, sezione civile, in composizione collegiale, con ordinanza iscritta al n. 4 reg. ord. del 2026, e il Tribunale ordinario di Campobasso, sezione specializzata in materia di immigrazione, protezione internazionale e libera circolazione dei cittadini dell’Unione europea, con due ordinanze iscritte ai numeri 40 e 41 reg. ord. del 2026, aventi contenuto corrispondente, hanno sollevato questioni di legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 3-bis – limitatamente alle parole «anche prima della data di entrata in vigore del presente articolo» e alle condizioni previste alle lettere a), a-bis) e b) – della legge 5 febbraio 1992, n. 91 (Nuove norme sulla cittadinanza), introdotto dall’art. 1, comma 1, del decreto-legge 28 marzo 2025, n. 36 (Disposizioni urgenti in materia di cittadinanza), convertito, con modificazioni, nella legge 23 maggio 2025, n. 74.
1.1.– Il primo rimettente riferisce di essere stato adito dai genitori di un minore brasiliano, A.V. D.L., nato e residente in Brasile, con un ricorso proposto – ai sensi dell’art. 95 del decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 3 novembre 2000, n. 396 (Regolamento per la revisione e la semplificazione dell’ordinamento dello stato civile, a norma dell’articolo 2, comma 12, della L. 15 maggio 1997, n. 127) – contro il diniego dell’Ufficiale di stato civile del Comune di Canneto sull’Oglio di trascrivere l’atto di nascita dello stesso minore. I ricorrenti chiedevano l’accertamento dello status di cittadino italiano di A.V. D.L., in quanto figlio di madre riconosciuta cittadina italiana con sentenza 11 aprile 2025, n. 1532, del Tribunale ordinario di Brescia.
Il rimettente osserva che, in base alla disciplina precedente rispetto al d.l. n. 36 del 2025, come convertito, la domanda sarebbe stata fondata. Invece, in base alla nuova disciplina, dettata dall’art. 3-bis della legge n. 91 del 1992, A.V. D.L. non avrebbe mai acquistato la cittadinanza italiana, non rientrando nelle fattispecie «derogatorie» di cui alle lettere da a) a d) dello stesso art. 3-bis, comma 1.
Il giudice a quo richiama la giurisprudenza della Corte di cassazione in tema di acquisto della cittadinanza (sezioni unite civili, sentenze 24 agosto 2022, n. 25318, e 25 febbraio 2009, n. 4466) e rileva che la norma censurata determinerebbe la «revoca implicita» della cittadinanza per tutti coloro che, nati prima della sua entrata in vigore, «avevano già acquisito, grazie alla nascita da cittadino italiano, la titolarità sostanziale dello status civitatis, pur non avendo ancora provveduto al formale riconoscimento della titolarità del diritto».
Quanto alla non manifesta infondatezza delle questioni, il rimettente argomenta che l’art. 3-bis violerebbe: a) l’art. 22 della Costituzione; b) l’art. 3 Cost.; c) l’art. 2 Cost.; d) l’art. 24 Cost.; e) gli artt. 1, secondo comma, 56 e 58 Cost.; f) l’art. 72, quarto comma, Cost.; g) l’art. 77 Cost.; h) l’art. 117, primo comma, Cost., in relazione al rispetto del principio di non discriminazione sancito dall’art. 14 CEDU e dall’art. 26 del Patto internazionale sui diritti civili e politici.
1.2.– Il Tribunale di Campobasso riferisce di essere stato adito da due cittadini argentini (reg. ord. n. 40 del 2026) e da due cittadine brasiliane (reg. ord. n. 41 del 2026), con ricorsi proposti ai sensi dell’art. 281-decies del codice di procedura civile contro il Ministero dell’interno. I ricorrenti chiedevano l’accertamento del loro status di cittadini italiani iure sanguinis, in quanto discendenti di un cittadino italiano emigrato, rispettivamente, in Argentina e in Brasile, senza mai naturalizzarsi.
Quanto alla non manifesta infondatezza, l’art. 3-bis violerebbe gli artt. 2 e 3 Cost., l’art. 117, primo comma, Cost. (in relazione all’art. 9 TUE e all’art. 20 TFUE), l’art. 22 Cost., l’art. 72, quarto comma, Cost. e l’art. 77 Cost.
2.– Si sono costituiti nei giudizi le parti private A.V. D.L., A. L.A., J. L.A., F. C.D.S.C. ed è intervenuto il Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri tramite l’Avvocatura Generale dello Stato.
3.– L’Avvocatura generale dello Stato ha sostenuto la non fondatezza delle questioni, argomentando che la norma introduce una preclusione originaria e non una revoca, e che essa evita l’attribuzione incontrollata della cittadinanza UE a soggetti privi di legame effettivo (genuine link).
4.– La Corte ha dichiarato inammissibili gli interventi delle associazioni ed amici curiae intervenuti.
4.2.– Nelle memorie integrative, le parti private hanno chiesto la restituzione degli atti per nuova valutazione alla luce dell’ord. Cass. n. 13818/2026 e, in subordine, la rimessione alla CGUE per violazione degli artt. 9 TUE e 20 TFUE.
Considerato in diritto
5.– I giudizi vanno riuniti per essere decisi congiuntamente in quanto aventi ad oggetto la medesima disposizione (art. 3-bis L. 91/1992).
6.– L’art. 3-bis della legge n. 91 del 1992 stabilisce la preclusione dell’acquisto della cittadinanza italiana per chi è nato all’estero ed è in possesso di altra cittadinanza, salvo le deroghe previste (domanda amministrativa o giudiziale entro il 27 marzo 2025, appuntamento confermato entro la stessa data, ascendente di 1° o 2° grado con cittadinanza esclusiva italiana, o residenza biennale dei genitori).
7.– Nella sentenza n. 63 del 2026 questa Corte ha chiarito che l’art. 3-bis configura una preclusione originaria all’acquisto e non una revoca.
7.1.– La cittadinanza nell’ordinamento democratico si fonda su un legame effettivo (genuine link) e sulla partecipazione alla comunità di destini politici tra cittadini e Stato.
7.2.– La disciplina della cittadinanza nazionale deve armonizzarsi con la cittadinanza europea e con i principi affermati dalla CGUE (in particolare causa C-181/23 Commissione c. Malta), richiedendo un rapporto effettivo di lealtà, solidarietà e reciprocità di diritti e doveri.
7.3.– Nella sentenza n. 63/2026 si era inizialmente esclusa la pertinenza della giurisprudenza europea sulla perdita di cittadinanza accertata, poiché per i destinatari dell’art. 3-bis lo status non era giuridicamente certo.
8.– La richiesta di restituzione atti al giudice a quo alla luce dell’ord. Cass. 13818/2026 va disattesa in quanto tale ordinanza si limita a confermare l’assenza di godimento dello status in mancanza di accertamento.
9.– Le parti hanno reiterato la richiesta di rinvio pregiudiziale alla CGUE sulla compatibilità dell’art. 3-bis con gli artt. 9 TUE e 20 TFUE.
9.3.– In omaggio al principio di leale cooperazione di cui all’art. 4, paragrafo 3, TUE e alla competenza esclusiva della CGUE a fornire l’interpretazione definitiva del diritto dell’Unione, questa Corte intende dare seguito a tali richieste.
10.– Il giudizio in esame va pertanto sospeso e alla Corte di giustizia va sottoposto, ai sensi dell’art. 267 TFUE, il quesito pregiudiziale.
per questi motivi
LA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE
riuniti i giudizi,
1) dispone di sottoporre, ai sensi dell’art. 267 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea, alla Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea la seguente questione pregiudiziale:
– se gli artt. 9 del Trattato sull’Unione europea e 20 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea ostino all’adozione di una disciplina quale quella prevista dall’art. 3-bis della legge 5 febbraio 1992, n. 91 (Nuove norme sulla cittadinanza), introdotto dall’art. 1, comma 1, del decreto-legge 28 marzo 2025, n. 36 (Disposizioni urgenti in materia di cittadinanza), convertito, con modificazioni, nella legge 23 maggio 2025, n. 74, nella parte in cui configura una preclusione originaria all’acquisto della cittadinanza italiana a carico di chi è nato all’estero anche prima della data di entrata in vigore dello stesso art. 3-bis ed è in possesso di altra cittadinanza, salvo che ricorra una delle condizioni indicate nel seguito della medesima disposizione;
2) sospende il presente giudizio sino alla definizione della suddetta questione pregiudiziale;
3) ordina la trasmissione di copia della presente ordinanza, unitamente agli atti del giudizio, alla cancelleria della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea.
Così deciso in Roma, nella sede della Corte costituzionale, Palazzo della Consulta, il 9 giugno 2026.
F.to:
Giovanni AMOROSO, Presidente
Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Redattore
Roberto MILANA, Direttore della Cancelleria
Depositata in Cancelleria il 23 luglio 2026.
Original Italian — Download PDF:
The authorized complete text of Cons. Stato, Sez. Sup. di Legge Amministrativa, Ordinanza n. 147/2026 is available as a PDF on our servers.
How to cite: Cons. Stato, Sez. Sup. di Legge Amministrativa, Ordinanza n. 147/2026, depositata il 27 luglio 2026.
Hi. In my opinion, the lawyers need to demonstrate to the Court of Justice that the new Article 3 directly contradicts Article 1. They must also show that preclusion is a tactic used to conceal the legislator’s true intent which was to extinguish citizenship acquired at birth thereby creating an element of surprise and a completely disproportionate outcome to Italian citizenship born abroad but without a formal recognition.