By Attorney Michele Vitale

A ruling worth noting was deposited on May 12, 2026.

The First Civil Section of the Corte Suprema di Cassazione — presided by Maria Acierno — issued Ordinance No. 13818/2026, which I will be analyzing in depth over the coming days. For now, I want to flag it immediately because the direction it points is significant.

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The Ruling in Plain Terms

The case involved a group of descendants of an Italian citizen who emigrated to Colombia. They tried — and failed — to book an appointment at the Italian Embassy in Bogotá to submit their citizenship recognition application. The Embassy’s system was frozen; no dates were being offered. They went directly to an Italian court. The Court of Appeal dismissed them for lack of standing, reasoning that they had not first filed a formal administrative application.

The Supreme Court reversed that decision. Its conclusion: when the administration itself creates the obstacles that prevent you from even submitting a request, that situation is enough — on its own — to generate the right to seek judicial recognition of your citizenship.

A necessary note on timing. This case was initiated in 2022 — well before Law 74/2025 entered into force. The applicants in this proceeding are not subject to the new restrictions introduced by Art. 3-bis of Law 91/1992. I flag this explicitly because it matters: the procedural path validated by the Cassazione in this ruling is not, by itself, a workaround for cases that fall within the scope of Law 74/2025. The legal landscape for those cases is different, and I have written about it at length in previous posts.

Why This Matters

Precisely because this ruling belongs to a different legal era — pre-Law 74/2025 — its interest lies not in its direct applicability to current cases, but in the principle it affirms.

This ruling moves in a direction that will be familiar to anyone following the consequences of Constitutional Court Ruling No. 63 of 2025. That decision effectively validated the legislative restrictions introduced by Law 74/2025 — restrictions that have penalized, among others, precisely those applicants who found themselves blocked not by any fault of their own, but by the structural inability of consulates to process their applications.

The Cassazione’s response, at least on the procedural plane, is clear: the system cannot use its own dysfunction as a weapon against the people it was supposed to serve. That principle — regardless of when it was articulated — is a reasoned legal position from Italy’s highest civil court. It does not dissolve because the legislative context changed. It remains available as a point of reference, an argument, a counterweight.

A Principled Affirmation

There is a further point in this ruling that deserves attention — paragraph 2.7. The Supreme Court restates, forcefully, that the right to Italian citizenship is (did not write “was”) an absolute subjective right of the highest constitutional rank, one that arises at birth, and is both permanent and imprescriptible.

These are not new principles. But their reaffirmation in 2026 matters, precisely because they sit in direct tension with the reasoning underpinning Constitutional Court Ruling No. 63/2025 — which, in validating Law 74/2025, accepted a reading of citizenship that treats it as something the legislature can reshape retroactively. The Cassazione reminds us that the constitutional foundations of jus sanguinis were not dismantled by that ruling; they were strained.

I will return to this tension in detail. There is more to say.

Ordinance No. 13818/2026, First Civil Section, Corte Suprema di Cassazione. Decided: March 4, 2026. Deposited: May 12, 2026. R.G. No. 1944/2025.

13818_2026 Cassazione su interesse ad agire Download

English Translation

THE SUPREME COURT OF CASSATION FIRST CIVIL SECTION

Composed of the Most Illustrious Magistrates: MARIA ACIERNO President LAURA TRICOMI Councilor RITA ELVIRA ANNA RUSSO Councilor ELEONORA REGGIANI Reporting Councilor MARTINA FLAMINI Councilor

Subject: CITIZENSHIP RIGHT – INTEREST TO ACT. Hearing 04/03/2026 CC R.G.N. 01944/2025 Rep.

has pronounced the following

ORDINANCE

in the appeal R.G. n. 19044/2025 promoted by [blank] born on [blank] in [blank] – [blank], born on [blank] in [blank] [blank] born on [blank] in [blank] – [blank] born on [blank] in [blank] represented and defended by lawyer [blank] with elected domicile in Rome, via [blank] by virtue of the special power of attorney in the acts; appellants

against

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, in the person of the Minister pro tempore, represented and defended ex lege by the State Attorney General’s Office and domiciled at its Offices in Rome, via dei Portoghesi 12; counter-appellant

against the judgment n. 1246/2024 of the Court of Appeal of Genoa, published on 16/10/2024 and notified on 23/11/2024;

Signed By: MARIA ACIERNO Issued By: TRUSTPRO QUALIFIED CA 1 Serial#: 70b5f127a964ede7 Redaction ordered General registry number 1944/2025 Sectional number 1064/2026 General collection number 13818/2026 Publication date 12/05/2026

having heard the report on the case given in the council chamber of 04/03/2026 by Councilor ELEONORA REGGIANI; having read the acts of the proceedings in the epigraph;

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

With an appeal pursuant to art. 702-bis c.p.c. of 26/09/2022, the current appellants applied to the Court of Genoa requesting the recognition of Italian citizenship iure sanguinis, stating that they were descendants of [blank]_[blank] Italian citizen born in [blank] on [blank] and emigrated to [blank] where the latter had died without ever renouncing his Italian citizenship and without being naturalized as a Colombian citizen.

The parties specified that they could have obtained the citizenship also through administrative channels, but that they had decided to apply to the judicial authority because the consular authority had not provided any response to the numerous attempts to obtain an appointment to present the application through administrative channels.

The Ministry of the Interior entered an appearance in court, preliminarily objecting to the petitioners’ lack of interest to act due to not having proposed the application through administrative channels.

The case was instructed on a documentary basis and the Court of Genoa upheld the appeal, declaring that the petitioners were Italian citizens, ordering the Ministry of the Interior and, on its behalf, the competent civil status Officer, to proceed with the registrations, transcriptions and annotations required by law.

According to the judge of first instance, the petitioners had an interest to act directly via judicial channels, because the presentation of the application through administrative channels did not constitute a condition of procedibility, since it involved the ascertainment of the subjective right to citizenship within a double-track system, as stated in a ruling by the Joint Sections of this Court (Cass., Sec. U, Judgment n. 28873 of 09/12/2008). The same Court held

that the petitioners had proven the continuity of the transmission line, while none of the elements characterizing an extinguishing hypothesis of Italian citizenship had been proven by the Ministry.

The latter appealed the aforementioned decision, deducing three grounds of complaint. With the first ground (“VIOLATION AND/OR FALSE APPLICATION OF ART. 100 C.P.C. LACK OF INTEREST TO ACT.”), the appellant argued that the interest to act pursuant to art. 100 c.p.c. of the original petitioners had been erroneously considered existent, who had not followed the prescribed administrative iter, noting that the mentioned pronouncement of the Joint Sections (Cass., Sec. U, Judgment n. 28873 of 09/12/2008) was not relevant to the present case, as it pertained to a case of statelessness, characterized by needs for protection nonexistent in the situation of the original petitioners. Furthermore, the Administration argued that the opposing parties had not proven to have ever presented any application to the competent diplomatic–consular Authorities to obtain Italian citizenship iure sanguinis and that the accesses made on the website of the Italian Embassy in Bogota were entirely instrumental as they were subsequent to the conferral of the power of attorney for litigation to the defenders. Finally, the appellant highlighted that, in deeming the interest to act pursuant to art. 100 c.p.c. to be existent, the Court had improperly made reference, in the motivation of the appealed ordinance, to pronouncements of the Court of Cassation concerning the different case of the transmission of citizenship through the maternal line. With the second ground (“OMITTED OR ERRONEOUS EVALUATION OF FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES”), it censured the head of the appealed ordinance with which the Court of Genoa had considered the Italian citizenship of the petitioners to be existent in the presence of a deemed substantial lack of opposition on the part of the Ministry. With the third ground (“ON THE PECULIARITY OF THE CASE IN QUESTION. VIOLATION AND/OR FALSE APPLICATION OF ART. 4 CIVIL CODE 1865 AS WELL AS ART. 8 LAW N. 555/1912

APPLICABLE RATIONE TEMPORIS. INEXISTENCE OF ITALIAN CITIZENSHIP IN THE ANCESTOR.”), it argued that the first Judge had not applied the correct legislation to the case, identified in art. 4 of the civil code of 1865, in art. 8 of law n. 555 of 1912 and in art. 1 of law n. 91 of 1992, since the ancestor of the original petitioners, [blank]_[blank] had not ever been an Italian citizen, having been born in the pre-unification era (04/06/1818), with the consequence that he had never transmitted Italian citizenship to his own offspring.

The appellees entered an appearance in court, contesting the adversarial arguments, of which they requested the rejection.

The Prosecutor General of the Republic at the Court of Appeal of Genoa intervened in the proceedings, requesting the upholding of the appeal.

With the judgment appealed herein, in total reform of the first instance decision, the Court of Appeal declared the inadmissibility of the application for the recognition iure sanguinis of Italian citizenship proposed by [blank], [blank], [blank] [blank], [blank], [blank], [blank], [blank], [blank] and [blank], [blank], [blank].

The latter have proposed an appeal in cassation entrusted to three grounds of complaint.

The Ministry defended itself with a counter-appeal.

The appellants filed defensive memoranda.

GROUNDS OF THE DECISION

1. With the first ground of appeal the following censure is formulated: «1. Violation pursuant to art. 360 paragraph 1 point 3 and point 5 c.p.c. Violation of art. 132 c.p.c. and 111 const. concerning a decisive point for the dispute. Violation and/or false application of art.100 c.p.c. regarding the existence of the interest to act.»

With the second ground of appeal the following censure is formulated: «2. Violation pursuant to art. 360 paragraph 1 point 3 and point 5 c.p.c.

Violation of art. 132 c.p.c. and 111 const. concerning a decisive point for the dispute. Violation of art. 2 of law n. 241/1990. Violation of table 4 annexed to ministerial decree March 3, 1995, n. 171, as modified by ministerial decree n. 57/2004 (regulation modifying and integrating ministerial decree March 3, 1995, n. 171, concerning the implementation of arts. 2 and 4 of law 241/1990, bearing new rules on the matter of administrative procedure with reference to the procedures within the competence of foreign affairs administration organs). Violation of art. 3 presidential decree 362/1994. Violation and/or false application of art. 24 Const. Violation of the right of defense.»

With the third ground of appeal the following censure is formulated: «3. Violation pursuant to art. 360 paragraph 1 point 3 and point 5 c.p.c. Violation of art. 132 c.p.c. and 111 const. Violation and/or false application of law n. 91 of 05.02.1992.»

2. The first ground of appeal is well-founded, albeit within the terms highlighted below.

2.1. The Court of Appeal, in excluding the admissibility of the application, ruled as follows: «9.2. Now, it is first useful to point out that the prior proposition of the application to the competent diplomatic – consular Authorities, in the case (such as the one under examination) of acquisition of Italian citizenship iure sanguinis through the male line, does not configure itself, in the judicial action aimed at obtaining the same status, as a condition of the action (in the absence of a specific legal provision), but rather it constitutes the necessary prerequisite for the interest to act of the descendant to be considered existent, in the event that the Administration does not evaluate the application within the time limit established by art. 3 of Presidential Decree n. 362/94.»

After recalling some merits precedents, including a ruling by the Court of Rome that ascertained the Italian citizenship of other descendants of [blank]_[blank] the same Court affirmed the following: «9.3. Having stated this, in the present case, the appellees, in the opinion of this Court, should

have been considered by the Court of Genoa as lacking the interest to act pursuant to art. 100 c.p.c., for not having provided proof of having presented, before applying to the ordinary Judge, a valid application to the diplomatic – consular Authority.»

The Court, therefore, illustrated the probationary findings which, in its opinion, did not prove that the parties had presented a valid application for the recognition of citizenship.

In summary, the aforementioned Court held that the presentation of a valid application for the recognition of citizenship to the competent Authority does not constitute a condition of the action, not being there an express provision of law in this sense, but it is the prerequisite to consider the interest to act pursuant to art. 100 c.p.c. to be existent, which in this case was deemed non-existent because, precisely, the petitioners had not offered proof of having presented a valid request for the recognition of their Italian citizenship.

2.2. The appellants reiterated that the presentation of the application through administrative channels does not constitute a condition of procedibility for the presentation of the judicial application, given that it involves the ascertainment of the subjective right to citizenship, in a double-track system, recalling for this purpose Cass., Sec. U, Judgment n. 28873 of 09/12/2008, which pronounced itself on the matter of the recognition of the status of stateless person, where it reads that «it cannot be considered that the presentation of the application through administrative channels constitutes a condition of procedibility for the presentation of the judicial application, since it involves ascertaining the right to a personal status, as the absence of administrative certification cannot preclude the jurisdictional proceedings for the recognition of the perfect subjective right, as such being the subject of the jurisdiction of the ordinary judge».

The same appellants added that the subjective right to citizenship constitutes a permanent and imprescriptible status, so that the uncertainty regarding the definition of the request for

recognition of the status civitatis and the passing of an unreasonable time lapse in relation to the claimed interest amount to a denial of the recognition of the subjective right, justifying the interest to resort to jurisdictional protection.

The same appellants stated that, according to the legitimacy jurisprudence, in actions of mere ascertainment, the interest to act consists in the removal of the situation of uncertainty that without the judge’s intervention could not be eliminated. The prejudice must be concrete and current, but it does not necessarily have to imply the violation of a right, being sufficient an objective state of uncertainty regarding the existence of a legal relationship or the exact scope of the rights and obligations arising from it, since the removal of such uncertainty represents a useful, legally relevant result that cannot be achieved except with the judge’s intervention.

In this perspective, the appellants stated that the interest to act for the ascertainment of citizenship exists, among the various hypotheses, also in the case where the parties have not been able to file any application for recognition due to severe and chronic delays in the management and definition of said procedures by the Consulates, these being well-known facts, as was also affirmed by the Court of Rome in the “twin” trial, promoted by other descendants of the same ancestor, none of whom had been able to obtain an appointment at the Embassy of Bogota, as resulting from the ordinance of the Court of Rome produced in court.

The appellants deduced that the impasse of the Embassy of Bogota regarding the service related to the recognition of citizenship iure sanguinis, is not only “notorious” but was also acknowledged by the Embassy itself, which, as documented since the first degree of the proceedings, precisely in the period when the appellants were trying to “schedule” the appointment, in 2022, had candidly confessed through its own website that «Following

the COVID-19 emergency, the Embassy is managing the requests for CITIZENSHIP BY DESCENT received prior to the beginning of the health emergency. Currently a date for the resumption of these appointments is not yet foreseen. Such date will be communicated as soon as possible on the Embassy’s website» (doc. 14 of the first instance party file).

The appellants added that they had fulfilled the evidentiary burden of demonstrating their own interest to act having documented having fruitlessly attempted to book an appointment at the Embassy of Bogota (cfr. the booking attempts in the acts, the request for access and the email communications from 2018).

2.2. It is necessary to preliminarily note that in the present case the appellants have proposed to be already Italian citizens iure sanguinis, by virtue of descent from [blank]_[blank] Italian citizen emigrated to Colombia, therefore requesting the recognition by the Administration of their status, a legal condition completely different from the hypotheses in which the acquisition or concession of Italian citizenship is requested as a result of the adoption of an administrative act having a constitutive character (see e.g. art. 9 law n. 91 of 1992).

In these hypotheses, in fact, the administrative Authority is called upon to perform a merely ascertainment function, aimed at recognizing an absolute subjective right of primary constitutional relevance, existing from the moment of the holder’s birth, which has a permanent and imprescriptible nature (cfr. in the motivation Cass., Sec. U, Judgment n. 4466 of 25/02/2009; Cass., Sec. 6-1, Judgment n. 6205 of 18/03/2014).

2.3. As also stated by the judge of merits, no regulatory provision in force at the time of the presentation of the judicial application foresees the necessity of initiating the relevant administrative procedure, before starting the trial for

the ascertainment of the status of Italian citizen iure sanguinis in the male line (as for example is foreseen for the recognition of the status of refugee according to the combined provisions of arts. 6 and 35 legislative decree n. 25 of 2008).

Placed on the same line, is the ruling of this Court in Joint Sections, recalled by the appellants (Cass., Sec. U, Judgment n. 28873 of 09/12/2008), and also mentioned in the appealed decision, concerning the ascertainment of the status of a stateless person, where, with reference to the legislation applicable at the time, the following is established: «Erroneously it was deemed non-existent the right to apply to the ordinary judge for the ascertainment of the status of stateless person, that is the negative recognition of the citizenship of any State, based on art. 17 of Presidential Decree n. 572 of 1993. This preclusion, not foreseen by any legislative or regulatory norm and only inferred by the Court of Appeal of Bologna, based on an unshareable reading reading of the aforementioned norm of the execution regulation of the law on citizenship, contrasts, aside from arts. 10, 1 and 2 paragraph, and 113 of the Constitution, because it denies protection to the stateless foreigner by the State in which he permanently resides even though the same is foreseen and imposed upon the States that have adhered to the aforementioned New York Convention of 1954, and impedes the protection of subjective rights before the organs of ordinary jurisdiction, sanctioned instead by the constitutional charter. The preclusion is furthermore in contrast with art. 9 c.p.c., for which the ordinary Tribunal is competent “exclusively” for cases “relating to the status and capacity of persons”, and with art. 2 of the law of 20 March 1865 n. 2248 annex E, which to the same ordinary judge reserves the matters in which there is a question of a political civil right, the protection of which is always allowed before the aforementioned judge pursuant to art. 113 of the Constitution. ….».

2.4. The subject matter of the dispute, therefore, does not concern the abstract possibility of proposing the action for the ascertainment of Italian citizenship, which – regardless of the existence or not of an

administrative measure adopted on the relative application – was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, concerning rather the interest to act to obtain such ascertainment.

2.5. Like any judicial action, the action for the ascertainment of the status of Italian citizen must also be supported by the interest to act pursuant to art. 100 c.p.c. («To propose a claim or to contradict it, it is necessary to have an interest in it»).

2.6. This Court is consolidated in holding, contrary to what was stated by the Court of Appeal, that the interest to act constitutes a condition of the action and must be identified in an objective situation, deriving from a harmful fact, in a broad sense, of the right. It follows that such interest must necessarily have a current character, since only in this case does it transcend the level of a mere subjective proposal, rising to legal and objective consistency, and is instead excluded when the judgment is instrumental to the solution only in a general or academic way of a question of law in view of future or merely hypothetical situations (Cass., Sec. 2, Ordinance n. 12532 of 08/05/2024).

In numerous pronouncements, it has been effectively stated that the interest to act must be not only current, but also concrete, consisting in the need to obtain a useful result that is legally appreciable and not achievable without the intervention of the judge (among many, see Cass., Sec. 1, Judgment n. 7786 of 29/03/2007).

Also with specific reference to the action of ascertainment, the legitimacy jurisprudence has specified that whoever acts by bringing an action of ascertainment must be the holder of an interest, current and concrete, to obtain a useful, legally relevant result that is not achievable if not with the judge’s intervention, which, in these cases, is substantiated in the need to remove an objective state of uncertainty regarding the existence of the right deduced in court.

The need for declaratory jurisdictional protection is characterized by the fact that it arises when the certainty of the right has been compromised by the conduct of others, that is by the previous occurrence of an impediment, of a contestation or of a boast opposed to the holder of the right, capable of causing the prejudicial state of uncertainty that the proposition of the action aims to neutralize, since, in light of the general instrumentality of the trial with respect to the substantive right, the purpose of the action of ascertainment is the restoration of legal certainty on a right in a positive or even negative key, in the event that the negative action of ascertainment is undertaken (Cass. Sec. 3, Ordinance n. 9061 of 06/04/2025).

As repeatedly specified by this Court, in fact, the interest to act in an action of mere ascertainment does not imply necessarily the timeliness of the violation of a right, being sufficient an objective state of uncertainty, even not pre-existing to the trial, inasmuch as it arose in the course of the proceedings following the contestation regarding the existence of a legal relationship or the exact scope of the rights and obligations arising from it, capable of being overcome precisely with the judge’s intervention (Cass., Sec. L, Judgment n. 16262 of 31/07/2015; see also Cass., Sec. 1, Ordinance n. 29479 of 10/10/2022; Cass., Sec. 2, Judgment n. 17026 of 26/07/2006).

Being a condition of the action, the interest to act must, however, be ascertained at the time of the decision of the case, and not at the time of the proposition of the application, potentially even arising during the course of the proceedings, as an expression of the need for jurisdictional protection (cfr. Sec. 1, Judgment n. 8584 of 16/03/2022; see also Cass., Sec. 6-2, Ordinance n. 32792 of 09/11/2021; Cass., Sec. 1, Judgment n. 29252 of 12/11/2019; Cass., Sec. 2, Judgment n. 17029 of 11/08/2016; Cass., Sec. 2, Judgment n. 14649 of 11/06/2013), so that, if following the proposition of the action, the defendant party contests the right subject to the requested ascertainment,

the interest to act cannot be excluded (see Cass., Sec. L, Judgment n. 16262 of 31/07/2015).

2.7. As highlighted above, the right to citizenship is an absolute subjective right of high constitutional rank, which arises together with the holder and has a permanent character (besides being imprescriptible), so that the lack of recognition, or even just the delay in the recognition of such right by the Administration appointed for this purpose, is substantiated in a prejudice for the holder who, despite being an Italian citizen, cannot enjoy such status and the rights and prerogatives connected in relations with others and with the legal system itself.

To the lack of recognition or the delay in the recognition of such right must be equated the existence of obstacles to the presentation of the relevant application interposed by the same Administration, which poses itself as a reason of prejudice upstream with respect to the hypotheses in which the Administration rejects the request or does not provide within the expected times for the definition of the procedure initiated with the application.

In the present case, the appellants deduced that the Administration had made it impossible even to schedule an appointment to present the application for recognition, producing documentation coming from the Administration certifying what was deduced (doc. 14 of the first instance party file), so that the Court should have evaluated this circumstance, decisive for the judgment, while instead it deemed that there was no demonstration of the presentation of a valid request to the Administration.

3. The upholding of the first ground of appeal entails the cassation with referral of the appealed judgment and makes superfluous the examination of the other grounds of complaint, to be considered therefore absorbed.

4. In conclusion, the first ground of appeal must be upheld within the limits stated in the motivation and, the others being absorbed, the judgment appealed must be quashed with referral to the Court of Appeal of

Genoa, called to rule also on the costs of the present proceedings.

The Judge of the referral shall apply the following principle of law:

«In the matter of an action for the ascertainment of the status of Italian citizen, the interest to act exists not only in the event of a denial or of a delay in the recognition of such status, but also in the hypothesis in which impediments, difficulties or delays occur that do not even allow the presentation of the relevant request to the Administration appointed for this purpose, since such situation generates uncertainty on the status and on the connected rights and prerogatives of the holder.»

5. In case of dissemination, the personal details of the parties and of the subjects mentioned in the decision must be omitted, pursuant to art. 52 legislative decree n. 196 of 2003.

P.Q.M.

The Court upholds the first ground of appeal within the limits stated in the motivation and, the others being absorbed, quashes the appealed judgment with referral to the Court of Appeal of Genoa, called to rule also on the costs of the present proceedings; orders that, in case of dissemination of this ordinance, the personal details of the parties and of the mentioned subjects be omitted, pursuant to art. 52 legislative decree n. 196 of 2003.

Thus decided in Rome, in the council chamber of the First Civil Section of the Supreme Court of Cassation, on March 4, 2026.

The President Maria Acierno

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A Positive Signal from the Supreme Court: Ordinance No. 13818/2026

The Ruling in Plain Terms

Why This Matters

A Principled Affirmation